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FOREWORD
The risk of nuclear proliferation increased dramatically with the collapse of the Soviet
Union and the end of the cold war.  The long standing strategy of denying would-be
proliferants access to nuclear materials was put at grave risk when the Soviet system
disintegrated and Russia's nuclear security infrastructure was undercut.  As the threat of
deliberate superpower nuclear exchanges became a thing of the past, the danger that small
states or terrorist groups might exploit the lack of effective nuclear safeguards over
material and personnel in the former Soviet Union to acquire nuclear weapons became a
menacing reality.
The United States government, while finally recognizing the scope of the overall risks
posed by the current situation, was slow to understand the large-scale and long-term effort
that would be needed to address these complex and serious threats.  Few have worked as
tirelessly or doggedly as Matthew Bunn in assessing these threats and in helping
governments develop realistic and practical steps to deal with them.  From the security of
nuclear weapons and materials, to ending the production of weapons-usable materials, to
disposing of excess plutonium and highly enriched uranium, to helping to develop plans
for the commercial employment of Russian nuclear scientists, Matthew Bunn has
enriched the understanding of these issues and contributed materially to their solution.  In
calling attention to the still urgent need to do more, he is again providing a valuable
service.
The Carnegie Endowment's Non-Proliferation Project and Harvard's Belfer Center for
Science and International Affairs are pleased to join in producing this valuable
assessment of how far US-Russian cooperative efforts to address nuclear security have
progressed and how far we have yet to go.  Both programs are dedicated to improving the
public's understanding of these issues, and to producing constructive and practical
research to help policy makers address the national security threat now facing the United
States as a result of nuclear insecurity in the former Soviet Union.
Jessica Mathews
President
Carnegie Endowment For International Peace
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Nothing could be more central to U.S. and world security than ensuring that
nuclear warheads and their essential ingredients—plutonium and highly enriched uranium
(HEU)—do not fall into the hands of terrorists or proliferating states.  If plutonium and
HEU become regularly available on a nuclear black market, nothing else we do to prevent
the proliferation of nuclear weapons will succeed.  Similarly, unless stockpiles of nuclear
warheads and fissile materials can be secured, monitored, and verifiably reduced, it will
be impossible to achieve deep, transparent, and irreversible reductions in nuclear arms.
Measures to control warheads and fissile materials, therefore, are central to the entire
global effort to reduce nuclear arms and stem their spread.  The tens of thousands of
nuclear weapons and hundreds of metric tonnes of plutonium and HEU that remain in the
U.S. and Russian nuclear stockpiles represent a deadly legacy of the Cold War, and
managing them securely must be a top U.S. security policy priority.
Urgent Security Threats
Today, there remains a clear and present danger that insecure nuclear materials
could be stolen and fall into hostile hands.  This danger is particularly acute in the former
Soviet Union, where a security system designed for a single state with a closed society,
closed borders, and well-paid, well-cared-for nuclear workers has been splintered among
multiple states with open societies, open borders, desperate, underpaid nuclear workers,
and rampant theft and corruption—a situation the system was never designed to address.
As a result, there have been multiple confirmed cases of theft of real weapons-usable
nuclear materials.  As recently as 1998, a group of conspirators at a major Russian
nuclear weapons facility attempted to steal enough material for a nuclear bomb at a single
stroke. While there is no evidence that enough material for a bomb has yet fallen into the
hands of states such as Iran, Iraq, or North Korea, such a proliferation disaster could
occur at any moment. At the same time, virtually none of the measures that would be
required to verifiably reduce stockpiles of nuclear warheads and materials to low, agreed
levels are in place—and those measures will have to be developed by the states with the
largest stockpiles, the United States and Russia.
Current Programs to Address the Threats
Since the demise of the Soviet Union, the United States has undertaken dozens of
programs costing hundreds of millions of dollars a year to cooperate with the former
Soviet states to address these threats.  Other nations have also contributed, on a far more
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limited scale. If judged against the almost total lack of nuclear security cooperation as
recently as early 1994, the progress of these efforts is nothing short of dramatic.
Thousands of nuclear weapons have been dismantled, tens of tonnes of nuclear material
has been equipped with modern security and accounting equipment, and tens of tonnes
more—enough for thousands of nuclear weapons—has been blended into forms that can
never again be used in weapons.  The many people who have worked incredibly hard
under difficult conditions to move these efforts forward have made remarkable
contributions to U.S. and world security.  These programs—representing less than one
quarter of one percent of the defense budget—are among the most cost-effective
investments in U.S. security found anywhere in the U.S. budget, and deserve strong
support.
But if judged against the scale and urgency of the threat, or the opportunities
available to address it, current efforts still fall woefully short.  After some six years of
effort, less than one-sixth of the Russian plutonium and HEU is in facilities fully
equipped with modern security and accounting systems.  Russia’s nuclear weapons
complex remains dangerously oversized and underfunded.  Seven years after the initial
agreement to purchase blended HEU from dismantled Russian warheads, less than one-
tenth of the HEU in Russia (and still less of the U.S. HEU stockpile) has been blended to
forms that can never again be used in weapons.
This pace of progress simply does not match the scope and urgency of the threat—
or the opportunities available to address it.  There are many factors that constrain the pace
at which these urgent security threats can be reduced.  But the time has come to provide
the resources needed to ensure that lack of funding and leadership from the U.S. side are
no longer among the key constraints. The Clinton Administration has announced that its
policy for national missile defense is to ensure that the program is “limited only by what
is technologically practical, not by money”: the same approach should be taken for the far
less costly task of controlling proliferation at its source.
Unfortunately, though announced with great fanfare as a two-thirds increase in
funding for programs to “safeguard nuclear materials and technology,” President
Clinton’s Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative keeps funding for most of these programs
essentially flat, and included no new initiatives to jump-start the effort to reduce the
security hazards posed by these deadly Cold War nuclear stockpiles. By contrast, in its
budget proposal for fiscal year 2001, the Administration has proposed a $100 million
package that finally calls for real increases for programs to reduce the urgent security
threats posed by weapons-usable nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union, including
new initiatives to accomplish that objective.  That initiative deserves strong support—but
it is still only a fraction of what would be required to address these security threats as
rapidly and effectively as possible.
The “Next Wave”: a Comprehensive New Nuclear Security Plan
This report outlines a comprehensive strategy for faster and more effective
programs to secure, monitor, and reduce these dangerous nuclear stockpiles in the former
Soviet Union and the United States, including dozens of specific proposals.  The basic
principle of this strategy is to provide the resources necessary to reduce the security
hazards posed by these dangerous stockpiles as rapidly as technology and cooperation
                                                                         Executive Summary vii
with the former Soviet states will allow, giving this effort priority commensurate with the
threat to U.S. security.
The strategy can be summarized as a six-point plan requiring the expenditure of
$1-$1.5 billion a year for each of the next five years—roughly a doubling or tripling of
currently planned funding for programs related to safeguarding warheads and fissile
material.  The six key elements of the plan are listed in the table below, and then fleshed
out in somewhat more detail.
Two fundamental points about these programs need to be made from the outset.
First, these efforts can only succeed as genuine partnerships with the former Soviet states,
serving their interests as they serve U.S. interests, and with former Soviet experts playing
leading roles in their design and implementation.  Second, these programs are not about
providing large checks to go into bank accounts of dubious ownership, in the hope that
some good will result: they are about paying for specific, demonstrable goods and
services—warheads dismantled, security systems installed, bomb uranium blended down.
As such, they are not charity, but investments in the security of the United States, and of
the international community as a whole.
An Agenda for Action: Summary of Key Proposals
Proposal Approximate Cost Over Five Years (est.)
Expand nuclear material security and
accounting program to a level not
constrained by funding
$1.3 billion
Pay costs and financial incentives to blend
all excess HEU to LEU within a few years $1 billion
Finance disposition of excess Russian
plutonium $2 billion
Help shrink Russian nuclear weapons
complex, and re-employ excess scientists
and technicians
$0.5 billion
Offer to finance transparent dismantlement
of thousands of warheads, with reciprocity $0.5 billion
Expand available revenue for nuclear
security through spent fuel storage, HEU
purchases, debt swaps, and/or lifting
restraints on legitimate exports
$0-$2 billion
Total: $5-$8 billion
A NUCLEAR MATERIAL SECURITY AND ACCOUNTING PROGRAM NOT CONSTRAINED BY FUNDING.  The
programs intended to ensure that all nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear
material are secure and accounted for should be drastically expanded and accelerated,
providing the resources to accomplish that job as fast as it can be done.  Lack of funding
should not be allowed to be among the major constraints on progress.
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An expanded and accelerated program to improve security and accounting for
nuclear material should focus on accomplishing three key objectives as rapidly as
possible: (a) consolidating material in the smallest practicable number of buildings and
sites; (b) providing both facility-level and national-level security and accounting system
improvements as quickly as practicable; and (c) helping to put in place the resources,
incentives, and organizations needed to sustain effective security over time (including
ensuring that security and accounting upgrades are actually used and maintained). The
latter goal involves changing ways of thinking and patterns of organizational behavior,
which is a challenge that involves much more than money—but the plan outlined in this
report includes a wide range of specific steps to help achieve those objectives. As part of
the consolidation effort, there are particularly promising opportunities to address the
proliferation threats posed by the smallest, most desperate facilities by simply buying the
HEU from those facilities for shipment elsewhere, while providing assistance to convert
those facilities to other types of research.
A funding level of $250 million per year for perhaps five years represents a
minimum level for such a funding-unconstrained program; further creative thinking may
identify opportunities that would require still larger levels of funding. To protect the U.S.
investment, the program should be continued at a modest level—perhaps $50 million per
year—for a considerable period after the initial upgrades are accomplished, to ensure that
security and accounting systems are sustained and improved, and to maintain cooperation
and communication concerning the state of nuclear security.
PAYING FOR RAPID BLEND-DOWN OF EXCESS RUSSIAN HEU.  The Russian facilities that are
blending HEU from dismantled Russian weapons to forms that can never again be used in
weapons, for sale to the United States as commercial reactor fuel, would need only a few
additional machines—costing only about $1 million—to double the current 30-tonnes-
per-year pace of blending.  That would mean destroying enough material for thousands of
additional bombs each year.  (The current pace was determined by what the commercial
market would bear, not by what the national security demanded.)  No one yet knows how
much blending capacity could be provided for investments of $10 million, $50 million, or
$100 million.  The United States should aggressively pursue a new initiative to pay the
costs of blending all of Russia’s excess HEU—including stocks above and beyond the
500 tonnes Russia has declared excess already—to non-weapons-usable forms within a
few years, and provide substantial financial incentives to Russia to undertake such a rapid
blending effort.  The blended material would continue to be released on the market at a
pace consistent with commitments made to uranium industry firms as part of the existing
HEU purchase agreement.  The total cost is uncertain, as no one yet knows how large a
financial package would be needed to gain Russian agreement, but might be in the range
of $1 billion over several years.  That would be a small price to pay for permanently
eliminating the security hazards posed by Russia’s massive excess stockpiles of HEU.
Some of the funding could be in the form of prepayments against future deliveries of the
blended material, allowing a portion of the funds to be recouped when the material is
delivered for commercial sale.
FINANCING DISPOSITION OF RUSSIAN EXCESS PLUTONIUM.  Reducing excess plutonium
stockpiles as rapidly as practicable is also a high priority.  Russia does not have the
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money to accomplish this objective.  Paying the $1-$3 billion needed to finance the
transformation of Russia’s weapons plutonium into forms that are no longer suitable for
use in nuclear weapons—effectively eliminating the material for many thousands of
nuclear weapons—would be a highly cost-effective investment in U.S. national security.
If a plan can be worked out that would make it possible to carry out disposition of this
excess plutonium stockpile on a reasonable timetable, it would make sense to fund this
investment, over a period of perhaps 5 years.  The first priority should be to ensure that
all the excess plutonium is secure, placed under monitoring, and converted to unclassified
forms as rapidly as practicable, pending longer-term disposition. (The needed steps on
disposition of excess plutonium are described in more detail on pp. 67−73.)
HELPING TO SHRINK THE RUSSIAN NUCLEAR COMPLEX.  Russia and the United States share
crucial national security interests in shrinking Russia’s oversized and underfunded
nuclear weapons complex to a sustainable size appropriate to its post-Cold War missions,
and reemploying the thousands of scientists and technicians who are no longer needed for
nuclear weapons work.  From Russia’s perspective, a smaller complex would be cheaper
to maintain, mitigate the social instability and proliferation risks posed by the desperate
funding situation that now permeates the complex, and harness the talents of those no
longer needed for weapons work to crucial civilian tasks.  From the U.S. perspective, a
smaller complex would have a greatly reduced ability to produce thousands of nuclear
weapons to be targeted on the United States, and providing sustainable employment for
the excess scientists and technicians would greatly reduce the incentives for theft of
nuclear material or sale of nuclear knowledge posed by the financial desperation that
currently permeates the complex.  A comprehensive approach to this problem would
include, at a minimum: (a) assistance for closing or converting facilities for the
production of nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons components, and materials for nuclear
weapons; (b) a broad range of measures to support private-sector employment growth
(ranging from business development centers to tax incentives for employment of excess
nuclear weapons workers), including both establishment of new businesses in these cities
and employment of nuclear city experts as “knowledge workers” working for outside
businesses over the internet; (c) support for employment of nuclear city experts on
nonproliferation and arms control analysis and technology development (providing
employment well-matched to their nuclear skills while serving other U.S. arms control
and proliferation interests as well); and (d) support for employment of nuclear city
experts on tasks related to nuclear cleanup, energy, and the environment.  The third and
fourth of these areas could be supported in a “win-win” approach by contracting a
fraction of the hundreds of millions of dollars the Department of Energy spends each year
on R&D in these areas to experts from the nuclear cities—getting the Department’s work
done for less while providing interesting and relevant R&D employment to excess experts
in the nuclear cities.
ASSISTANCE FOR TRANSPARENT DISMANTLEMENT OF THOUSANDS OF WARHEADS.  Increased
transparency in the management of nuclear warhead and fissile material stockpiles (while
maintaining protection for legitimate nuclear secrets) will be fundamental to achieving
deep reductions in nuclear arms, as well as cooperation to secure nuclear stockpiles—and
hence to reducing the nuclear threat to the United States.  Unfortunately, Russian secrecy
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concerns have largely blocked transparency progress in recent years, and increased
concern over protecting nuclear secrets in the United States in the wake of the Chinese
espionage scandal is likely to make increased transparency a hard sell in the United States
as well.  To date, the United States has not offered Russia any significant incentives—
strategic, financial, or otherwise—to agree to accept wide-ranging transparency for
warhead and fissile material stockpiles.
To jump-start the stalled process of formal negotiations over warhead limitations
and transparency, President Clinton should propose a new initiative, modeled on the
successful informal reciprocal-unilateral initiatives launched by President Bush and
Soviet President Gorbachev in 1991, which resulted in the pull-back and dismantlement
of many thousands of nuclear weapons.  For example, President Clinton could offer to
place a large fraction of the U.S. strategic reserve and tactical nuclear warheads
(stockpiles unregulated by arms control to date, and which will represent the vast majority
of the total U.S. warhead stockpile under START II) in secure storage open to Russian
monitoring, and commit them to verifiable dismantlement (with specific procedures to be
worked out later), if Russia would do the same with its comparable warhead stockpiles.
This could address Russian concerns about the U.S. maintenance of a large stockpile of
reserve strategic warheads that could be rapidly returned to missiles, and U.S. concerns
about the huge Russian tactical warhead stockpile.  Within a few months, the majority of
all the warheads in both sides’ nuclear arsenals could be under reciprocal monitoring, and
committed to dismantlement.  Indeed, technology exists that would make it possible to
permanently and verifiably disable these warheads, pending their eventual dismantlement,
rather than only subjecting them to monitoring.
As part of this package, the United States should offer to provide financial
assistance for warhead dismantlement in return for Russian agreement to a transparency
package that would also be implemented reciprocally at the Pantex dismantlement facility
in the United States.  The transparency measures would have to be designed jointly by
U.S. and Russian experts, to give both sides confidence that they could confirm
dismantlement was taking place without revealing sensitive information. Preliminary
U.S.-Russian lab-to-lab work in designing such measures is already under way.  The total
cost of such an effort, including the financial assistance for warhead dismantlement,
might be in the range of half a billion dollars over several years.
EXPANDING AVAILABLE REVENUE FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY.  The cost of many of the
nonproliferation and arms reduction tasks that are urgently needed is substantial, and the
former Soviet states are facing desperate budget problems.  At the same time, there is
increasing “donor fatigue” among the states providing assistance, and there is a wide
range of critical steps that are difficult or impossible for foreign governments to fund—
such as paying the salaries of nuclear guards.  Hence, finding new sources of revenue for
nuclear security is critically important.  Promising concepts include commercial spent
fuel storage in Russia, with a substantial portion of the revenues going to nuclear security
and cleanup; additional purchases of HEU, premised on a portion of the proceeds being
directed to nuclear security efforts; a “debt-for-security” swap, in which a portion of
Russia’s foreign debt would be canceled in return for Russia paying smaller amounts into
an auditable fund to finance nuclear security; and modifications to the stringent trade
restraints limiting Russia’s access to markets for civilian nuclear exports, premised on
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Russian agreement to devote an agreed portion of the proceeds of expanded exports to
nuclear security.  Such initiatives could provide billions of dollars in much-needed
revenue to address the security hazards posed by the dangerous Cold War legacy of
nuclear warheads and materials.
The Need for Leadership
Unfortunately, there is no single “silver bullet” that will address the myriad risks
to international security posed by the gigantic nuclear stockpiles and complex of the
former Soviet Union.  A broad “next wave” of new measures to reduce these risks is
needed, representing roughly a doubling or tripling of current funding for programs
devoted to reducing these security threats.  Such an expanded effort can only succeed in
close cooperation with the states of the former Soviet Union, who will have to play a
central role in its design from the very outset.  While important progress is already being
made in nuclear security cooperation with these states, at the current pace there can be no
confidence that a proliferation catastrophe will be averted, or the foundation laid for
transparent and irreversible nuclear arms reductions.
To reinvigorate these efforts with new initiatives, to make them work as a
package, to coordinate, prioritize, and integrate them into a strategic plan, and to
negotiate them with Russia and the other former Soviet states, will require a dramatic
increase in sustained leadership from the highest levels of the U.S. government.  Too
often in recent years, President Clinton has said a few words about the high priority of
these issues, and then has failed to follow through with the sustained commitments of
money, personnel, and political attention needed to get the job done.  President Clinton,
Vice President Gore, and their White House staff have allowed myriad other events to
distract attention from the fundamentally important task of ensuring that the essential
ingredients of nuclear weapons do not fall into the wrong hands.
There is still time to correct this situation—and if President Clinton fails to do so,
the next President must act.  In addition to a sea change in sustained Presidential
leadership on these issues, two fundamental steps are necessary: the appointment of a
senior official with direct access to the President, with full-time responsibility to carry out
these efforts, and the development of a strategic plan setting priorities, targets, and
timetables, and identifying the key synergies among the many efforts being pursued.  The
current organizational structure of the government, with programs scattered through many
departments and no one in charge of coordinating and leading them on a full-time basis,
is simply not suited to the task of managing this broad range of crucial nonproliferation
and arms reduction efforts.  A senior, full-time point person for these efforts is needed,
with direct access to the President and appropriate staff and resources—on the model of
former Secretary of Defense William Perry’s return to government to reshape the U.S.
approach to the North Korean nuclear and missile threat, or even on the model of Gen.
Barry McCaffrey’s White House office leading U.S. anti-drug efforts.  Preventing nuclear
material from falling into the hands of states like North Korea or Iraq is certainly no less
critical to U.S. security than drugs or the North Korean nuclear program itself.
There is much to be done to address the security risks posed by the deadly Cold
War legacies of plutonium and highly enriched uranium.  The cost of taking action now
to address this threat is tiny by comparison to the cost and risk of failing to act and
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finding that the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons find their way into the hands of
terrorists or proliferant states.  The time for action is now.  Indeed, we cannot afford to
wait.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nothing could be more central to U.S. and world security than ensuring that
nuclear warheads and their essential ingredients—plutonium and highly enriched uranium
(HEU)1—do not fall into the hands of terrorists or proliferating states.  If plutonium and
HEU become widely available on a nuclear black market, nothing else we do to prevent
the proliferation of nuclear weapons will succeed.  Similarly, unless stockpiles of nuclear
warheads and fissile materials can be secured, monitored, and verifiably reduced, it will
be impossible to achieve deep, transparent, and irreversible reductions in nuclear arms.
Measures to control warheads and fissile materials, therefore, are central to the global
effort to reduce nuclear arms and stem their spread.2
                                                
1 All nuclear explosives require some form of fissionable material capable of supporting an explosive chain
reaction.  As far as is known, the material used in all the weapons in existence today is plutonium, HEU, or
some combination of the two.  Some “alternative nuclear materials,” however, such as certain isotopes of
neptunium and americium (among others) could also be used as the basis for nuclear explosives.
2 For a discussion of the technical background of this issue, and a detailed review of the status of programs
to address it as of mid-1997, see Matthew Bunn and John Holdren, “Managing Military Uranium and
Plutonium in the United States and the Former Soviet Union,” Annual Review of Energy and the
Environment, 1997, Volume 22, pp. 403-486 (available at http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/BCSIA
/Library.nsf/atom).  For previous attempts at comprehensive sets of recommendations on fissile material
control, see, for example, Sam Nunn (chair), Managing the Global Nuclear Materials Threat – Policy
Recommendations, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, January, 2000 (drafted
in part by the present author); John P. Holdren and Matthew Bunn, “Reducing the Risk of Nuclear Theft,”
in Joseph Rotblat, ed., Nuclear Weapons: The Road to Zero, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998 (available
at http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/BCSIA/Library.nsf/atom); Graham T. Allison, Owen R. Coté, Jr., Richard
A. Falkenrath, and Steven E. Miller, Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: Containing the Threat of Loose Russian
Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, CSIA Studies in International
Security, 1996; and David Albright and Kevin O’Neill, eds., The Challenges of Fissile Material Control,
Washington DC: Institute for Science and International Security, March 1999.  For recent sets of
recommendations focused on specific areas, see National Research Council, Committee on Upgrading
Russian Capabilities to Secure Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium, Protecting Nuclear Material In
Russia, Washington DC: National Academy Press, 1999; Congressional Budget Office, Cooperative
Approaches to Halt Russian Nuclear Proliferation and Improve the Openness of Nuclear Disarmament,
Washington DC: Congressional Budget Office, May 1999; and the papers evaluating cooperative threat
reduction programs prepared by teams from the Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the Monterey
Institute of International Studies, forthcoming in Nonproliferation Review.  While the programs and
recommendations outlined in this report cover a broad range of activities, they are focused specifically on
security issues relating to management of nuclear warheads and nuclear material, not on the broader agenda
of nonproliferation, arms control, and cooperative threat reduction in which the United States is engaged
with the states of the former Soviet Union, or on environmental issues.  Thus, issues ranging from export
controls to START II, from de-alerting to biological disarmament, are not addressed here.
2    The Next Wave
This suitcase carried plutonium seized from a flight
from Moscow to Munich in 1994, as a result of a
German sting operation.  There have been multiple
documented cases of theft of kilogram quantities of
weapons-usable plutonium and highly-enriched
uranium from former Soviet facilities in the 1990s, and
urgent new steps are needed to prevent these deadly
materials—the essential ingredients of nuclear
weapons—from falling into the hands of terrorist
groups or proliferating states.  Source: AP
Today, however, there is a clear
and present danger that insecure nuclear
materials could be stolen and smuggled to
potential proliferators.  This is a global
problem requiring global cooperation.
But a significant part of the problem is in
the former Soviet Union, where controls
have been dramatically weakened by
ongoing economic and political
upheavals.  At the same time, virtually
none of the measures that would be
required to verifiably reduce stockpiles of
nuclear warheads and materials to low,
agreed levels are now in place—and those
measures will have to be developed by
the states with the largest stockpiles, the
United States and Russia.
Since the demise of the Soviet
Union, the United States has undertaken
dozens of programs costing hundreds of
millions of dollars a year to cooperate
with the former Soviet states to address
the security threats by the vast stockpiles of warheads and fissile material left over from
decades of Cold War.  Other nations have also contributed, on a far more limited scale.  If
judged against the almost total lack of nuclear security cooperation as recently as early
1994, the progress of these efforts is nothing short of dramatic.  The many people who
have worked incredibly hard under difficult conditions to move these efforts forward have
made remarkable contributions to U.S. and world security.
But if judged against the scale and urgency of the threat, or the opportunities
available to address it, current efforts still fall woefully short.  A “next wave” of targeted
cooperative efforts to improve the management of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable
nuclear materials is urgently needed, to rapidly reduce the risks of proliferation and
provide a firm basis for deep reductions in nuclear arms.  The Clinton Administration has
announced that its policy for national missile defense is to ensure that the program is
“limited only by what is technologically practical, not by money”: the same approach
should be taken for the far less costly task of controlling proliferation at its source.3
Unfortunately, the Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative (ETRI) announced in early 1999
fell far short of this goal, doing little more than maintaining flat funding for existing
programs related to these critical proliferation threats (see “The Expanded Threat
Reduction Initiative,” p. 62).  While a useful step, ETRI would leave most of what is
required for such a “next wave” of fissile material security programs still undone.  The
                                                
3 “National Missile Defense Policy,” remarks of Undersecretary of Defense Walter Slocombe, Washington
DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 5, 1999.  In this case, progress will be limited
not only by what is technologically practical but also by what the degree of cooperation achieved with the
states of the former Soviet Union will permit.
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$100 million new “long-term nonproliferation program for Russia” proposed by the
Clinton Administration in early 2000, while an extremely valuable step, is still a fraction
of the level of effort that would be required to reduce these security hazards and quickly
and effectively as possible (see “DOE’s Proposed Long-Term Nonproliferation Initiative
for Russia,” p. 70).
Is dramatic new progress in U.S.-Russian nuclear security cooperation possible?
Experience suggests that the answer is “yes”.  In the fall of 1998, in the last hours of
negotiations over the federal budget, Senator Pete Domenici (R-NM), chairman of the
Senate Budget Committee, suddenly inserted over half a billion dollars to save the U.S.
purchase of 500 metric tonnes of HEU from dismantled Russian weapons, and to provide
the basis for progress in negotiations over disposition of excess plutonium (both
described in more detail below).  After intensive further negotiations on both fronts,
Domenici’s initiative led directly to U.S.-Russian agreements that restarted Russian
blending of HEU from dismantled weapons and started the process of eliminating tens of
tonnes of excess weapons plutonium, neither of which would have been possible without
Domenici’s intervention.  After years of interagency and executive-legislative wrangling
over a few tens of millions of dollars for this program or that, Domenici’s initiative
served as compelling proof that energetic leadership and a commitment to provide
requisite funding can break through logjams and open new possibilities.
Without doubt, there are enormous obstacles to a major expansion of U.S.-
Russian nuclear security cooperation (see “Obstacles to Cooperation,” p. 4).  With
souring U.S.-Russian political and strategic relations, the window of opportunity for far-
reaching security cooperation between the United States and Russia is clearly not as open
as it was in the early 1990s, and no one knows how long the remaining opportunities will
last.
But even within the context of U.S.-Russian relations as they now stand, and in a
Presidential election year in both the United States and Russia, there is much that could
be done.  The recent ascension to power of a new and energetic Russian President,
apparently in firm control of the security agencies of the Russian government, gives cause
for optimism that new initiatives that President Putin saw as serving Russia’s security
interest could gain approval and be swiftly implemented on the Russian side.  Many of
the needed new initiatives can and should still be undertaken in the remainder of Bill
Clinton’s presidential term.  What is left undone at the end of that term will represent the
agenda for the next president, on one of the most critical national security issues the
United States now faces.
More than anything, what is needed now is a substantial and sustained increase in
high-level leadership from the White House.  A bipartisan panel chaired by former
Senator Sam Nunn recently called for a “sea change in the level of sustained leadership
from the highest levels of the U.S. government—including the President and the Vice
President,” arguing that “it is simply unacceptable to continue a situation in which lack of
sufficient funding and senior leadership attention on the U.S. side are among the major
factors preventing faster and more effective actions to reduce these serious security
threats.”4  As Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE) has recently written, “The war against these
                                                
4  Managing the Global Nuclear Materials Threat – Policy Recommendations, op. cit.
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Obstacles to Nuclear Security Cooperation
There are enormous obstacles to genuine cooperation in sensitive nuclear security areas between
former adversaries like the United States and Russia.  The souring of U.S.-Russian political relations
during 1998 and 1999, accelerated by NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia, has made cooperation even more
difficult, and the hurdles to be overcome if major new steps are to succeed even higher.  The politics of
Presidential elections in both countries, Russia’s increased reliance on nuclear weapons, and the
sharpening dispute between the two sides over missile defenses and arms reductions further complicate
the picture.  The experience of the last several years makes clear that nuclear security cooperation can
succeed only if it is approached as a genuine partnership, with experts from both sides contributing their
work and ideas to solve common problems together—rather than as an effort by one side to impose
solutions on the other.
The most fundamental obstacle to cooperation is that the United States and Russia continue to
have many conflicting interests—though they have profound common interests in preventing the
proliferation of nuclear weapons and achieving permanent nuclear arms reductions.  Russia would like to
maintain a cutting-edge nuclear arsenal comparable to that of the United States, and the United States has
no interest in helping Russia do that.  Both countries’ intelligence services would like to find out as much
as possible about the other country’s nuclear secrets, and both countries are deeply suspicious of the
other’s intentions in that regard.  The United States has an interest in achieving specific nonproliferation
and arms reduction goals as quickly and cost-effectively as possible; Russia, while not opposed to that
objective, also has an interest in providing as much employment for excess nuclear workers as possible
for as long as possible.  Substantial segments of the political establishments in both countries—including
a large fraction of both countries’ legislatures—remain deeply suspicious of the other, and skeptical of
the whole idea of nuclear security cooperation (which creates a constant danger that problems will be
blown out of proportion and spin out of control).  Given these differences of interest, disagreements about
specific approaches to cooperation are inevitable, and need to be resolved patiently with good-faith
negotiation and discussion.
Secrecy and limited access to facilities is another serious obstacle faced by essentially all
cooperative nuclear security programs with Russia.  Enormous progress has been made in breaking down
barriers, particularly compared to the early 1990s, when Russia would not allow cooperation on security
upgrades at any site with separated plutonium or HEU, even civilian ones—whereas today, cooperation is
underway at almost every such site.  But enormous barriers still remain, and as political relations have
deteriorated, the Russian security services have become more active in restricting access.  At the same
time, the United States has frequently been reluctant to offer comparable access to its own facilities, and
this, too, has slowed progress.  The recent furor over Chinese spying and laboratory security in the United
States is only making this problem worse.
 Competing priorities, bureaucratic disorganization, frequent changes of government personnel,
‘loose nukes’ and ‘brain drain’ threats is as important as any war in our history… it is a
war that the United States dares not lose.”5
Structure of the report
Section II of this report describes the threats the international community now
faces that relate to management of nuclear material in the former Soviet Union, in five
key categories: (a) the inadequate security of nuclear materials; (b) the continued
existence of an oversized and underfunded nuclear complex; (c) the lack of international
                                                
5 “Maintaining the Proliferation Fight in the Former Soviet Union,” Arms Control Today, March 1999.
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and lack of sustained attention to these issues by the highest levels of government have been serious
problems on both sides.  It is difficult to do business with a Russian government facing a thousand priorities
it considers more urgent, whose prime minister changes every few months, whose ministries often do not
communicate, whose nuclear facilities increasingly may not abide by deals cut in Moscow, whose officials
often put their industry’s commercial interests ahead of nonproliferation interests, and whose senior
leadership takes only occasional interest in resolving issues related to these nuclear security cooperation
programs.  Russian experts have much the same complaints about dealing with the U.S. government.
Another major issue is the difficulty of ensuring that U.S. taxpayers’ dollars are being spent as they
should be—an issue with several parts.  First, there is the widespread corruption in Russia, which makes it
essential to structure assistance programs so that the funds cannot simply be raked off into foreign bank
accounts.  Second, Russia has a dysfunctional payments system, in which, for example, money deposited at
a particular bank for use by a joint project at a nearby institute may be seized by the bank to cover the
institute’s bad debts, or may be seized by tax police to cover the institute’s back taxes, or may be used by a
desperate institute director to pay salaries of other employees (in the hopes that it can be paid back if
institute’s promised government funding ever comes).  Third, there is the continuing problem of Russian
efforts to impose a variety of taxes, tariffs, and duties on U.S. assistance, in effect directing a portion of the
assistance away from the agreed projects and into the general coffers of the Russian government instead.
While the specific situation of each nuclear security program is unique, all of them have faced these
problems, and even when they have found successful solutions, the fact is that an enormous amount of time,
energy, creativity, and political capital is spent following the money trail rather than getting the cooperative
work done.
Cultural differences and poor negotiating tactics on both sides have, on occasion, also led to
obstacles and disputes, which in some cases have delayed progress by months or years.  What may appear
from a U.S. perspective to be the minimum necessary audit and examination approach to ensure U.S.-
financed equipment is used appropriately may appear from a Russian perspective as unwarranted intrusion
and possibly an intelligence mission.  A policy change seen on the U.S. side as tightening up lax spending
practices of the past may be seen on the Russian side as abrogating the spirit of partnership by ignoring
Russian suggestions for how funds should be spent.
Given this list of obstacles to cooperation—which is by no means comprehensive—success in
nuclear security cooperation is never guaranteed, and the obstacles to initiating major new efforts are
substantial.  The fundamental ingredients of success are: initiatives that genuinely serve the security
interests of both sides; sustained and energetic leadership; a genuine commitment to working in partnership;
a step-by-step approach designed to build trust as progress is made; patience, persistence, and creativity in
overcoming obstacles; and consistent follow-through on commitments.  With those ingredients, and with a
willingness to apply additional financial resources, there are opportunities for dramatic new progress to deal
with the nonproliferation and arms reduction challenges both countries face, and perhaps even contribute to
improving the overall political atmosphere between Russia and the United States.
transparency and monitoring of these stockpiles; (d) the continued production of
additional weapons-usable material; and (e) the lack of an agreed, financed, and
implementable plan for reducing the vast Cold War stockpiles of warheads, plutonium,
and highly-enriched uranium to levels appropriate to the post-Cold War world, in both the
United States and the former Soviet Union.
Section III then provides an overview of the current cooperative programs in place
to address each of these five categories of threat, including the progress these programs
have made so far, the work that remains to be done, and the plans and prospects for
further work in the near term.  For each of the five categories of threats to be addressed,
Section III provides an assessment (inherently judgmental) of the percent of the job that is
already accomplished or covered by budget plans and agreements now in place—both for
the relatively limited goals many of these programs originally set themselves, and for the
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larger goals that would have to be achieved to resolve the international security threats
posed by the remaining Cold War nuclear stockpiles.
Section IV then outlines a recommended comprehensive strategy to further reduce
the risks, in each of the five threat areas.  While that strategy involves dozens of
individual actions, the key elements can be summarized as a six-point plan requiring the
expenditure of $1-$1.5 billion a year over five years—roughly a doubling or tripling of
current spending on programs related to safeguarding nuclear warheads and materials.
This strategy is intended to achieve a set of ambitious strategic objectives, including
ensuring, within approximately five years, that (a) effective security and accounting
systems have been provided for all weapons-usable nuclear material in the former Soviet
Union, with a structure of resources, incentives, and organizations to ensure that security
is maintained over the long haul; (b) all U.S. and Russian excess HEU has been blended
to forms that can no longer be used in weapons, and large-scale disposition of excess
plutonium has begun; (c) the Russian nuclear weapons complex’s capacity to build many
thousands of new nuclear weapons has been substantially reduced, and thousands of the
scientists and technicians no longer needed for weapons work have been re-employed;
and (d) agreements have been reached to reduce U.S. and Russian total warhead and
fissile material stockpiles, with a broad system of transparency and monitoring to help
confirm those commitments and lay the basis for deep, transparent, and irreversible
nuclear arms reductions.
Finally, Section V offers some summary conclusions, focusing primarily on
approaches to the leadership, management, and strategic planning that will be required to
accomplish this ambitious agenda.
This report represents an American viewpoint.  But unlike many of the military
threats of the Cold War era, these are security threats that can only be addressed through
cooperation.  And the experience of nuclear security cooperation with Russia to date
makes clear that these programs will only succeed if they are carried out as true
partnerships, serving both Russian and American interests, with Russia playing a major
part in their design and implementation.  Russia is likely to remain a major nuclear
power, and require a substantial nuclear complex, for as long as the United States does so,
and is not likely to agree to cooperation that does not serve Russia’s national interests.
Moreover, while this report focuses on the situation in the former Soviet Union, the fact
is that there is much to be done in improving nuclear security and transparency in many
countries around the world—including in the United States.6  Even programs focused
                                                
6 For discussions of the need for more international cooperation and stronger international standards to
secure nuclear material worldwide, see Matthew Bunn, “Security for Weapons-Usable Nuclear Materials:
Expanding International Cooperation, Strengthening International Standards,” in Comparative Analysis of
Approaches to Protection of Fissile Materials: Proceedings of a Workshop at Stanford California, July 28-
30, 1997, Livermore, CA:  Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Document Conf.-9707121, May
1998; Matthew Bunn, “Ensuring Security for Weapons-Usable Nuclear Material Worldwide: Expanding
International Cooperation, Strengthening Global Standards,” in Proceedings of Global '99: Nuclear
Technology- Bridging the Millennia, Jackson Hole, Wyoming, 30 August - 2 September 1999, La Grange
Park, IL: American Nuclear Society, 1999  (both available at http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/BCSIA/Library.
nsf/atom), and George Bunn, “Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials: Strengthening Global Norms,”
IAEA Bulletin, 39/4/1997.  The first of these also provides some discussion of some of the problems that
have arisen in the United States’ system for security and control over nuclear materials.
Introduction 7
primarily on the former Soviet Union will generally work best as true partnerships,
involving a considerable degree of reciprocity, with similar measures implemented at
facilities in the United States as well.  A report like this one, therefore, offering only an
American perspective and focusing primarily on what needs to be done in the former
Soviet Union, can only be a starting point.
II. THE THREAT
Insecurity
Nuclear Materials
The possibility that nuclear weapons or their essential ingredients will be stolen
and made available on a nuclear black market poses an urgent threat to U.S. and
international security.  The facts are stark:1
• Limited access to plutonium and HEU is the primary technical barrier to the spread of
nuclear weapons.  Most countries, and even some terrorist groups, could build at least
a crude nuclear bomb, capable of obliterating the downtown area of a major city, if
they had these materials in hand.  The ability to buy these materials on a nuclear black
market could shorten a proliferating state’s bomb program from a decade to months—
or even less.  Hence, as a committee of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences
recommended in 1994, plutonium and HEU should be secured and accounted for
essentially as rigorously as nuclear weapons themselves are—the so-called “stored
weapons standard” of protection.2
• The amounts required are small.  Four kilograms of plutonium—an amount smaller
than a soda can—or about three times that amount of HEU is potentially enough for a
nuclear bomb.3  Unless proper security and accounting systems are in place, a worker
at a nuclear facility could simply put enough material for a bomb in a briefcase or
                                                
1 This summary of the basic facts of the problem is based largely on John P. Holdren, testimony as chairman
of the Panel on U.S.-FSU Cooperation to Protect, Control, and Account for Weapons-Usable Nuclear
Materials, President’s Committee of Advisers on Science and Technology, before a joint hearing of the
Subcommittee on Europe, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, August 23, 1995.  The author served as the
Executive Secretary of that panel, whose full report remains secret.
2 Committee on International Security and Arms Control, National Academy of Sciences, Management and
Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium, Washington DC: National Academy Press, 1994.  See also
George Bunn, “U.S. Standards for Protecting Weapons-Usable Fissile Material Compared to International
Standards,” Nonproliferation Review, Fall 1998, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 137−143.
3 These are the amounts required for a reasonably well-designed implosion bomb.  A simpler gun-type
weapon, which can be made with HEU but not with plutonium, requires considerably more material, in the
range of 50-70 kilograms.  For an interesting discussion, based on unclassified sources, arguing that with
good designs and high-speed explosives, nuclear weapons can be made with as little as one kilogram of
plutonium, see Thomas B. Cochran and Christopher E. Paine, The Amount of Plutonium and Highly-
Enriched Uranium Needed for Pure Fission Weapons, Washington DC: Natural Resources Defense
Council, August 22, 1994.
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under an overcoat and walk out.  Yet these materials exist in both the civilian and
military sectors around the world in amounts measured in the hundreds of tonnes—
enough for tens of thousands of nuclear weapons.
• There have already been multiple seizures, by authorities in Russia and elsewhere, of
kilogram quantities of stolen weapons-usable uranium, and one seizure of hundreds of
grams of weapons-usable plutonium (see details below).
That a large fraction of reports of nuclear smuggling have been scams, involving
materials with no relevance to nuclear weapons, should not distract attention from the
seriousness of the cases of theft of genuinely weapons-usable material that have occurred.
While there is no evidence that enough material for a bomb has yet fallen into the hands
of terrorist groups or states such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, or North Korea, we do not know
what we have not detected.  Such a proliferation disaster could occur at any time—and
there is strong evidence that both hostile states and terrorist groups are seeking to acquire
such material (see “The Demand for Black Market Fissile Material,” p. 14).
In short, the dangers of unpredictable nuclear proliferation posed by the threat of
nuclear theft are extremely grave.  If a state such as Iran or Libya were to suddenly
acquire the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons, the international community could
be faced with a devastating new threat with virtually no warning, and hence no
opportunity for diplomatic, economic, and military measures to head off the threat before
it arose.  The consequences to U.S. and world security would be severe, and the possible
defense responses would be both extremely expensive and of uncertain effectiveness.
SOVIET SECURITY, MODERN THREATS.  While the risk of nuclear theft is a global problem
requiring global solutions, a critical part of the problem lies within the former Soviet
Union—as evidenced by the geographic pattern of seizures to date, including those that
have been made within Russia.  The Soviet Union had a highly effective and intelligently
designed security system for its nuclear weapons and nuclear materials—but it was
designed for a world that no longer exists, and funding to maintain it has not been
available.  A security system designed for a single state with a closed society, closed
borders, and well-paid, well-cared-for nuclear workers has been splintered among
multiple states with open societies, open borders, desperate, underpaid nuclear workers,
and rampant theft and corruption—a situation the system was never designed to address.4
Even Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Evgeniy Adamov has acknowledged that “the
weakening of our ability to manage nuclear material has been immeasurable.”5
The former Soviet states are thought to possess roughly 1,350 tonnes of weapons-
usable nuclear material—plutonium and HEU—of which some 700 tonnes is in nuclear
weapons, and 650 tonnes is in a variety of other forms, ranging from metal weapons
                                                
4 For discussions, see, for example, Bunn and Holdren, “Managing Military Uranium and Plutonium,” op.
cit.; Oleg Bukharin, “Security of Fissile Materials In Russia,” Annual Review of  Energy and the Environment,
1996, Vol. 21, pp. 467−96; Frank von Hippel, “Fissile Material Security in the Post-Cold War World,” Physics
Today, June 1995; Allison et. al., Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy, op. cit; Oleg Bukharin and William Potter,
“Potatoes Were Guarded Better,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 1995,  pp. 46−50; Jessica Eve
Stern, “U.S. Assistance Programs for Improving MPC&A in the Former Soviet Union,” Nonproliferation
Review, 1996, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp.17−32; and “We Cannot Preclude the Possibility of Nuclear Materials Theft,”
(edited transcript of Duma hearing), Yaderny Kontrol Digest No. 5, Fall 1997.
5 Nick Wadhams, “Center to Track Russian Nuclear Material,” Associated Press, November 4, 1998.
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components to impure scrap.6  These
materials are stored in over 50 sites, at
which there are estimated to be nearly 400
buildings containing at least kilogram
quantities of plutonium or HEU.  All of
the nuclear weapons in the former Soviet
Union are in Russia, as is some 99% of
the weapons-usable material, but civilian
facilities in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Latvia,
Ukraine, and Uzbekistan also have
quantities large enough to pose
proliferation risks.  Serious security
problems and risks of theft exist
throughout this huge complex of
facilities.  Indeed, in 1996, the U.S.
Director of Central Intelligence testified
that weapons-usable nuclear materials
“are more accessible now than at any
other time in history—due primarily to
the dissolution of the former Soviet Union
and the region's worsening economic
conditions,” and that none of the facilities handling plutonium or HEU in the former
Soviet states had “adequate safeguards or security measures” in place.7  In the author’s
judgment, with a few exceptions, this remains an accurate assessment today, despite the
considerable progress that has been made in improving security and accounting systems
at many sites (described in Section III).
The Soviet security system was heavily based on “guards, guns, and gates” at
military facilities, and a system in which the manager of each area handling nuclear
material took “personal responsibility” for the material in that area.  The principal threat
the system was designed to address was Western spies.  “Insider” nuclear material thieves
were not considered to be a major problem, as rigorous personnel reliability programs—
careful screening of employees, high pay and status for employees, close KGB
surveillance of everyone, and draconian penalties for any detected transgression—were
expected to be effective.  Moreover, in a closed society in which all contacts with
foreigners were carefully monitored by the KGB, even if some one did steal nuclear
material, they would have had little prospect of being able to arrange a sale to an
interested buyer.8  Hence, a wide range of technologies used routinely in the West to
                                                
6 See MPC&A Program Strategic Plan, U.S. Department of Energy, January 1998, p. 2 (available at
http://www.dp.doe.gov/nn/mpca/frame03.htm).
7 John Deutch, “The Threat of Nuclear Diversion,” testimony before the U.S. Senate, Committee on
Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction. Part 2. 104th Congress, 2nd Session. S. Hrg. 104−422. March 20, 1996.
8 For a useful discussion of how the security system dealt with insider threats in Soviet times, and how
thinking and practice on this issue is evolving in Russia today, see Irina Koupriyanova, “Russian
Perspectives on Insider Threats,” in Proceedings of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, 40th
Annual Meeting, Phoenix, AZ, July 25-29, 1999.  Koupriyanova reports, inter alia, that a 1995 analysis of
This building at the Kurchatov Institute in Moscow,
shown before cooperative security upgrades began,
holds enough HEU for a nuclear bomb.  The barely
visible fence is almost entirely overgrown, and there
are no sensors or detectors to alert security forces to an
intrusion; nor was there any detector to detect
authorized workers removing nuclear material.
Source: DOE
12    The Next Wave
Clay and wax tamper-indicating seals such as the
one shown above, in wide use in facilities in the
former Soviet Union, can easily be broken and
replaced with an identical seal by any worker with
an appropriate stamp.  Source: DOE
address the insider threat was not used.  Few Soviet facilities were equipped with
detectors at the doors that would set off an alarm if some one attempted to smuggle out
plutonium or HEU (known as “portal monitors”).  Simple wax seals, the same technology
that Louis the XIV used to seal his letters, were used to indicate whether containers had
been opened or material tampered with, making it a simple task for those with the
necessary stamps to open containers, remove material, and reseal the containers with an
apparently identical seal.  What little there was in the way of alarms, security cameras and
the like within the buildings relied on open
wiring that could easily be cut.  While some
measurements of material on hand were
conducted, these measurements were
structured more to contribute to financial
accounting and production records than for
safeguards and security, and few facilities had
accurate and up-to-date measurements of their
nuclear material (an essential item if covert
thefts are to be detected).9
Moreover, purely civilian facilities
(where foreign spies were not a major
concern) often had little security even if they
were working with hundreds of kilograms of
weapons-usable material.  The author has
visited facilities, for example, where the only
security was provided by a single seated guard
behind a desk at the entrance, who did not
bother to check known workers entering and
leaving, and the material was secured in a
simple locker with a padlock that could have been snapped with a bolt-cutter available at
any hardware store.  As one senior Russian nuclear official put it to the author in 1994,
“at some of these facilities, we have no one guarding but Aunt Masha with a cucumber.”
When civil war broke out in Georgia, scientists at one facility housing kilograms of HEU
took turns guarding the unprotected facility “with sticks and garden rakes.”10
                                                                                                                                                
theft incidents by the Russian nuclear regulatory agency determined that every single case had involved
personnel working within the nuclear material industry; that none of the thefts had been detected by the
physical protection system, the containment and surveillance system, or the accounting systems; and that
there were no regular assessments of protective system effectiveness against insider threats.
9 For a useful discussion of how the Russian material accounting system—still largely the system left over
from Soviet times—functions and is regulated, see “Material Accounting System Was and Is Still Based on
the Principles of Financial Accounting,” roundtable discussion, Yaderny Kontrol Digest No. 5, Fall 1997.
See also David D. Wilkey and Charles R. Hatcher, “Implementation of Materials Accounting in Russia,” in
Proceedings of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, 40th Annual Meeting, Phoenix, AZ, July
25-29, 1999.
10 Emily Ewell Daughtry and Fred Wehling, “Cooperative Efforts to Secure Fissile Material in the NIS:
Shortcomings, Successes, and Recommendations for the Future,” Nonproliferation Review, forthcoming.
This is the Institute of Physics in Tbilisi, Georgia, which at that time had 10 kilograms of 90% enriched
HEU.  Some of this material was later sold to a similar facility in Uzbekistan, and the rest was removed to
the United Kingdom in Project Auburn Endeavor (described below).
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This padlock – which could be cut in seconds with
a bolt-cutter available in any hardware store –
secures a room holding weapons-usable nuclear
material. Source: DOE
Despite years of hard work and considerable progress in cooperative programs to
address these threats, most of these problems still exist today.  By the end of the year
2000, if all goes well, modern safeguards and security systems will have been completed
at facilities housing one-sixth of the weapons-usable material outside of weapons in
Russia, leaving work still underway for the remaining five-sixths of the material.  While
portal monitors have been installed at many facilities, hundreds of tonnes of fissile
material is still in buildings that are not equipped with portal monitors.  Accurate
measured inventories of all nuclear
material on hand have still not been carried
out at most facilities, and there is still no
accurate and up-to-date national inventory
system11—meaning that if there were
material missing, it is quite possible that no
one would know.  Wax seals are still in
wide use as tamper-indicating devices.
The Russian government has
recognized at the highest levels that major
upgrades in security and accounting for
nuclear materials are needed.  In September
1994, President Boris Yeltsin issued a
decree calling for a far-reaching
interagency effort to improve security and
accounting measures, and this was followed by a government-wide order outlining
specific tasks signed by Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin in early 1995.12
Unfortunately, however, the government managed to provide only a fraction of the
funding needed to carry out the program13—and the same has consistently been true for
subsequent efforts, as well.  New regulations on physical protection of nuclear material
have been adopted, and new regulations for material control and accounting have been
developed.  As recently as 1999, after the shock of the terrorist bombings attributed to
Chechens, security against outside attack at nuclear facilities was beefed up14—though
these measures may not offer much benefit against covert insider theft, which has been
the source of all the major thefts of weapons-usable nuclear material to date.  At the same
time, after initial reluctance, the Russian government in recent years has given
                                                
11 William C. Potter, remarks at the 7th Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference, Washington
DC, January 11-12, 1999 (available at http://www.ceip.org/npp/potter.htm).
12 Presidential Decree No. 1923, September 15, 1994, “On Priority Measures to Improve the Nuclear
Materials Accounting and Protection System,” and Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation
No. 34, January 13, 1995, “On Priority Projects for 1995 to Develop and Implement the State Nuclear
Materials Control and Accounting System.”
13 See, for example, Duma testimony in “We Cannot Preclude the Possibility of Nuclear Materials Theft,”
Yaderny Kontrol, op. cit.  In that hearing, Alexander Dmitriev, deputy chairman of the Russian nuclear
regulatory agency, testified that the state program for improving physical protection of nuclear material had
received only 20% of its planned funding.  First Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy Lev Ryabev testified
that implementing the federal program for improving the nuclear materials accounting and control system
that had been drawn up for 1997-2001 would cost 150 billion rubles per year (roughly $50 million a year at
then-current rates of exchange).
14 “Russia Tightens Security at Nuclear Plants,” Agence France Press, October 25, 1999.
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The Demand for Black Market Fissile Material
There is significant evidence that both proliferating states and terrorist groups are actively
seeking to acquire stolen fissile material for nuclear weapons.  Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea, among
others, have all been reported to be seeking to acquire such material, as have the Aum Shinrikyo
doomsday cult in Japan (recently renamed Aleph), and Osama bin Laden’s terrorist organization, Al
Qaida.  Below, the cases of Iraq, Iran, and the two terrorist groups are described as examples of the
broader phenomenon.
Iraq’s Saddam Hussein spent billions of dollars attempting to establish an indigenous Iraqi
capability to produce fissile material.1  While such an indigenous production capability was the first
choice, after the invasion of Kuwait, when Iraq launched a “crash” program to rapidly produce a single
bomb, it planned on using HEU from its safeguarded research reactor.  Even after the Gulf War, with the
U.N. inspection regime in place, Iraq sought to continue its weapons of mass destruction programs, and
built up its foreign procurement network, including its extensive network in the former Soviet Union.
Iraq succeeded, for example, in buying gyroscopes taken directly from Russian strategic nuclear missiles,
tested and certified by the Russian institutes that had made them. The CIA has warned that Iraq “would
seize any opportunity to buy nuclear weapons materials or a complete weapon.”2  Indeed, one of the
former leaders of Iraq’s nuclear weapons program has described Iraq’s efforts to maintain that program
after the Gulf War, and warned that Iraq might be able to produce a bomb within months if it acquired
fissile material from the former Soviet Union, concluding that “preventing Iraq from acquiring nuclear
explosive material abroad, particularly in Russia and former Soviet republics, remains a difficult but
absolutely essential goal.”3 Both he and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors for
Iraq have emphasized that even if the long-term monitoring system once planned for Iraq could be re-
established, it might not be able to detect the small-scale effort needed to turn fissile material acquired
from abroad into a working bomb.4
Iran, too, has sent a substantial network of procurement agents to the former Soviet Union in
search of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them, has succeeded in acquiring key
missile technologies from Russian institutes, and has specifically sought technologies for producing both
HEU and plutonium.5  The CIA has specifically warned that “Teheran continues to seek fissile material”6
and reportedly concluded in a recent analysis that it could not rule out the possibility that Iran has already
acquired a nuclear weapon capability, if it has succeeded in secretly procuring fissile material abroad.7
There have been innumerable press reports (of varying levels of credibility) of Iranian attempts to acquire
nuclear materials or even nuclear weapons, and there have been a significant number of actual arrests of
Iranian nationals, for smuggling of various types of nuclear materials.8  At the Ulba facility in Kazakhstan,
canisters were found labeled for shipping to Teheran, in a room next to the room where hundreds of
kilograms of HEU was located.  The Iranians had reportedly approached Kazakhstan to secretly purchase
beryllium and LEU from this facility, perhaps as a trust-building prelude to an offer to purchase the HEU.
(The HEU was subsequently removed from this facility under the U.S.-Kazakh cooperative effort known
____________________
1 For a useful overview, see Rodney W. Jones and Mark G. McDonough Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in
Maps and Charts, 1998, Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1998 (available at
http://www.ceip.org/programs/npp/track98b.htm).
2 John Deutch, then Director of Central Intelligence, testimony to the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of
the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, quoted in Jones and McDonough, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, op.
cit.
3 David Albright and Khidhir Hamza, “Iraq’s Reconstitution of its Nuclear Weapons Program,” Arms Control Today,
October 1998.  See also the interview with Hamza on 60 Minutes II, CBS News, January 27, 1999, in which Hamza
describes Iraqi bribery in Russia to acquire advanced weapons technologies.
4 See Sixth Consolidated Report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency Under
Paragraph 16 of UNSC Resolution 1051 (1996), Vienna, Austria: IAEA, October 8, 1998.
5 See Jones and McDonough, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, op. cit.
6 Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and
Advanced Conventional Munitions: 1 January Through June 30, 1999, Washington DC: Central Intelligence
Agency, Nonproliferation Center, February 2, 2000.
7 See James Risen and Judith Miller, “CIA Tells Clinton an Iranian A-Bomb Can’t Be Ruled Out,” New York Times,
January 17, 2000.
                                                                                  The Threat 15
as Project Sapphire.)9  Iran is also purchasing safeguarded civilian nuclear power reactors from Russia—
which the United States suspects will be used to build up the technical infrastructure for Iran’s weapons
program—and has sought to purchase a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plant from Russia as well.
The United States has imposed economic sanctions on some Russian institutes because of their
cooperation with Iran on sensitive nuclear technology.
Most terrorist groups have no interest in threatening large-scale destruction.  Unfortunately,
however, there are a few dangerous exceptions who do seek to cause mass destruction, and the possibility
that some terrorist groups could actually make a crude nuclear bomb from plutonium or HEU cannot be
ruled out.10  Both Aum Shinrikyo and Osama bin Laden’s group have attempted to acquire the necessary
materials and technologies—though whether either group would have been able to make a nuclear bomb
is highly uncertain.
Aum Shinrikyo carried out a comprehensive program of development for chemical, biological,
and nuclear weapons prior to its famous nerve gas attack in the Tokyo subway.11  Much of Aum’s nuclear
program, like its chemical and biological programs, seems to have been poorly focused, pursuing efforts
such as purchasing a sheep farm with uranium deposits in Australia and stealing confidential documents
on laser isotope enrichment, with the idea of producing HEU by the extraordinarily difficult route of
mining uranium, purifying it, and using laser enrichment to separate the U-235.  At the same time,
however, Aum aggressively pursued the possibility of acquiring nuclear technology and material from the
former Soviet Union, recruiting thousands of members in Russia, including staff from the Kurchatov
Institute in Moscow (a leading nuclear research institute where hundreds of kilograms of weapons-usable
HEU were poorly protected and accounted for) and physicists from Moscow State University, and even
seeking a meeting with Minister of Atomic Energy Victor Mikhailov to attempt to purchase a nuclear
weapon.  While Mikhailov refused to meet with Aum, then-Russian Vice President Alexander Rutskoi
met with an Aum delegation headed by the cult’s leader, Shoko Asahara, in early 1992, and Aum
reportedly paid between $500,000 and $1 million to Oleg Lobov, then Secretary of the Russian Security
Council, between 1991 and 1995, for reasons that have never been explained.  Kiyohide Hayakawa, a
leading official of the cult, made repeated trips to Russia on weapons-buying expeditions on the cult’s
behalf.
Like Aum Shinrikyo, Osama bin Laden’s group has attempted to get all types of weapons of
mass destruction, but there is little hard evidence that they have succeeded.12  The U.S. Federal indictment
of bin Laden charges that “at various times from at least as early as 1993, Osama bin Laden and others
known and unknown, made efforts to obtain the components of nuclear weapons.”  Similarly, a criminal
complaint lodged against Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, one of bin Laden’s top lieutenants, charged that in
1993 he had approved the attempted purchase of enriched uranium “for the purpose of developing nuclear
weapons.”  Some reports suggest Bin Laden's group may have attempted to purchase nuclear material
through contacts in Ukraine and in the Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union.
Unfortunately, the information needed to make a nuclear bomb with the fissile material in hand is now
widely available.  Should fissile material become readily available on a nuclear black market, hostile
proliferating states and terrorist groups would have access to the last essential ingredient for acquiring
nuclear bombs, potentially posing terrifying new threats with virtually no warning.
_______________________
8 See, for example, the subscription-only nuclear trafficking database maintained by the Center for Nonproliferation
Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies (http://cns.miis.edu), which contain countless incidents
involving Iranian nationals.
9 See discussion in William C. Potter, “Project Sapphire: U.S.-Kazakhstani Cooperation for Nonproliferation,” in
Shields and Potter, Dismantling the Cold War, op. cit.
10 For a useful unclassified discussion of the possibility that terrorists could build nuclear explosives, see J. Carson
Mark et al., “Can Terrorists Build Nuclear Weapons?” in Paul Leventhal and Yonah Alexander, eds., Preventing
Nuclear Terrorism. Lexington MA: Lexington Books, 1987.  For discussions of the incentives and disincentives for
terrorists to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction, and specifically nuclear weapons, see, for example,
Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, America’s Achilles’ Heel: Nuclear, Biological,
and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack, Cambridge MA: MIT Press for BCSIA Studies in International Security,
1998; and Jessica Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1999.
11 The account below is largely based on Gavin Cameron, “Multi-Track Micro-Proliferation: Lessons from Aum
Shinrikyo and Al Qaida,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 22, No. 4, 1999, and sources cited therein.
12 Ibid.
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increasingly broad support to cooperation with the United States designed to help address
these issues (discussed in Section III).
The economic crisis in Russia following the August 1998 financial meltdown
exacerbated the security problems that were already evident.  Guards at many facilities—
most of whom had very little knowledge of the importance of the material they were
guarding, or training in nuclear matters—were not paid for months at a time.  Guards at
some facilities were observed leaving their posts to forage for food, or refusing to patrol
freezing perimeters because they had not been issued warm winter uniforms.  At some
facilities, electricity—the lifeblood of the alarms and other security systems—was
occasionally shut off because the facilities had not been able to pay their electricity bills.
At a number of facilities, security equipment installed with U.S. assistance was simply
not being used, because there was no money to operate and maintain it.  The economic
crisis, in short, was making the situation worse faster than U.S. assistance and Russia’s
unilateral efforts were making it better.15  (Russian experts report, however, that these
kinds of incidents had been taking place for some time, and had become virtually a
normal part of life at Russian nuclear facilities; the August 1998 events only exacerbated
an existing situation.)
At least for facilities within the Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM),
however, this emergency situation had largely stabilized by early 1999, as the banks had
resumed functioning, the decline of the ruble had made the Ministry’s hard-currency
export income go farther domestically, and collections of payments for electricity
produced at nuclear plants had modestly improved.16  During the course of 1999, the
Russian government’s financial picture was further improved by the substantial increase
in the price of oil, Russia’s largest export commodity, and the return of a modest rate of
economic growth in Russia.
DOCUMENTED THEFTS OF WEAPONS-USABLE MATERIAL.  As a result of these changed security
conditions since the collapse of the Soviet Union, there have been a number of
documented cases of theft of substantial quantities of weapons-usable nuclear materials.
Key confirmed cases include: 1.5 kilograms of weapon-grade HEU from the “Luch”
production association in Podolsk, Russia, in 1992; 1.8 kilograms of 36 percent enriched
HEU from the Andreeva Guba naval base near Russia's Norwegian border in July 1993;
4.5 kilograms of material enriched to over 19 percent U-235 from the Sevmorput naval
shipyard near Murmansk in November 1993; over 360 grams of plutonium seized in
Munich on a plane from Moscow as a result of a German “sting” operation in August
                                                
15 See, for example: Bill Richardson, “Russia’s Recession: The Nuclear Fallout,” Washington Post,
December 23, 1998; Kenneth N. Luongo and Matthew Bunn, “A Nuclear Crisis in Russia,” Boston Globe,
December 29, 1998; Todd Perry, “Securing Russian Nuclear Materials: The Need for an Expanded U.S.
Response,” Nonproliferation Review, Winter 1999, Vol. 6, No. 2; and William C. Potter, “Prospects for
U.S.-Russian Collaboration for Nonproliferation in the Post-Cold-War Era,” presentation to the Defense
and Security Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly, 44th Annual Session, Edinburgh, November 10-
13, 1998.  For a referenced listing of specific incidents suggesting a serious problem in security during this
period, see Matthew Bunn, “Loose Nukes Fears: Anecdotes of the Current Crisis,” December 5, 1998
(available at http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/BCSIA/Library.nsf/atom).
16 Interview with senior MINATOM official, February 1999.  Also interviews with senior nuclear scientists
from the closed nuclear cities, October 1999.
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1994; and 2.73 kilograms of essentially weapon-grade (87.7 percent U-235) HEU seized
in Prague in December 1994.17
It is widely thought that there have been no cases since then involving directly
weapons-usable material, but this is not the case.18  As recently as late 1998, for example,
the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB, successor to the KGB) revealed the first
known case that apparently involved a conspiracy to steal enough nuclear material for a
bomb at a single stroke.  The conspirators—who were stopped before the material
actually left the facility—tried to steal 18.5 kilograms of radioactive material described as
suitable for the “production of components of nuclear weapons” from a major
MINATOM facility in the Chelyabinsk region (which include the nuclear weapons design
laboratory at Snezhinsk, the plutonium and HEU processing plant at Ozersk, and the
nuclear weapons assembly and disassembly facility at Trekhgorny).  MINATOM’s chief
of nuclear material accounting later confirmed the FSB’s account, and warned that the
theft, if successful, could have inflicted “significant damage on the [Russian] state.”
While the Russian government has not confirmed the specific type of material involved in
this case, one can conclude with considerable confidence that it was either plutonium or
HEU, based on (a) the statement that it was radioactive material that can be used to make
nuclear weapons components; (b) the quantity of material involved (which effectively
rules out a variety of other radioactive materials used in weapons, such as tritium or
polonium); (c) the conclusion that theft of this amount of material would be enough to
cause significant damage to the state; and (d) another MINATOM statement that the
material could be used to make products for either the military or the civilian nuclear
industry (which is true of both plutonium and HEU, but of few other radioactive materials
likely to be available in quantities of tens of kilograms at a time).  This makes this case by
far the largest documented attempt to steal weapons-usable material in the former Soviet
Union.19
                                                
17 For a useful discussion of some of these cases, see William Potter, “Before the Deluge? Assessing the
Threat of Nuclear Leakage From the Post-Soviet States,” Arms Control Today, October 1995, pp. 9−16.
18 For a useful discussion of the apparent gap in cases in the last half of the 1990s, see Emily Ewell, “NIS
Nuclear Smuggling Since 1995: A Lull in Significant Cases?” The Nonproliferation Review, Spring-
Summer 1998.
19 For the original announcement, see “FSB Agents Prevent Theft of Nuclear Material in Chelyabinsk,”
ITAR-TASS, December 18, 1999.  The chief of the FSB for the Chelyabinsk region, Major General Valeriy
Tretyakov, expressed “concern” about security for nuclear material at nuclear facilities in the region, and
said that while U.S. MPC&A assistance was helpful, it was “far from being [the] permanent measure we
need.”  (See also Monterey Institute for International Studies, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Nuclear
Smuggling Database [http://cns.miis.edu/db/nistraff/index.htm], Document 19980790, quoting Alevtina
Nikitina, “Komu vygodno razrusheniye FSB?” Chelyabinskiy rabochiy, 19 December 1998.)  In late 1999,
this incident was confirmed by the head of MINATOM’s material accounting department, Victor Yerastov,
in a published interview.  In one translation, Yerastov described the material as “a sort of semi-finished
product made of fissile material,” which “can be used in the manufacture of various military and civilian
products in the nuclear industry,” and said that if the theft had succeeded, it “it could have inflicted a
significant damage to the [Russian] state.”  (See “Interview: Victor Yerastov: MINATOM Has All
Conditions for Providing Safety and Security of Nuclear Material,” Yaderny Kontrol Digest, Vol. 5, No. 1,
Winter 2000.)  Oleg Bukharin, however, indicates that in the original Russian, Yerastov used a phrase
meaning “nuclear material” rather than “fissile material.”  (Personal communication, January 5, 2000.)
Yerastov reports that “the attempt to steal this material was prevented at the very beginning, on the
enterprise territory, and we do not find it correct to say that the theft occurred.”  In the interview, Yerastov
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Another incident, where the material was found to be missing in the late 1990s
(though the theft may have occurred earlier), involves the only confirmed case where the
weapons-usable material is still missing.  This occurred at the Sukhumi research center in
the Abkhazia region of Georgia, where 2 kilograms of 90 percent enriched HEU was once
located.  An accounting for the HEU was last conducted in 1992.  In 1993, as a result of
the Abkhaz civil war, the scientists fled the facility.  Neither Georgian nor Russian
                                                                                                                                                
also says that there was a case of fissile material theft (explicitly distinguished from thefts of other types of
nuclear material) at a MINATOM enterprise in 1995, while the last previously confirmed seizure had taken
place in 1994.  Yerastov attributed the decline in thefts since 1995 to a combination of a decline in press
exaggeration of the prices available to thieves, unilateral Russian government efforts to improve security,
and international MPC&A cooperation, particularly with the United States.
Sizing the Problem
While the problems posed by Russia’s nuclear infrastructure are enormous, they are not infinite.
A few basic calculations provide useful bounds for thinking about the magnitude of the problem.
Costs of safeguards and security.  The weapons-usable nuclear materials in the former Soviet
Union are believed to exist in nearly 400 buildings at nearly 60 sites.  If there was no progress at all in
consolidating this material at fewer sites, and it cost $10 million, on average, to upgrade security and
accounting for each of these buildings,1 the total cost of these upgrades would be in the range of $4
billion.  If the roughly 40 small sites required an average of 100 guards each, and the roughly 20 very
large sites required an average of 2000 guards each, and each guard was paid $500 a month (substantially
more than current salaries), the total cost of guarding all of these facilities (again assuming no
consolidation) would be over $250 million per year.  If security and accounting costs other than the guard
forces added another 50 percent, the total cost would be in the range of $400 million per year.  These are
large numbers, but not outlandish ones. Russia receives more than $600 million each year from income on
the HEU deal alone.  The United States spends roughly  $700 million a year on the broad spectrum of
safeguards and security activities (not just guarding fissile material) in the DOE complex.
Costs for paying nuclear weapons complex employees.  There are approximately 150,000
total employees in MINATOM’s nuclear weapons complex.  Currently, on average, they are reportedly
paid less than $100 per month.2  The total payroll for MINATOM’s entire nuclear weapons complex is
therefore in the range of $180 million a year—again, far less than what Russia takes in each year from the
HEU deal alone (though not all of those funds go to MINATOM).  The average age of these workers is
now in the 50s, and the average male life-expectancy in Russia is roughly 58 years (though workers at
these nuclear facilities apparently tend to live somewhat longer), suggesting that in the extreme case of
offering lifetime “buyouts” to everyone, the total cost for paying for all of the Russian nuclear weapons
complex workers to retire on full salary for the rest of their lives would probably be in the range of $2-$4
billion.  Of course, some of these workers could be paid to work on decommissioning and cleaning up the
sites where they used to work on producing weapons and materials, rather than being paid to retire.  Such
a combination of buy-outs to encourage early retirement and engaging workers in cleanup is, in effect, the
approach that has been taken in shrinking the nuclear weapons complex in the United States—but Russia
has not had the funds to pursue a similar strategy.
Commercial value of Russia’s total stockpiles of fissile material.  As noted in the text, Russia
is believed to have roughly 1350 tonnes of fissile material.  At the $12 billion for 500 tonnes price
originally negotiated for the HEU Purchase Agreement, the value of the entire stockpile, including all the
material in all of Russia’s nuclear weapons, would be in the range of $26 billion—less than the costs of
many of the new weapon systems currently planned by the U.S. Department of Defense.
_______________________
1 See similar estimate in CBO, Cooperative Approaches, op. cit.
2 Khripunov, “MINATOM on the Edge,” op. cit.
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officials were able to visit the facility again until 1997, when a Russian team found the
facility abandoned and the HEU gone.  To this day, no one knows where this HEU went;
it may be in the hands of the Abkhaz separatists, or it may have been stolen by or sold to
others.20
In short, theft and smuggling of the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons is not
just a possible risk for the future, it is an ongoing reality.  Were it not for the intense
patriotism and devotion to duty of the vast majority of the nuclear scientists and workers
in the former Soviet states, it seems likely that a genuine nuclear proliferation catastrophe
would have occurred already.   But everyone has a breaking point, and no one can know
how long that remarkable bulwark protecting the world from proliferation will last.
Unless further actions are taken urgently, the danger that potential nuclear weapons
materials will yet fall into the hands of terrorists or proliferating states will remain
unacceptably high.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Security for nuclear materials in weapons in Russia is substantially better than for
the “loose” materials just discussed, for reasons relating both to the fundamental nature of
nuclear weapons and to the organizational arrangements for their protection.21  All of the
estimated 17,000-22,000 former Soviet nuclear weapons that still exist have been
consolidated within Russia.22  (Successfully working with the former Soviet states to
make this come about was one of the unsung nonproliferation success stories of the
Clinton administration.) In Russia, management and security for nuclear weapons is the
responsibility of the 12th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, a trained,
professional force of roughly 30,000, of whom 45% are officers.23  People working with
nuclear weapons are carefully screened, and a “three-man rule” is in place forbidding
anyone from working with nuclear weapons either alone or even in a group of two.
Nuclear weapons are relatively large, heavy objects; unlike weapons-usable nuclear
material, one cannot simply carry them out in a briefcase or under one’s overcoat.
                                                
20 This incident is described on the subscription-only web page of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at
the Monterey Institute for International Studies, at http://cns.miis.edu/db/nisprofs/georgia/facils/
vekua.htm.  See also Daughtry and Wehling, “Cooperative Efforts,” op. cit.
21 For a detailed discussion of Russian nuclear weapon storage facilities and storage practices, see Joshua
Handler, Russian Nuclear Warhead Dismantlement Rates and Storage Site Capacity: Implications for the
Implementation of START II and De-Alerting Initiatives. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Center for
Energy and Environmental Studies, CEES Report No. AC-99-01, February 1999.
22 In 1997, Gen. Eugene Habiger, then commander of U.S. Strategic Command, estimated that there were
20,000-25,000 warheads remaining in Russia.  (Testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, March
13, 1997).  A year later, Habiger referred to 17,000-22,000 as being the number of tactical nuclear
warheads alone in Russia, but from other sources it appears that this was a mis-description of the U.S.
estimate of the total Russian nuclear warhead stockpile after some additional dismantlement had taken
place.  See testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 31, 1998, in FY1999: Strategic
Forces, S. Hrg. 105-605, pt. 7.  See also William Arkin, Robert Norris, and Joshua Handler, Taking Stock:
Worldwide Nuclear Deployments, 1998. Washington, D.C.: Natural Resources Defense Council Nuclear
Program, 1998.
23 “Interview: Igor Valynkin: We’ll Do Our Best to Prevent Incidents Like That One at the Novaya Zemlya
Test Site,” Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control), Vol. 42, No. 6, November-December, 1998 (Center for
Policy Studies in Russia, Moscow).
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Similarly, nuclear weapons are easily countable: the commander of a storage unit is very
much aware of whether there are 99 or 100 weapons in his charge.  Inventories are taken
regularly, and security forces are regularly tested against a mock terrorist team that
attempts to break in.
As the Soviet Union moved toward collapse, the Soviet military rapidly reduced
the number of nuclear weapon storage sites, from 500 in the 1980s to 65-80 today,
eliminating the risks and costs of having such weapons stored at large numbers of small
sites.24  In 1997, Gen. Eugene Habiger, then-commander of the U.S. Strategic Command,
led the first American delegation allowed to tour an active Russian nuclear weapons
storage facility and view the security procedures there.  Habiger declared himself
“impressed,” saying that the Russians “go to great lengths” to provide security for nuclear
weapons, and that “if what I saw was representative, yes, I have confidence in the safety
and security of their nuclear weapon stockpile.”25  Similarly, the CIA concluded in 1996
that security for nuclear weapons in Russia remained effective, in contrast to its
conclusions with respect to Russian nuclear material.26  Despite myriad claims and
exaggerated press accounts, there are no confirmed cases of theft or attempted theft of
actual nuclear weapons.27
Nevertheless, even in the case of nuclear weapons, there are grounds for concern.
The top leadership of the 12th Main Directorate have testified to the Russian Duma that
funding for nuclear weapons security is grossly inadequate28 (with the 12th Main
Directorate’s budget apparently only half as large as U.S. assistance for Russian warhead
security).29 As the CIA has pointed out, “the threat [of theft] from within the Russian
military and the deteriorating economy” mean that the judgment that nuclear weapons
                                                
24 See Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, November 1997, p. 43; Joshua Handler,
“Lifting the Lid on Russia’s Nuclear Weapon Storage,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, August 1, 1999; and
Handler, Russian Nuclear Warhead Dismantlement Rates, op. cit.
25 Habiger noted, however, that he had seen only one facility; he observed others on a later visit.  Habiger
pointed out that the Russians used a somewhat different approach relying more on people and less on high
technology.  See Gen. Eugene Habiger, “Special Defense Department Briefing,” Federal News Service,
November 4, 1997; for the later trip, see Gen. Eugene Habiger, “News Briefing,” Federal Document
Clearing House News Transcripts, June 16, 1998.
26 Deutch, testimony in Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, op. cit.
27 Perhaps the most disturbing allegations of missing nuclear weapons originated with former Russian
National Security Advisor Alexander Lebed, who indicated in several discussions and interviews that while
national security advisor to President Yeltsin, he had ordered an accounting of the “suitcase bombs” in the
Russian arsenal, and that scores of these weapons were unaccounted for.  Lebed’s charge that such suitcase
bombs existed was backed by the anti-nuclear environmental expert Alexander Yablokov, who had been
Yeltsin’s environmental adviser early in Yeltsin’s term, but the Ministries of Defense and Atomic Energy
strongly denied that any weapons could be missing, and Lebed later appeared to back off many of his
original charges himself.  For an extended discussion of this episode, see Scott Parish and John Lepingwell,
Are Suitcase Nukes on the Loose? Monterey, CA: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute
of International Studies, 1998 (available at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/lebedlg.htm).  For Lebed’s
seeming retraction, see Pavel Felgengauer, “Lebed Backpedals on Allegedly Missing 'Suitcase' Nuclear
Devices,”  St. Petersburg Times, October 13-19, 1997.  The full text of the interview quoted by Felgengauer
was posted in October 1997 at the www.msnbc.com web site, and is available from the author on request.
28 For an edited English translation of the transcript, see Yaderny Kontrol Digest, No. 5, Fall 1997.
29 See statement by Gen. Igor Valynkin, commander of the 12th Main Directorate, quoted in “Valynkin
Thanks Nunn-Lugar for Russian Nuclear Safety,” Yaderny Kontrol Digest, No. 10, Spring 1999 (available
at http://www.pircenter.org/yke/index.htm).
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remain secure “could change rapidly.”30 Crime is rising rapidly in the Strategic Rocket
Forces, and the violent incident in September 1998 when several 12th Main Directorate
soldiers murdered one of their comrades, took hostages, and attempted to hijack an
aircraft suggests that the severe stresses permeating the Russian military in the wake of
the August 1998 financial meltdown have been felt within the force that guards nuclear
weapons as well.31  In October 1998, the commander of the 12th Main Directorate, while
emphasizing that there was no need for concern over the security of Russian nuclear
warheads, acknowledged that the directorate’s troops had not been given any higher
priority in receiving pay than other troops, that they had received the paychecks due them
only through July, and that the directorate was helping officers to get vegetables and
potatoes for the winter in lieu of cash.32
Underfunding an Oversized Complex
Concerns over security for nuclear weapons and materials are seriously
exacerbated by Russia’s maintenance of a nuclear complex—both civilian and military—
vastly larger than the available funding can support, and vastly larger than needed for the
complex’s post-Cold War missions. Russia will inevitably maintain a significant arsenal
of nuclear weapons for many years to come, and as long as it does so, will continue to
have a legitimate need for a nuclear weapons complex sufficient to maintain that arsenal
and keep it safe and secure.  But such a complex could be far smaller than the one that
now exists.
Today, there remain ten entire cities, home to three quarters of a million people,
built only for the purpose of designing and producing nuclear weapons or producing
nuclear material for them, closed off from the outside world by barbed wire and armed
troops.  While these cities once got the best of everything the Soviet Union had to offer,
their funding has collapsed with the end of the Cold War, and pay there is both meager
and intermittent; government funding for the defense activities of the Ministry of Atomic
Energy has been cut to one-seventh its previous level.33  Yet the nuclear facilities in these
cities still employ some 150,000 people—whose pay, on average, is now less than $100
                                                
30 Deutch, testimony in Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, op. cit.
31 For press accounts of this incident, see Bill Gertz, “Yeltsin Orders Nuclear Security Probe,”  The
Washington Times, October 21, 1998, and Vladimir Georgiev, “Underlying Reason: Crime in the Russian
Army Has Rolled up to Nuclear Munitions Units, But the Ministry of Defense Believes Russia Is Capable
of Controlling Weapons of Mass Destruction Without Foreign Intervention,” Moscow Nezavisimoye
Voyennoye Obozreniye, September 11-17, 1998 No.34, p. 1, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information
Service, Central Eurasia, September 23, 1998.  For an official reaction from the commander of the 12th
Main Directorate, see “Interview: Igor Valynkin: We’ll Do Our Best to Prevent Incidents Like That One at
the Novaya Zemlya Test Site,” op. cit.
32 “Russia is capable to ensure its security, general,” ITAR-TASS, October 9, 1998.  According to Russian
officials, a statement in October that troops have only received pay for July means that they are receiving
paychecks with some regularity, but that the paychecks they received recently only bring them up to what
they were supposed to have been paid by July; it does not necessarily mean that they have received no pay
at all since July.
33 First Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy Lev Ryabev, “The Role of the NCI in Meeting Russia’s Nuclear
Complex Challenges,” remarks to the 7th Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference, Washington
DC, January 11-12, 1999 (available at http://www.ceip.org/programs/npp/ryabev992.htm).
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per month.34  In late 1996, Vladimir Nechai, director of one of Russia’s two premier
nuclear weapons laboratories, committed suicide, in part in desperation over his inability
to pay his employees’ salaries.35  In November, 1998, 3,000 workers at Nechai’s institute
went on strike, protesting “constant undernourishment, insufficient medical service, [and]
inability to buy clothing and footwear for children or to pay for their education.”36  The
following month, an employee at Russia’s other leading nuclear weapons design institute
was arrested for spying for Iraq—in this case, on advanced non-nuclear weapons—a
development the regional head of the successor agency to the KGB blamed on the “very
difficult financial position” facing Russia’s nuclear experts.37
The situation for many civilian nuclear facilities is even worse—particularly for
small, isolated research labs which no longer have the funding to do the research or to
provide adequate protection for the material they still have on hand.  In visits to a wide
variety of nuclear facilities following the August financial meltdown in 1998, the
increasing desperation that erodes the performance of security systems while
simultaneously increasing temptations for theft was starkly evident.38 In September, 1998,
the Russian Minister of Atomic Energy, responding to thousands of nuclear workers
protesting unpaid wages, said that the government owed the Ministry over $170 million
and had not provided a single ruble in two months.39 Thus, the threat includes not only
weaknesses in technical security and accounting systems, but also the profound
destabilization of the lives of the guards and workers who have access to or provide
                                                
34 Igor Khripunov, “MINATOM At the Edge,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 1999, estimated
$60/month; Minister of Atomic Energy Yevgeniy Adamov reported in the spring of 1999 that average
salaries for nuclear industrial workers were 1,800 rubles per month, and for scientists approximately 1,400
rubles per month, corresponding to $80 and $60 respectively at then-current rates of exchange (see
“MINATOM Reviews 1998, Making Plans for 1999,” Yaderny Kontrol Digest, No. 10, Spring 1999).
35 For discussions of the status of the Russian nuclear weapons complex, see Matthew Bunn, Oleg Bukharin,
Jill Cetina, Kenneth Luongo, and Frank von Hippel, “Retooling Russia’s Nuclear Cities,” Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, September/October 1998; Khripunov, “MINATOM at the Edge,” op. cit.; Susan S. Voss
et al., “Overview of Minatom’s Ten Closed Nuclear Cities,” in Proceedings of the Institute of Nuclear
Materials Management, 40th Annual Meeting, Phoenix, AZ, July 25-29, 1999; The Nuclear Cities
Initiative: Status and Issues, Washington DC: Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council
(RANSAC), January 1999; and Jill Cetina, Oleg Bukharin, and Frank von Hippel, Defense Conversion and
Small Business Development: A Proposal for Two IFC Projects in Three of Russia’s Closed Nuclear Cities,
Princeton, NJ: Center for Energy and Environmental Studies, Princeton University, Report 306, March
1998.  For a detailed description of the sites in the closed nuclear complex, with declassified U.S.
intelligence satellite photographs of the sites, see Oleg A. Bukharin, Thomas B. Bukharin, and Robert S.
Norris, New Perspectives on Russia’s Ten Secret Cities, Washington DC: Natural Resources Defense
Council, Nuclear Weapons Databook Working Papers, October 1999; that paper serves as an update of the
book by the same authors, Making the Russian Bomb: From Stalin to Yeltsin, Boulder, CO: Westview,
1995, which has the most detailed unclassified descriptions of many of these facilities available.
36 	
	“Ural Nuclear Workers on Strike, Demanding Wage Arrears,” ITAR-TASS,
November 19, 1998.  For a listing of this and many other incidents from the same period, see Bunn, “Loose
Nukes Fears,” op. cit
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38 For one published account, see Potter, “Prospects for U.S.-Russian Collaboration for Nonproliferation,”
op. cit.
39 David Hoffman, “Russia's Nuclear Force Sinks With the Ruble: Economic Crisis Erodes Strategic
Arsenal,” The Washington Post, September 18, 1998.
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security for nuclear weapons and materials.
Their patriotism and dedication to duty,
even in the face of unpaid wages and
shortages of everything from food to
medicine—combined with the continuing
fear of the consequences of being caught—
have been critical factors limiting the scale
of nuclear theft and leakage of nuclear
weapons information to date.
Secrecy
All of these urgent security hazards
are taking place within a nuclear complex
that remains shrouded in secrecy.  Of
course, there are many nuclear secrets that
must be protected to prevent proliferation
and avoid revealing vulnerabilities.  But the
scale of nuclear secrecy that still exists in
Russia goes well beyond those
requirements, reflecting the legacy of
decades of Communist obsession with
secrecy, and centuries of tsarist secrecy
before that.
After a period immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union when a
substantial amount of new information was released, and Russia seemed positively
inclined to pursue nuclear transparency, the opponents of nuclear openness in Russia
appear to have regained the upper hand.  This pervasive secrecy—symbolized by
Alexander Nikitin’s arrest and trial for espionage for helping to compile publicly
available information relating to the environmental problems of the Russian nuclear
navy—poses substantial barriers to cooperation to improve security, and even more
fundamental obstacles to the kinds of monitoring and openness that would be required to
verify deep reductions in nuclear warhead stockpiles.  With the recent deterioration of
U.S.-Russian political relations, the increased constraints on Russian access to U.S.
nuclear facilities in the wake of the Chinese espionage scandals, and the ascension of a
former security service chief to the Presidency, the Russian security services have cracked
down harder during 1999, significantly constraining a variety of types of sensitive U.S.-
Russian cooperation on nuclear issues, and harassing or arresting a number of
environmentalists and arms control experts.
An enormous range of nuclear issues remains shrouded in secrecy, not subject to
any form of international verification or cooperation.  It is not widely understood, for
example, that arms control agreements to date have focused only on delivery vehicles and
launchers; once warheads were removed from delivery vehicles, there has been no
requirement that they be dismantled, or even accounted for.  The United States has never
verified the dismantlement of a single Russian nuclear warhead, or provided a penny of
Unpaid nuclear workers protesting in Moscow.
Average salaries in the nuclear sector in Russia are
less than $100 per month, and sometimes go unpaid
for months at a time: at some facilities, unpaid
nuclear guards have left their posts to forage for
food. Source: AP
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assistance directly for warhead dismantlement.  Similarly, Russia has never been
permitted to verify the dismantlement of a single U.S. warhead.  Nor have the two
countries ever told each other how many warheads they now have, how many they plan to
retain under future arms control agreements, or how large their stockpiles of fissile
material are (though Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to such a stockpile data
exchange in September 1994).
Indeed, excessive secrecy is a barrier that both countries, not just Russia, must
address. In both the United States and Russia, for example, the total number of nuclear
weapons in the stockpile—to say nothing of the breakdown by specific types—remains a
closely guarded secret, though revealing these figures could not possibly undermine either
country’s security.  In the United States, at least some substantial first steps have been
taken toward eliminating unnecessary Cold War secrecy: large areas of the nuclear
facilities have been opened to visitors, vast arrays of safety-related information has been
made public, and a number of important facts about the stockpile—the total quantity of
plutonium (and the breakdown of this plutonium stock by location, grade, and form), the
average isotopics of plutonium used in weapons, the number of nuclear weapons
dismantled year by year, and, soon, the details of the HEU stockpile—have been
declassified and made available both to the public and to Russia and other foreign
powers.40  (Prospects for further reductions in nuclear secrecy in the United States appear
slim, however, in the wake of the recent scandals surrounding alleged Chinese nuclear
espionage.41)  All of this information remains secret in Russia, and access even to the
cities surrounding the facilities where nuclear weapons work is done remains closely
controlled.  No American, for example, has ever set foot in the plants where nuclear
weapons assembly and disassembly work takes place in Russia.  Restrictions on access
and information at other facilities are so far-reaching that in some cases it has been
impossible to judge which buildings at a facility require security upgrades, as the Russian
experts at the facility cannot openly provide accurate information on what types of
materials the buildings contain.  In some cases, even the location of the building or
facility to be upgraded is considered a state secret.
As a result, U.S. estimates of the size of the Russian warhead stockpile are
officially judged to be uncertain to plus or minus 5,000 warheads, estimates of the size of
the Russian fissile material stockpile are uncertain to more than a hundred tonnes, and
assessments of the security situation at individual facilities are based on information that
ranges from nearly complete to virtually nonexistent.  In many cases, the continuing
shroud of secrecy poses enormous obstacles to cooperation that would benefit both sides’
security.
                                                
40 For a review of the U.S. Openness Initiative, see Jennifer Weeks, “Will the O’Leary Legacy Last?”
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 1998 (available at http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/BCSIA/
Library.nsf/atom).  The text of the various documents released during the course of the U.S. Openness
Initiative can be found at http://www.osti.gov/opennet/.  Remarkably, the Department of Energy has
compiled a list of all the declassified facts related to nuclear weapons design and made it available on the
internet.  See Drawing Back the Curtain of Secrecy: Restricted Data Declassification Decisions, 1946 to
the Present, Washington DC: Department of Energy, Office of Declassification, Report RDD-5, January 1,
1999 (available at http://www.doe.gov/opennet/rdd-5.html).
41 “Secrecy vs. Openness: Finding a Balance at the Department of Energy,” Proceedings of a Workshop,
Harvard University, Project on Managing the Atom, November 29, 1999, forthcoming.
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Russia’s Closed Nuclear Cities
Name Population1
Nuclear
Workforce Main Defense Role
Sarov (Arzamas-16) 83,000 21,5002
Weapons design; small weapons
assembly/ disassembly facility
Snezhinsk (Chelyabinsk-70) 48,000 15,0003 Weapons design
Zheleznogorsk (Krasnoyarsk-26) 100,000 9,5004
Plutonium production,
reprocessing
Ozersk (Chelyabinsk-65) 88,000 18,0005
Plutonium and tritium production,
plutonium and HEU weapon
component fabrication,
reprocessing
Seversk (Tomsk-7) 119,000 15,0006
Plutonium production, HEU
enrichment, plutonium and HEU
weapon component fabrication,
reprocessing
Novoural'sk (Sverdlovsk-44) 96,000 19,0007 HEU enrichment
Zelenogorsk (Krasnoyarsk-45) 67,000 13,000 HEU enrichment
Lesnoy (Sverdlovsk-45) 58,000 15,5008
Weapons assembly/
disassembly
Zarechnyy (Penza-19) 64,000 17,000
Weapons assembly/
disassembly
Trekhgornyy (Zlatoust-36) 33,000 9,000
Weapons assembly/
disassembly
Total: 756,000 140-160,0009
___________________
1 All population figures from First Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy Lev Ryabev, “The Role of the NCI in
Meeting Russia’s Nuclear Complex Challenges,” remarks to the 7th Carnegie International
Nonproliferation Conference, Washington DC, January 11-12, 1999 (available at http://www.ceip.org/
programs/npp/ryabev992.htm).
2 This includes 18,000 employees at the nuclear weapons design laboratory, and 3,500 at the Avangard
nuclear weapons assembly/disassembly facility.  See James W. Toevs, “Sarov, Russia: The Sarov
Demonstration Project,” presentation to the Forum on the European Nuclear Cities Initiative, Rome,
December 12-13, 1999.
3 Population and workforce figures from Snezhinsk Web page (www.ch70.chel.su), April 12, 1997.
4 Workforce figure provided by Krasnoyarsk-26 Deputy Director Yuri Revenko, in a discussion on May 24,
1997.  Revenko indicated that the workforce is declining.
5 Workforce figure provided by Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy Lev Ryabev in a discussion on May 24,
1997.  Ryabev indicated that 1,500 of these workers are employed at the RT-1 reprocessing plant.
6 Workforce figure provided by Tomsk-7 Director Gennadi Khandorin in a discussion on May 24, 1997.
Khandorin indicated that the workforce had declined substantially in the early 1990s, but that the current
workforce was 30 percent higher than at its minimum in 1994, as a result of commercial contracts.
7 Workforce figures for Novoural’sk and Zelenogorsk are estimated on the basis of the average 5-1 ratio of
population to nuclear workforce in the other nuclear cities.
8 In an interview on May 24, 1997, Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy Lev Ryabev indicated that
approximately 45,000 people work at the four Russian nuclear weapons assembly/dismantlement facilities.
The estimates here are based on assuming that the Avangard plant at Sarov employs 3,500 of these 45,000
(see above), and assigning the remaining workforce proportionally to the populations of those towns.
9 A range is provided to indicate the uncertainties in the available data.  Ryabev (“Role of the NCI,” op.
cit.) indicated that of these, 75,000 were employed directly in defense work, to be cut to 40,000 by 2005.
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Excessive Stockpiles and Continued Production
With the end of the Cold War, Russia and the United States both have far more
nuclear warheads than they could possibly need, and far more plutonium and HEU than
needed even to support those bloated warhead stockpiles.  According to unclassified
estimates, the United States still possesses over 12,000 nuclear weapons, and is planning
to retain some 10,000 of these (counting both strategic and tactical weapons, both those
deployed and those in reserve) even when the START I and START II arms reduction
treaties are fully implemented.42  The United States has an estimated stockpile of nearly
100 tonnes of plutonium and some 645 tonnes of HEU.43  As noted earlier, Russia is
believed to have 17,000-22,000 nuclear weapons remaining, and unclassified U.S.
estimates suggest that it has 160 tonnes of separated plutonium (counting both military
and civilian stockpiles), and 1050 tonnes of HEU.44  These remaining plutonium and
HEU stockpiles would be sufficient to support a rapid return to Cold War levels of
armament.  It is this fact, combined with the risks of nuclear theft posed by maintaining
such vast stockpiles in readily weapons-usable form, that makes disposition of nuclear
materials an urgent security issue for the United States.
Yet in Russia, production of new weapons plutonium continues, at a rate of
approximately 1.5 tonnes per year—not because Russia needs or is using the plutonium
for new weapons, but because the reactors that produce it also produce essential heat and
power for nearby communities.  Similarly, Russia’s civilian spent fuel reprocessing
enterprise continues to operate at the RT-1 plant at Mayak, separating somewhat less than
a tonne of reactor-grade (but weapons-usable) plutonium each year to add to the 30-tonne
                                                
42 See William Arkin, Robert Norris, and Joshua Handler, Taking Stock: Worldwide Nuclear Deployments,
1998, Washington, DC: Natural Resources Defense Council Nuclear Program, 1998.
43 See David Albright, Frans Berkhout, and William Walker, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium
1996: World Inventories, Capabilities, and Policies. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press for the
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1997; for the official breakdown of the U.S. plutonium
stockpile, see Plutonium: The First 50 Years, Washington DC: U.S. Department of Energy, February, 1996
(available at http://www.osti.gov/html/osti/opennet/document/pu50yrs/pu50y.html).
44 Albright, Berkhout, and Walker, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996, op. cit. These estimates
of Russia’s plutonium and HEU stockpiles have substantial uncertainties; note that their sum is over 100
tonnes less than the official estimate of the total in MPC&A Strategic Plan, op. cit.  Russian statements are
generally consistent with the Albright, Walker, and Berkhout estimates on plutonium, but some Russian
statements suggest that the HEU figure may be even higher. In a statement in April, 1996, Russian President
Boris Yeltsin indicated that the 50 tonnes of weapons plutonium to be placed at Mayak represented 40
percent of the Russian stockpile of weapons plutonium (quoted in Dirk Schiefer and Thomas Shea, “IAEA
Perspectives on Excess Materials,” in Proceedings of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, 40th
Annual Meeting, Phoenix, AZ, July 25-29, 1999), suggesting a total military stockpile in the range of 125
tonnes, along with a civilian stockpile officially declared to be just over 30 tonnes, for a total in the range of
155.  On HEU, in 1993 then-Minister of Atomic Energy Victor Mikhailov told Elizabeth Martin that the
500 tonnes of HEU covered in the U.S.-Russian HEU purchase agreement represented some 40 percent of
the Russian HEU stockpile, suggesting that the total stockpile might be as large as 1250 tonnes, 200 tonnes
more than estimated by Albright, Berkhout, and Walker. (See Martin, “A Conversation With Victor
Mikhailov,” NUKEM Market Report, October 1993.) A substantial part of this apparent difference,
however, may arise from the Albright, Berkhout, and Walker estimates being based on the number of tonnes
of equivalent 90% enriched material, which is smaller than the number of actual tonnes of less enriched
material that exists.
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stockpile already in storage there45—again, not because there is any need for this
plutonium, but because the contracts for this work from foreign countries with Soviet-
designed reactors keep nuclear workers gainfully employed.  (A new DOE initiative to
put in place a moratorium on this reprocessing is described in the next section.)
Finally, there is the problem of what to do with the enormous excess stockpiles of
plutonium and HEU in the long run.  With HEU, the answer in general terms is
straightforward (though implementation has been anything but): it can be blended with
other forms of uranium to produce non-weapons-usable low enriched uranium, which is a
valuable commercial product as fuel for nuclear power reactors.  Plutonium can also be
blended with uranium to produce fuel, but because of the special handling procedures
required by plutonium’s radiotoxicity and proliferation hazard, doing so is more
expensive than simply buying equivalent low-enriched uranium fuel on the open market,
even if the plutonium itself is considered “free.”  Moreover, in contrast to the situation
with uranium, simply blending the plutonium does not solve the proliferation problem, as
uranium can be chemically separated from the uranium without great difficulty, at least
virtually all mixes of plutonium isotopes are weapons-usable, and plutonium mixed with
until it has been irradiated in a reactor.46
In short, the problems with management of nuclear material in the former Soviet
Union that pose threats to U.S. security boil down to five categories: the materials are
insecure; their custodians are on the edge of desperation, in a complex far too large to be
sustainable; their management remains shrouded in secrecy; more weapons-usable
material continues to be produced; and no sustainable plan is yet in place for getting rid
of the enormous stockpiles of weapons-usable material that are no longer needed.  In each
of these areas, there are U.S. cooperative programs in place to address the problem, which
are making some progress—but in each of these areas far more urgently needs to be done.
                                                
45 From the end of July 1996 to the end of December 1998, for example, a period of two and a half years,
the amount of separated civil plutonium Russia declared as being either in storage at reprocessing plants or
in fabricated fuel increased by 2.1 tonnes, from 27.3 tonnes to 29.4 tonnes.  See “Communication Received
from Certain Member States Concerning Their Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium,”
INFCIRC/549/Add.9, International Atomic Energy Agency, November 11, 1998, and
INFCIRC/549/Add.9/1, International Atomic Energy Agency, May 31, 1999 (both available at
http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/infcircs/inf501-600.html).
46 Reactor-grade plutonium can be used to make nuclear weapons at all levels of sophistication.  The most
detailed unclassified official discussion of the usability of reactor-grade plutonium in weapons is in
Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment of Weapons-Usable Fissile Material Storage and Excess
Plutonium Disposition Alternatives, Washington DC: Department of Energy, DOE-NN-007, January 1997,
pp. 37−39.  This document also provides descriptions of the proliferation hazards posed by the various
steps involved in different approaches to long-term plutonium disposition.
III. THE CURRENT RESPONSE
The United States has two fundamental goals in cooperative programs related to
the control of nuclear warheads and fissile material: to reduce the risk of nuclear
proliferation, and to achieve deep, transparent, and irreversible nuclear arms reductions.
The myriad U.S. programs designed to take steps toward these goals can be divided into
five categories corresponding to the five problems just described:
• preventing theft and smuggling of nuclear weapons and material;
• stabilizing the custodians of these stockpiles, providing alternative
employment for those no longer needed, and shrinking the nuclear complexes;
• monitoring stockpiles and reductions;
• ending further production of fissile material;
• reducing stockpiles of fissile material.
 The programs in each of these areas are making significant progress and deserve
strong support; they are among the most cost-effective investments in U.S. security found
anywhere in the U.S. budget.  (Annual spending on these efforts represents less than one
quarter of one percent of the U.S. defense budget.)  The U.S. and former Soviet experts
working on these programs have managed to make enormous strides, often under
extraordinarily difficult circumstances.  If judged against the limited goals that many of
these programs initially set for themselves, much of the job is already done or well
underway.  But if judged instead by comparison to what is needed to address the threat, it
is clear that current efforts represent only a small beginning.
 This basic dichotomy is outlined in Figure 1.  Figure 1 shows the categories of
effort, capsule descriptions of the limited goals initially set in each category and the more
ambitious goals needed to address the threat, and rough percentage estimates of how
much of the work needed to accomplish both the initial limited goals and the ultimate
goals is now underway.  These percentages are purely judgmental; they do not describe
the fraction of the work already completed, but rather the larger fraction of the work that
is at least planned, and covered by budget plans in place for the next few years and
international agreements either already negotiated or well underway.
 As can be seen from the figure, in most cases 80-90% of the work needed to
achieve the initial, limited goals set for these programs is underway.  Much of that work
will be accomplished in the next few years.  But in most cases what is now underway
represents only 5-20% of what would be needed to provide real solutions to the security
threats the United States faces from these nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union.
(The exception is the area that ought in principle to be relatively simple—verifiably
stopping the production of still more weapons-usable fissile material—where a
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substantial fraction of what would ultimately be needed is at least included in proposed
budget plans and negotiations.)  The remainder of this section will describe in some detail
the programs underway in each of these five areas, the progress they have made, and what
remains to be done—providing the background for each of the percentage judgments in
Figure 1.
 
 Figure 1: Control of Fissile Material: How Much Are We Doing So Far?
 
 
 Category
 
 Objective (Past vs. Ideal)
 Percent
 Underway
(Notional)
 
 Install modern security and accounting systems
 
 80%  Preventing Theft and
Smuggling  Achieve effective and sustainable security  20%
 Provide short-term jobs for top weapons
scientists
 80%
 
 
 
 Stabilizing Nuclear
Custodians  Achieve sustainable economics in a smaller
nuclear complex
 10%
Achieve transparency for HEU deal and Mayak
storage facility
 
 80% 
 
 Monitoring Reductions Provide wide-ranging transparency base needed
for deep reductions
 
 5%
Convert or shut down plutonium production
reactors
 
 90% 
 
 Ending Further
Production  Verifiably end all HEU and separated Pu
production
 50%
 
 
 Reducing Stockpiles
 Gain implementable agreement on 34 tonnes of
Pu, fix 500-tonne HEU deal
 60%
  Reduce  Pu, HEU to levels needed to support
deep-cuts stockpiles
 10%
 In his State of the Union address in January 1999, President Clinton announced an
Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative (ETRI), ostensibly focused on dealing with
safeguards for nuclear materials as a key priority.  The reality, however, is that with
respect to programs for safeguarding nuclear materials, ETRI simply maintained flat
funding for existing programs, canceling previously planned cutbacks, with no substantial
increases or new initiatives.  While a useful step, therefore, ETRI is not the answer: even
if all the programs envisioned under the ETRI effort received full funding, much more
would remain to be done (see “The Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative,” p. 62).  The
$100 million increment to ETRI announced in February 2000 as a “Long-Term
Nonproliferation Program for Russia,” while deserving strong support, also represents
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A “mantrap” installed as part of U.S.-Russian
cooperation at the Kurchatov Institute in Moscow,
which allows in only authorized workers with
appropriate magnetized identification cards and
personal code numbers, and detects any attempt to
bring weapons in or nuclear material out of the
facility.  Hundreds of tonnes of nuclear material in
Russia is still in buildings not equipped with
detectors at the doors that would reliably detect
individuals carrying plutonium or HEU out the
door.  Source: DOE
only a fraction of what needs to be done to cooperate with the states of the former Soviet
Union to secure, monitor, and reduce nuclear stockpiles (see “DOE’s Proposed Long-
Term Nonproliferation Program for Russia,” p. 70).
 
Preventing Theft and Smuggling
 
 A variety of programs are in place
to directly improve security and accounting
for nuclear weapons and materials in the
former Soviet Union, and to interdict
nuclear smuggling.  The United States has
(a) a cooperative material protection,
control, and accounting (MPC&A)
program designed to improve security and
accounting for nuclear material in the
former Soviet Union, funded by the
Department of Energy (DOE); (b) a
program to build a secure storage facility
for fissile material from dismantled
weapons at Mayak, funded by the
Department of Defense (DOD); (c) an
effort to provide equipment for improving
security of nuclear weapon storage and
transport, also funded by DOD; (d)
programs that have removed weapons-usable nuclear material from selected particularly
vulnerable sites; and (e) several programs in Defense, Energy, Customs, and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation to cooperate with relevant countries in improving capabilities to
stop nuclear smuggling. Other countries have modest cooperative programs contributing
to MPC&A (particularly in the non-Russian states of the former Soviet Union), nuclear
smuggling interdiction, and (in the case of Japan) containers for the Mayak storage
facility.
 
 MPC&A
 
 The MPC&A program has made substantial progress in recent years, but has an
enormously long road yet to travel.1  There are now agreements in place to cooperate at
                                                
 1 For official summaries of the MPC&A program, see MPC&A Program Strategic Plan, op. cit.; and
Kenneth B. Sheely and Mary Alice Hayward, “New Strategic Directions in the MPC&A Program,” in
Proceedings of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, 40th Annual Meeting, Phoenix, AZ, July
25-29, 1999 (available at http://www.dp.doe.gov/nn/mpca/pubs/frame_tec.htm).  For other recent
summaries, see Oleg Bukharin, Matthew Bunn, and Kenneth N. Luongo, Renewing the Partnership:
Recommendations for Accelerated Action to Secure Nuclear Material in the Former Soviet Union,
(Washington DC: Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council, forthcoming); Protecting Nuclear
Material In Russia, op. cit.;  William C. Potter and Fred L. Wehling, “Sustainable Nuclear Material
Security in Russia: Commitment, Consolidation, and Culture,” presentation to the American Association for
the Advancement of Slavic Studies, 31st National Convention, St. Louis, MO, November 18-21, 1999;
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virtually every facility in the former Soviet Union where HEU or plutonium outside of
weapons is located. A new government-to-government umbrella agreement governing the
program was reached between the United States and Russia on October 2, 1999.2  The
United States had allocated $573 million to this cooperation through March 1999, with
the program budget at $150 million in fiscal year (FY) 2000, and $172 million more
requested for FY2001 (see “DOE’s Proposed Long-Term Nonproliferation Initiative for
Russia,” p. 70).3  Hundreds of U.S. and Russian experts are at work designing and
installing improved MPC&A systems.  As of May 1999, security and accounting system
upgrades had been declared completed at all of the nine sites in the non-Russian states of
the former Soviet Union where separated plutonium or HEU is still located, along with 11
sites in Russia.4  Security and accounting equipment upgrades for 50 tonnes of weapons-
usable material were expected to be completed by the end of 1999, with an additional 50
tonnes to be added by the end of 2000.5  Particularly remarkable progress is being made
in working with the Russian Navy to secure HEU naval fuel.6
 The MPC&A program is also undertaking a variety of efforts that go well beyond
equipment upgrades at individual sites.  First, the program is sponsoring a substantial set
of initiatives to train MPC&A operators, managers, and regulators.7  The program has
                                                                                                                                                
Emily Ewell Daughtry and Fred Wehling, “Cooperative Efforts to Secure Fissile Material in the NIS:
Shortcomings, Successes, and Recommendations for the Future,” Nonproliferation Review, forthcoming;
National Research Council, Committee on Dual Use Technologies Export Control and Materials Protection
Control and Accountability, Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and
Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union, Washington DC: National
Academy Press, 1997; James Doyle, “Improving Nuclear Materials Security in the Former Soviet Union:
Next Steps for the MPC&A Program,” Arms Control Today,  March 1998; Bunn and Holdren, “Managing
Military Uranium and Plutonium,” op. cit.; and Perry, “Securing Russian Materials,” op. cit.
2 A press release on this event, and the text of the agreement itself, can be found at
http://www.dp.doe.gov/nn/mpca/frame04.htm, and http://www.dp.doe.gov/nn/mpca/frame05.htm,
respectively.
 3 For the total, see Fact Sheet: U.S. Commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, Washington DC: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Nonproliferation, May 3, 1999; for the
FY2000 and FY2001 figures, see FY2001 DOE Budget Request to Congress, U.S. Department of Energy,
February 7, 2000 (available at http://www.cfo.doe.gov/budget/01budget/index.htm); the FY2001 request
includes $150 million in the core MPC&A program, and $20 million more for MPC&A efforts at Mayak
and the Russian Navy, and for MPC&A consolidation, in a $100 million proposed “Long-Term
Nonproliferation Program for Russia.”  See Fact Sheet: Long-Term Nonproliferation Program for Russia,
U.S. Department of Energy, February 7, 2000.
 4 Significant Milestones in Securing and Controlling Nuclear Materials, Washington DC: Department of
Energy, May 1999.
 5 Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation and National Security, Department of Energy,
“The Importance of Sustainability in Securing Nuclear Material in the Former Soviet Union,” paper
presented at “Global '99: Nuclear Technology— Bridging the Millenia,” Jackson Hole, Wyoming, 30
August-2 September 1999 (available at http://www.dp.doe.gov/nn/mpca/pubs/frame_tec.htm).
6 See Adm. Nikolai Yurasov, “Modernization of Navy Nuclear Fuel Storage Protection,” in Proceedings of
the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, 40th Annual Meeting, Phoenix, AZ, July 25-29, 1999, and
James Clay Moltz, “Assessing U.S. Assistance Program for Submarine Dismantlement and the Naval Fuel
Cycle,” forthcoming in Nonproliferation Review.
7 For a useful discussion of MPC&A training programs, see Todd Perry, “Coordinating U.S.-Sponsored
MPC&A Training: A Prerequisite for Sustainable Russian MPC&A Upgrades,” in Proceedings of Global
'99: Nuclear Technology- Bridging the Millenia, Jackson Hole, Wyoming, 30 August-2 September 1999,
La Grange Park, IL: American Nuclear Society, 1999.
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also undertaken efforts to improve the national-level MPC&A systems in Russia and
other former Soviet states, including establishing computerized national nuclear material
inventory systems, upgrading the security of fissile material transportation, and helping
the former Soviet states establish effective MPC&A regulatory programs—a particularly
critical factor if site managers are to be given the necessary incentives to put resources
toward effective MPC&A.8
 Recently, realizing the enormous size of the job of ensuring effective security and
accounting at all of the nearly 400 buildings where nuclear material is now located, the
United States and Russia have launched new efforts to consolidate material at fewer
buildings within sites, and to remove material from some sites entirely.  Within the
Russian Navy, for example, the number of sites with fresh HEU fuel has been reduced
from 20 to three; at the Luch Production Association near Moscow, the number of
buildings containing HEU has been reduced from 30 to five.  Under the new
consolidation initiative, the United States will pay Russia to bring HEU from potentially
vulnerable facilities to Luch or Dmitrovgrad to be blended to non-weapons-usable 19%
enriched LEU, which can then be stored or further blended and sold.  A pilot project has
been agreed to under which at least one site would have all of its HEU completely
removed each year for several years, and several tonnes of HEU would be blended to
LEU over that period.9
 Finally, after providing emergency assistance—from food and warm uniforms for
guards to backup electricity supplies—in the aftermath of the August 1998 financial
crisis, the program has undertaken a new focus on “sustainability” of upgrades over the
long term—focusing so far on making sure that equipment installed with U.S. assistance
can be maintained. 10  Indeed, the mission statement of the program has been changed to
include consolidation and sustainability as fundamental goals of the effort.
 Overall, the progress in MPC&A has been substantial enough to have spillover
benefits in other areas: for example, the director of one of the facilities in Russia where
deadly biological pathogens are stored was concerned about the possibility that some of
                                                
8 For a summary of the U.S. efforts at regulatory support, see Fredric Morris et al., “Creating the Regulatory
Base for MPC&A in the Russian Federation: Challenges and Strategy,” in Proceedings of the Institute of
Nuclear Materials Management, 40th Annual Meeting, Phoenix, AZ, July 25-29, 1999.
9 For discussions of the material consolidation efforts, see Gottemoeller, “The Importance of
Sustainability,” op. cit., and Thomas Wander and Neil R. Zack, “The MPC&A Material Consolidation and
Conversion Project: Exploring the Material Conversion Option,” in Proceedings of the Institute of Nuclear
Materials Management, 40th Annual Meeting, Phoenix, AZ, July 25-29, 1999.  For a brief description of
the pilot project, see “Significant Milestones Reached for the MPC&A Program’s Material Consolidation
and Conversion Project,” September/October 1999 MPC&A News, available at
http://www.dp.doe.gov/nn/mpca/frame04.htm.
10 For official summaries of the sustainability effort, see Gottemoeller, “The Importance of Sustainability,”
op. cit.; Carrie Smarto et al., “MPC&A Site Operations and Sustainability: A Policy Overview,” in
Proceedings of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, 40th Annual Meeting, Phoenix, AZ, July
25-29, 1999 (available at http://www.dp.doe.gov/nn/mpca/pubs/frame_tec.htm); and Michael Haase et. al.,
“Material Protection, Control, and Accountancy (MPC&A) Sustainability,” in Proceedings of the Institute
of Nuclear Materials Management, 40th Annual Meeting, Phoenix, AZ, July 25-29, 1999.  For unofficial
reviews of the issue, see Potter and Wehling, “Sustainable Nuclear Material Security,” op. cit.; Bukharin,
Bunn, and Luongo, Renewing the Partnership, op. cit.; and Todd Perry, “From Triage to Long-Term Care:
A U.S. NGO Perspective on the Future of the MPC&A Program,” in Proceedings of the Institute of Nuclear
Materials Management, 40th Annual Meeting, Phoenix, AZ, July 25-29, 1999.
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these materials might be stolen, had heard about the cooperative work to improve security
for nuclear materials at Chelyabinsk-70, which was near his facility, and proposed a
cooperative security upgrade plan to the United States based on the MPC&A work down
the road.11
 Despite this record, the vast
majority of the work required
remains to be done.  The 100 tonnes
of nuclear material expected to be
housed in facilities with fully
upgraded MPC&A systems by the
end of 2000 represents only one-
sixth of the non-weapons fissile
material in the former Soviet Union.
While progress has been made at a
wide range of other facilities that
are not yet close to completion,
most fissile material in the former
Soviet Union is housed in buildings
whose security and accounting
systems have not yet been
substantially upgraded.  There are
still some sensitive facilities with
very large quantities of fissile
material where Russia has been
unwilling to grant any access to at
all (such as the nuclear weapons assembly/disassembly facilities and the HEU fuel
fabrication line at Elektrostal), and as a result, no cooperative upgrades at these facilities
have been accomplished, and in late 1999 the U.S. MPC&A management team put a hold
on further efforts at those sites.
 While equipment for material accounting is being provided, efforts to conduct real
inventories are languishing.12  Only modest progress has been made in putting in place
effective MPC&A regulation, with the teeth to fine or shut down facilities that fail to
meet standards—without which facility managers have little incentive to devote resources
from tight budgets to ensuring adequate safeguards and security.  Most significantly, the
former Soviet economies are only beginning uneven recoveries from their deep
depressions, and the challenge of ensuring sustainable security after the period of initial
upgrading is completed remains a fundamental one.  Today, there are facilities in the
former Soviet Union where some U.S.-provided equipment is simply not being used, as
                                                
 11 Remarks by Anne Harrington, Senior Coordinator for Nonproliferation/Science Cooperation, U.S.
Department of State, at the conference on “Assessing U.S. Dismantlement and Nonproliferation Assistance
Programs in the Newly Independent States,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of
International Studies, Monterey, California, December 11-13, 1999.
12 See, for example, Potter at the 1999 Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference, op. cit.; see also
David D. Wilkey and Charles R. Hatcher, “Implementation of Materials Accounting in Russia,” in
Proceedings of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, 40th Annual Meeting, Phoenix, AZ, July
25-29, 1999.
Nuclear material accounting equipment, provided with U.S.
assistance.  Many facilities in the former Soviet Union do not
have accurate, measured inventories of the material on hand,
and do not have reliable means of detecting whether material
has been tampered with, making it difficult to know if material
has been stolen.  Material accounting is moving more slowly
than other parts of the MPC&A program.  Source: DOE
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the facilities do not have the money to operate and maintain it, or the incentive to use
what little money they have for that purpose.  While the MPC&A program’s initial work
on improving the sustainability of MPC&A upgrades is laudable, much more remains to
be done: the challenge of fostering change in Soviet-era thinking and habits is a difficult
one, particularly in an environment in which the former Soviet participants face a wide
range of other urgent problems, some as basic as providing the necessities of life for
themselves and their families.
 It is now clear that the MPC&A job will be larger and more challenging than
originally anticipated—as the Administration acknowledged in its ETRI proposals.  Early
planning envisioned that initial upgrades would be completed by 2002, that by this time
the economies of the former Soviet states would have improved, and that therefore
maintenance and further improvement of the installed systems could be handed off to
them with only modest needs for further U.S. assistance.  The total U.S. program cost
envisioned was less than a billion dollars.  Since those plans were made, expanding U.S.-
Russian cooperation has expanded the U.S. understanding of the scope of the work to be
done: it has become clear that there are significantly more buildings containing fissile
material than had been envisioned, that the scope of required upgrades is even larger than
had been thought, and that the need for continued funding for sustainability is much
greater than had been envisioned.13  At current funding levels, it is now expected to be
more than a decade before even initial MPC&A upgrades are completed for all the HEU
and plutonium in the former Soviet Union—a program pace that simply does not
correspond to the urgency of the threat.
 Moreover, political and management issues in both Russia and the United States
continue to pose significant obstacles to MPC&A progress.  As noted above, Russian
restrictions on access to facilities (and U.S. reactions to them) have slowed progress at a
number of facilities.  Worse, virtually all levels of the Russian system, from the President
to managers of individual areas handling nuclear material, have generally placed low
priority on improving safeguards and security when allocating their financial and
personnel resources (though there are some modest signs of improvement in this respect
at MINATOM, which has recently developed its own plan for MPC&A upgrades
throughout its complex).14  At the same time, Russia has attempted to impose taxes on the
U.S. assistance, which reduces both the amount of the assistance available for its intended
purpose and the political support for the assistance in the United States.  In the United
States, the President, Vice President, the National Security Advisor, and Cabinet
secretaries have given only sporadic attention to this issue, have allowed problems at the
working level to fester, and have only rarely put security for nuclear material on the top of
the security agenda with Russia where it belongs.  A prolonged period of interagency
disputes over how to implement the program was followed—after full budget and
program responsibility was shouldered by DOE in FY1996—by an equally prolonged
period of pulling and hauling between different factions with different approaches at
DOE headquarters and the DOE laboratories.
 From a Russian perspective, these internal U.S. disputes have resulted in frequent
and seemingly arbitrary changes in both the U.S. personnel managing activities at
                                                
 13 See discussion in National Research Council, Protecting Nuclear Material in Russia, op. cit.
14 Interviews with Russian officials, October, 1999.
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A secure storage facility for plutonium and HEU from
dismantled weapons under construction at Mayak, financed
by the U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction program.  The
facility will provide a highly secure storage site, and is
expected to be placed under international monitoring—but
unless additional modules are built, it will not have the
capacity to store all the material from Russia’s dismantled
warheads, and U.S.-Russian discussions of transparency for
the facility have not yet reached agreement.  Source: DOD
particular sites, and the approaches being taken.15  Only the most modest efforts have
been made to coordinate the MPC&A program with the many other fissile material-
related efforts described in this report.  The personnel resources devoted to the effort have
been so slim that many of those involved are suffering from exhaustion and burn-out, and
have no time to work seriously on envisioning and implementing new approaches.
 
   MAYAK STORAGE FACILITY
 
 In parallel with the MPC&A
program, which is largely designed to
improve security for fissile material
at the facilities where it has been
located, the U.S. Department of
Defense has been helping Russia
design and build a new secure
storage facility for plutonium and
HEU from dismantled weapons, at
Ozersk (formerly Chelyabinsk-65).16
Russian officials had stressed in the
early 1990s that the limited capacity
of the available storage space for this
material could pose a major
stumbling block to continued
warhead dismantlement, and that the
locations where this material was
then being stored did not meet
modern safety and security
requirements.17  After years of
delays, the first module of the facility, capable of holding 25,000 fissile material
containers (the result of the dismantlement of about 8,000 warheads, as each warhead
results in 3−4 containers of fissile material), is now coming along well, and is expected to
open in 2002.  (The United States and Japan are also supplying the containers.)
Originally, the facility was planned to have two modules, for a total of 50,000 containers,
and indeed, a second facility of equal size was to be built at another site, to accommodate
all the excess fissile material from dismantled Russian weapons.  Costs have been rising
                                                
 15 A prominent example is the issue of access: after U.S. teams negotiated and agreed on arrangements for
ensuring that U.S.-provided equipment was used appropriately at sites where the Russian side indicated it
would not be possible to grant access to U.S. personnel, in the fall of 1999 the U.S. side turned around and
rejected the agreed procedures, demanded direct access by U.S. personnel, and cut off further work at the
relevant sites until such access was granted.  (Interviews with U.S. and Russian participants.)
 16 Some of the background of this facility is summarized in U.S. General Accounting Office, Weapons of
Mass Destruction: Effort to Reduce Russian Arsenals May Cost More, Achieve Less Than Planned,
Washington DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO/NSIAD-99-76, April 1999.
 17 For an account of storage of fissile material from dismantled weapons at Tomsk-7, calling attention to
remarkable security deficiencies there, see Alexander Bolsunovsky and Valery Meshchikov, “Nuclear
Security is Inadequate and Outdated,” Moscow News, No. 49 (December 9-15, 1994).
The Current Response 37
as delays continue, however, and while the construction cost was once to have been split
50/50 between Russia and the United States, Russia has indicated that it will not be able
to pay its half; as a result, the Defense Department has deferred anything beyond the first
module of the first facility for now.  If a decision is made to proceed with the second
module, it could be completed by 2006.
 This first wing will not be sufficient even to hold the material from all the
weapons Russia has already dismantled, let alone material from additional
dismantlement.  Moreover, unless the Congressional requirement that this facility hold
only material from dismantled warheads is modified in the future, it will not be possible
to use the Mayak building as a secure place to consolidate vulnerable stockpiles of fissile
material from elsewhere in the former Soviet Union (even if additional capacity for that
purpose were eventually made available at Mayak).  While it was originally envisioned
that the material stored in Mayak would be in the form of metal plutonium and HEU
components from dismantled weapons, in the wake of President Yeltsin’s offer to make
the facility available for IAEA verification, MINATOM decided to convert all the
material to metal slugs no longer identifiable as components before placing them in the
facility—even though the United States, Russia, and the IAEA are working to develop
means to carry out monitoring of containers holding weapons components without
revealing classified information (as described below).  The United States and MINATOM
are discussing the provision of substantial U.S. assistance for reshaping the plutonium
components (or “pits”), packaging the resulting shapes, and shipping them to the Mayak
storage facility, but this assistance is contingent on agreement on transparency measures
for the process, and as of late 1999 there had been virtually no progress toward that
objective.  Indeed, for the Mayak project overall, no agreement has yet been reached on
the transparency measures the United States has sought, in return for its assistance, to
meet Congressional requirements to confirm that (a) the material in the facility comes
from dismantled weapons, (b) the material is safe and secure, and (c) the material is not
being returned to weapons (see discussion under monitoring, below).18
 
 NUCLEAR WARHEAD SECURITY
 
 The U.S. DOD and the Russian Ministry of Defense have been cooperating for
several years to improve security for nuclear warheads themselves. 19  The cooperation
                                                
18 The principal transparency difficulty relates to confirming that the material comes from weapons, which
is complicated by the fact that the material arriving at the facility will no longer be in the form of weapons
components—which would be resolved if the negotiations over transparency for the conversion of the
components could be addressed.  For further description of the issues, see the discussion of monitoring
stockpiles and reductions, below.
 19 For a discussion of this effort, see John Leppingwell and Nikolai Sokov, “Assessment of Delivery
Vehicle Elimination and Weapons Protection, Control, and Accounting,” Nonproliferation Review,
forthcoming. A useful earlier description from a Russian perspective can be found in Gen. Evgeniy Maslin
(former commander, 12th Main Directorate), “Russian-U.S. Cooperation on Nuclear Weapons Safety,” in
John M. Shields and William C. Potter, eds., Dismantling the Cold War: U.S. and NIS Perspectives on the
Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, CSIA Studies in
International Security, 1997.  More recent brief descriptions of this cooperation can be found in Gen. Igor
Valynkin, press conference, February 3, 1999, Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, Federal
Information Systems Corporation; Gen. Evgeniy Maslin, “The CTR Program and Russia’s National
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Fifty sets of security fencing such as that shown above are
being provided by the Cooperative Threat Reduction
program to help upgrade security at Russian nuclear
warhead storage sites.  Nuclear warheads are believed to be
much more secure than fissile material, but even in this
sector, low and intermittent pay and increasing reports of
crime and poor morale have raised security concerns.
Source: DOD
first focused on transportation, with
the provision of security upgrade kits
for railcars, secure blankets,
“supercontainers” for warhead
transport and storage, and the like.
While that effort continues, efforts are
now underway to improve security and
accounting of warheads in storage as
well, with the provision of computers
for creating a real-time accounting
system (replacing the paper accounting
systems of the past), equipment and
training for screening personnel, and
improved security equipment for
actual warhead sites.  A “model”
facility has been established at
Sergeyev Posad to demonstrate
modern equipment, which the United
States can then supply at Russian request for installation at actual warhead storage sites.
(The United States has also supplied computer software tools for assessing security
vulnerabilities at such sites and designing improvements to correct them.) The Sergeyev
Posad facility will also serve as a training center for warhead security forces.
 While the transportation security program is nearly complete, the storage security
program is still in its early stages.  “Quick fix” fencing and sensor systems to upgrade
outer perimeters is now being procured for 50 storage sites, and more elaborate upgrades
including sensors and other equipment for the interior of facilities are planned for the
future.  Access is still a fundamental issue slowing these upgrades, however: under U.S.
Department of Defense rules the United States needs to be able to have some means of
confirming that U.S.-supplied equipment is being used for the purposes intended at the
facilities intended, while under current Russian rules, the very locations of these storage
facilities remain state secrets (despite the fact that General Habiger was allowed to visit a
few of them).  Resolving this issue so as to allow the upgrades to move forward is likely
to require very high-level negotiations.20
 
 REMOVING MATERIAL FROM VULNERABLE SITES
 
 In some cases, the United States and its cooperative partners in the former Soviet
Union have concluded that it makes more sense to relocate the material to a safer location
than to try to protect it in place.  In November, 1994, after more than a year of secret
discussions and preparation, nearly 600 kilograms of weapons-usable HEU was airlifted
                                                                                                                                                
Security Interests,” Yaderny Kontrol Digest, Vol. 5, No. 1, Winter 2000; and U.S. Department of Defense,
“Secretary Tours Russian Defense Facility, Nuclear Weapons Security Projects Viewed at Sergiev Posad,”
press release, February 1998.
 20 Briefing by Gen. Thomas Kuenning (ret.), Director Cooperative Threat Reduction, Center for
Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey, California, December 13, 1999.
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from the Ulba facility at Ust-Kamenogorsk in Kazakhstan to the United States, in what
was known as Project Sapphire. The Kazakh government had indicated to the United
States that the material could not be adequately protected at Ulba, and there were
indications that Iranian representatives had expressed interest in the material.  The United
States paid for the operation, and in effect purchased the material from Kazakhstan with
both cash and promises of assistance for other projects.21  After shipment to the United
States, the material was blended to non-weapons-usable LEU under IAEA safeguards.
Similarly, in 1997, again after more than a year of secret discussions and preparations,
several kilograms of HEU—some fresh and some irradiated—were removed from a
research facility near Tbilisi, Georgia, and shipped to the British reprocessing plant at
Dounreay for processing (with U.S. funding and assistance), in an effort known as Project
Auburn Endeavor.22  Finally, the United States and the Kazakh governments are
considering a project to ship irradiated fuel elements from a Kazakh breeder reactor
located on the shores of the Caspian Sea across from Iran, which are no longer radioactive
enough to provide much of a barrier to theft, and some of which contain “ivory-grade”
plutonium (that is, plutonium with an even lower percentage of undesirable isotopes than
typical weapons-grade plutonium) to a more secure site deep within Kazakhstan.23
Although each of these efforts involved relatively modest quantities of material, the
intricacies of inter-government negotiation, long-distance shipment, safety assessments
and preparations, and the like led to each of them taking months of effort and costing tens
of millions of dollars.  Moreover, as noted above, a new effort to consolidate material
within Russia is being undertaken as part of the MPC&A program—and there have been
some Russian expressions of interest in the idea of including not only material within
Russia but other material that originated in the Soviet Union as well, with a small amount
of DOE funding allocated to that goal in the FY2001 request.24  As described in Section
IV of this report, such efforts can and should be radically expanded and accelerated.
 
 NUCLEAR SMUGGLING INTERDICTION
 
 Once fissile material has been removed from authorized control, much of the
battle is already lost—finding stolen fissile material within a country, or detecting and
interdicting its passage across borders, are herculean tasks, in most cases only practicable
if good intelligence and police work tells officials where to look.  Nevertheless, a “second
line of defense” designed to help catch nuclear thieves and interdict nuclear smuggling is
                                                
 21 For a detailed account, see Potter, “Project Sapphire,” op. cit.
 22 See, for example, Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. and Britain Relocate a Cache of Nuclear Fuel,” New York
Times, April 20, 1998, and Toby Dalton, “Tbilisi: The Tip of the Nuclear Iceberg,” Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, Issue Brief No. 1, April 23, 1998 (available at http://www.ceip.org/nnp).
 23 See, for example, Steve Goldstein, “U.S. Plots Move of Plutonium From Risky Site Near Iran,”
Philadelphia Inquirer, September 6, 1998; after the Goldstein story was written, the projected cost of the
move increased, and assessments of the security of the fuel at its existing site became more optimistic.
Hence, in December 1999, the U.S. and Kazakh governments agreed simply to continue studying various
options for longer-term storage of this material, rather than moving it immediately.  See “U.S., Kazakhstan
Agree to Decommission, Secure Kazakhstani Nuclear Reactor Near Iranian Border,” Department of Energy
press release, December 21, 1999.
24 Fact Sheet: Long-Term Nonproliferation Program for Russia, op. cit.
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an important part of the overall effort, especially as visibly increasing the apparent
likelihood of being caught may offer some deterrent effect against smuggling.  Limited
efforts are being pursued by the United States and other countries to exchange
intelligence, coordinate responses, and train and equip police, intelligence forces, customs
agencies, and border guards in the relevant states.25
 A “Programme for Preventing and Combatting Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear
Material” agreed at the P-8 Nuclear Safety and Security Summit in Moscow in April 1996
has made slow progress to date.  It has focused primarily on developing information
exchange mechanisms (still a difficult issue where sensitive police, intelligence, or
military nuclear information is involved), expanding the number of countries involved,
and a series of conferences and development activities related to “nuclear forensics”—
means to help determine the origin of a seized sample of nuclear material.  Many of the
international efforts to exchange information and consult on possible responses in these
areas are now being coordinated by the IAEA.26
 A variety of U.S. agencies have been providing specific training and equipment to
relevant states to deal with nuclear smuggling.  With funding from DOD, the U.S.
Customs Service has provided training and equipment to customs and border officials in
key states outside of Russia.  Similarly, also with DOD funding, the FBI has been
working to provide training to police and other officials in relevant countries, generally at
the International Law Enforcement Academy in Budapest, but increasingly in-country as
well.  Between them, these programs are planned to receive $17 million over fiscal 2000-
2004.27  The Department of Energy has launched a “Second Line of Defense” effort
focused on customs and border posts within Russia itself, which has installed nuclear
material detectors at three key border transit points (including Moscow’s Sheremetyevo
airport and two points at Astrakhan on the Caspian Sea).  Working closely with the
Russian State Customs Committee, the Second Line of Defense program has identified 22
high-priority transit points for installation of equipment.  The Russian customs officials
have been highly motivated to participate and to sustain the equipment because it brings
in revenue by detecting various other types of isotopes on which insufficient duties have
been paid.  The program was funded at $3 million dollars in FY2000, and $3 million
more is planned for FY2001 (from the State Department’s Nonproliferation and
Disarmament Fund).  With only a few million in additional funding, equipment could be
rapidly installed at all of the critical transit points identified—and much the same could
be done for the states outside of Russia as well.28  Some of these programs provide
                                                
25 For a recent summary of the U.S. part of this effort, see Scott Parrish and Tamara Robinson, “An
Assessment of U.S. Nonproliferation Assistance to the NIS: Export Controls, Illicit Trafficking, and
Braindrain,” Nonproliferation Review, forthcoming.  For summaries  of DOE’s efforts, see Lara Cantuti and
Lee Thomas, “The Second Line of Defense Program,” in Proceedings of the Institute of Nuclear Materials
Management, 40th Annual Meeting, Phoenix, AZ, July 25-29, 1999, and Countering the Threat: DOE’s
Nuclear Smuggling Program Plan, Washington DC: Department of Energy, March 1997.
26 For an official summary of the IAEA’s activities in this area, see “Measures Against Illicit Trafficking in
Nuclear Materials and Other Radioactive Sources,” report to the IAEA General Conference, GC(43)/13,
Vienna, Austria: IAEA, August 30, 1999 (available at http://www.iaea.or.at/GC/gc43/documents/gc43-
13.html).
 27 Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative, op. cit.
28 Interview with DOE official.
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equipment and training explicitly intended to address the widespread problem of
corruption among border patrol and customs forces—for example equipment for
detecting nuclear material that is equipped with video cameras that send an image of the
transactions that take place to another location less readily accessible for a bribe.
 Several departments—particularly State, but also Commerce and Energy, among
others—also have programs designed to strengthen export controls and border security
more generally, which provide an important foundation for nuclear smuggling
interdiction efforts.29  To date, however, U.S. programs focused on interdicting nuclear
smuggling have been piecemeal and have not yet gelled into a comprehensive plan.
 
 In short, as suggested in Figure 1, if one judges the MPC&A program and other
efforts to prevent theft and smuggling of nuclear material by the limited goal of providing
initial hardware upgrades and associated training, then the programs are well on their
way, and perhaps 80 percent or more of the job is covered by plans, budgets, and
agreements already in place.  But if the goal is to achieve effective and sustainable
security for all the weapons-usable nuclear material in the former Soviet Union, what is
now underway represents something
closer to 20% of what is needed.
Achieving that objective within a few
years would require a dramatic increase
in both financial and personnel
resources and political leadership
devoted to the problem.  The shape of
such an expanded and accelerated
program is outlined in Section IV of this
report.
 Stabilizing Nuclear Custodians
 
 As essential as efforts to improve
security systems for warheads and
materials are, they will not solve the
proliferation problem if the people who
guard and manage nuclear weapons and
materials are desperate, ill-paid, underfed, unable to provide for their families, and
embedded in a larger culture of crime and corruption.  To address the desperation that
could lead to theft of nuclear material or sale of nuclear knowledge, it is critical to (a)
help Russia reduce the size of its nuclear complex (both military and civilian) to a level it
                                                
29 In the State Department’s Freedom Support Act funds, there is a substantial program on export control
and border security for the newly independent states, funded at $40 million in FY2000.  Similarly, in State’s
Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, De-mining and Related (NADR) account, there is an export control
support program—which also pays for some detection equipment related to nuclear smuggling—which was
funded at $10 million in FY2000 (for activities worldwide, not just in the former Soviet Union). And as
noted in the text, some funding from State’s Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund goes to support
activities to counter nuclear smuggling, including programs administered by the State Department and by
others.
A commercial diamond-cutting line (financed by a South
Korean firm) is among the civilian enterprises employing
former nuclear weapons workers in Sarov, home of
Russia’s largest nuclear weapons laboratory.
Source: Los Alamos
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can afford to maintain safely and securely, including helping to provide alternative
employment for the excess nuclear scientists and workers, and (b) work with Russia to
ensure that the scientists, workers, and guards who remain as custodians of nuclear
weapons, materials, and information are adequately paid, fed, and housed.  The second of
these objectives is largely something Russia will have to do for itself; taxpayers from
other countries cannot be expected to pay for the maintenance of a nuclear stockpile
aimed at them.  But that makes it all the more essential to help Russia shrink its complex
to a size Russia can sustain on its own, appropriate to the complex’s post-Cold War
missions—which is every bit as much in Russia’s interest as it is in the
 U.S. interest.  From the U.S. point of view, shrinking the Russian weapons complex is
also essential to reduce Russia’s currently huge capability to fabricate new nuclear
weapons, should circumstances change.  Moreover, such programs can harness the
considerable technical skills of Russia’s nuclear scientists both to Russia’s economic
recovery and to providing useful scientific and technological input to U.S. programs.
Several U.S. and international programs are underway which focus on different aspects of
these issues.
 
 THE HEU PURCHASE AGREEMENT AND COMMERCIAL DEALS
 
 Large-scale commercial and quasi-commercial deals are currently the largest
sources of hard currency available to stabilize the giant Russian nuclear complex.  The
U.S.-Russian HEU Purchase Agreement (described below), in which the United States is
buying low-enriched uranium (LEU) blended from HEU from dismantled Russian nuclear
weapons, provides hundreds of millions of dollars a year—the income for most of the
remaining workers at several of Russia’s largest nuclear weapons complex sites.
Similarly, several Russian nuclear sites have commercial contracts providing enrichment,
reprocessing, or fuel fabrication services to foreign customers, which provide larger
income streams than foreign assistance programs generally do.  Few attempts have been
made, however, to tie any of these contracts or agreements to conversion efforts or
nuclear security improvements.
 
 SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION PROGRAMS
 
 The International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in Moscow, the similar
center in Kiev, and a variety of lab-to-lab programs are already employing thousands of
former Soviet weapons scientists in useful civilian work.30  As its name implies, the ISTC
                                                
 30 For a discussion of U.S. programs intended to employ former weapons scientists in general, see Parrish
and Robinson, “An Assessment of U.S. Nonproliferation Assistance to the NIS,” op. cit.; for the nuclear
portion considered in this paper, see also Sharon Weiner, Nuclear Cities News, Vol. 1, Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Center for Energy and Environmental Studies and Russian-American Nuclear Security
Advisory Council, December 1999 (available at www.princeton.edu/~ransac).  For information on the ISTC
in particular, see the Center’s web site (www.istc.ru) and the website for the similar center in Ukraine
(www.stcu.kiev.ua).  See also National Research Council, Committee to Assess the International Science
and Technology Center, An Assessment of the International Science and Technology Center: Redirecting
Expertise in Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Former Soviet Union, Washington DC: National
Academy Press, 1996; Glenn E. Schweitzer (first director of the Moscow ISTC), Moscow DMZ: The Story
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is a broad international effort, with funding from the United States, the European Union,
Japan, and other countries, and staff drawn from both donor and recipient states.  The
ISTC has provided grants to some 24,000 former weapons scientists (many of them for
only a small fraction of their time, however), for 835 projects, with international funding
of $231 million—$92.8 million of which was from the United States.31  Of these,
Russia’s nuclear cities accounted for 280 projects funded at roughly $39 million.32  After
allocating $59 million to the U.S. contribution to the ISTC and its sister center in Ukraine
in FY2000, the Administration is requesting a further $45 million in FY2001.33
 In recent years, in addition to its core mission of providing grants for research, the
ISTC has been financing training programs in key aspects of commercializing technology
(ranging from protecting intellectual property rights in technological innovations to
drawing up business plans), and, though a new “ISTC Partners” program, seeking to draw
in private firms interested in funding R&D by former weapons scientists through the
ISTC mechanism.  Recently, for example, Mobil Oil agreed to fund researchers from
Sarov (formerly Arzamas-16, one of Russia’s two main weapons design laboratories) to
do mathematical modeling of oil flow in porous media.34
 Similarly, DOE’s Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program (IPP, formerly
the Industrial Partnering Program), which seeks to provide initial funds to link Russian
and U.S. laboratory technical experts with businesses willing to invest in
commercializing their technologies, is also providing temporary employment for
thousands of former weapons scientists, and attempting to partner Russian institutes with
U.S. labs and industry to bring promising technologies to market.35  The concept has been
to begin with basic R&D involving only Russian and U.S. labs (“Thrust I” projects), then
bring in U.S. industry on a cost-shared basis as the projects progressed toward
commercialization (“Thrust II”), and finally to have industry pay the entire cost of the
final phase, when the projects became ready for commercialization (“Thrust III”).  As of
November 1999, IPP had allocated $106 million to fund 456 projects in the former Soviet
states; of these, 81 projects, with proposed funding of $21 million, were in Russia’s
closed nuclear cities.  IPP’s budget in FY2000 was $22.5 million, and a further $22.5
million is requested for FY2001. So far, however, only a few IPP projects have graduated
to being commercially self-supporting, much of the money has historically gone to fund
the U.S. laboratory participation, and some of the remainder has historically gone to
Russian taxes and overhead (from which the ISTC funds are exempted).  Nevertheless, a
                                                                                                                                                
of the International Effort to Convert Russian Weapons Science to Peaceful Purposes, Armonk, NY: M.E.
Sharpe, 1996; Victor Alessi and Ronald F. Lehman II, “Science in the Pursuit of Peace: The Success and
Future of the ISTC,” Arms Control Today, June/July 1998; and R. Adam Moody, “The International
Science Center Initiative,” in Potter and Shields, Dismantling the Cold War, op. cit.
31 Data from the ISTC web page, January, 2000.
32 Weiner, Nuclear Cities News, op. cit.
33 International Affairs (Function 150) Fiscal Year 2001 Budget Request: Summary and Highlights of
Accounts  by Appropriations Subcommittees, U.S. Department of State, February 7, 2000 (available at
http://www.state.gov/www/budget/fy2001/fn150/fn150_fy2001_cmtes.html#forops).
34 Weiner, Nuclear Cities News, op. cit.
35 For brief overviews of IPP, see Program Strategy: Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention, Washington
DC: U.S. Department of Energy, November 1999, and the IPP home page, at http://www-citr.ornl.gov
/ippover.html.  For data on specific projects, see Weiner, Nuclear Cities News, op. cit.
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significant number of IPP projects are now nearing the commercialization stage, and
DOE has been undertaking substantial reforms.36
 The United States (as well as George Soros and other sources) has also provided
funding to the Civilian Research and Development Foundation (CRDF), a private
organization (much smaller than the ISTC) which also provides funding for scientists in
the former Soviet Union (who need not be former weapons scientists, in the case of
CRDF) to do civilian work.  CRDF has a small program focused on the nuclear cities,
which helps arrange funding for U.S. collaborators to work with nuclear city researchers
on joint R&D projects with commercial potential, and also helps fund joint projects
between Russian labs, Russian industry, and U.S. industry.37
 
 NUCLEAR CITIES INITIATIVE
 
 Most recently, the United States and Russia have established a joint “Nuclear
Cities Initiative” designed to help downsize Russia’s nuclear weapons complex and
diversify the economic base of the closed cities of that complex, providing alternative
employment for scientists and workers no longer needed for nuclear weapons-related
activities.38  This is an enormous undertaking, and so far U.S. funding for this effort is
extremely modest: the effort received $15 million in FY1999, but Congress slashed it to
$7.5 million in FY2000 (although the Administration had requested $30 million for that
fiscal year).  The Administration has requested $17.5 million for this effort in FY2001,
with another $10 million in associated funds to accelerate the shut-down and conversion
to civilian tasks of two of Russia’s warhead dismantlement facilities—the small
Avangard plant in Sarov, and the plant in Zarechnyy (formerly Penza-19), both of which
Russia has announced plans to close (see “DOE’s Proposed Long-Term Nonproliferation
Initiative for Russia,” p. 70).39  By contrast, DOE has officially estimated that $550
million over 5 years—nearly four times currently planned budgets—would be needed to
                                                
 36 For a General Accounting Office review of IPP that was critical on these and other grounds, see General
Accounting Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Concerns With DOE’s Efforts to Reduce the Risks Posed by
Russia’s Unemployed Weapons Scientists, GAO/RCED-99-54, Washington DC: February 1999.  While this
report has been portrayed in the press as concluding that the IPP program is useless, in fact it concludes that
“DOE’s effort to supplement the salaries of former weapons scientists so that they do not sell their services
to terrorists, criminal organizations, or countries of proliferation concern is laudable and, we believe, in our
national security interests,” and acknowledges that the program is successfully involving thousands of
former Soviet weapons scientists in civilian projects.  GAO expressed a number of valid concerns over
“implementation and oversight,” of the program, and made a range of recommendations, nearly all of which
DOE has accepted.  For a useful response to the GAO report and defense of IPP and the Nuclear Cities
Initiative, see Biden, “Maintaining the Proliferation Fight in the Former Soviet Union,” op. cit.
37 Weiner, Nuclear Cities News, op. cit; see also the CRDF website, at www.crdf.org.
 38 For official discussions of the Nuclear Cities Initiative, see Nuclear Cities Initiative: Program Strategy,
Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Energy, August 1999;  Nuclear Cities Initiative Program Plan,
Washington DC: U.S. Department of Energy, May 19, 1999; and the Nuclear Cities Initiative website, at
http://nci.nn.doe.gov/ncihome.htm.  For unofficial discussions, see Weiner, Nuclear Cities News, op. cit.;
Bunn et. al., “Retooling Russia’s Nuclear Cities,” op. cit.; Kenneth N. Luongo, “The Nuclear Cities
Initiative,” in Proceedings of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, 40th Annual Meeting,
Phoenix, AZ, July 25-29, 1999; and Nuclear Cities Initiative: Status and Issues, op. cit..
39 See  FY2001 DOE Budget Request to Congress, op. cit.; and Fact Sheet: Long-Term Nonproliferation
Program for Russia, op. cit.
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foster sustainable employment for the roughly 50,000 people that MINATOM has
indicated will need new jobs.  The 50,000 figure is itself in all likelihood a substantial
underestimate.40  By agreement between the United States and Russia, the initial efforts
focus on three priority cities—the two weapons laboratories (Sarov, formerly Arzamas-
16, and Snezhinsk, formerly Chelyabinsk-70) and one of the plutonium production cities
(Zheleznogorsk, formerly Krasnoyarsk-26).  As Russia has recently announced that it
plans to close two of its four nuclear weapons assembly/disassembly facilities (the
Avangard plant located at Sarov, and the plant at Zarechniy, formerly Penza-19), DOE
has proposed funding to help facilitate shut-down of these facilities and re-employment of
their staff as well.
 NCI has launched a number of commercialization and community-building
programs in the nuclear cities.  An Open Computing Center has been established in Sarov
(with a similar center planned to open in 2000 in Snezhinsk), allowing computer experts
from the weapons design laboratories to work on software development contracts for
Western or Russian firms, at unclassified centers outside the nuclear weapons laboratories
themselves.  (As part of the agreements to establish these centers, U.S.-supplied high-
speed computers that Russia had obtained without the proper export licenses are being
moved from the weapons design labs to these open, unclassified centers, largely resolving
any concerns that these computers might be used for weapons design.)  An International
Development Center has been established in Zheleznogorsk—with similar centers
planned in Sarov and Snezhinsk—to foster development of private business in the town,
by providing training and strategic planning services to businesses, helping the town
government carry out economic development initiatives, and helping business make
contact with potential sources of financing.  NCI has also provided the initial funding
necessary to allow businesses in the three initial priority cities to compete for the $300
million in small-business loans for Russia available from the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).  A wide range of other specific projects are
being explored or implemented—but the challenge is huge, the effort is only just
beginning, and the resources provided to date are woefully inadequate to the task.
 
 In short, as noted in Figure 1, if the problem is conceived of as providing short-
term non-weapons opportunities that top weapons scientists can take if they so choose, a
case can be made that programs currently under way are addressing a substantial fraction
of the problem, perhaps 80 percent or more, at least in the nuclear area.  But if the
problem is conceived as achieving sustainable economics in a greatly downsized Russian
nuclear complex that would pose less threat to the United States, the effort has barely
begun—perhaps 10 percent of what would be needed to achieve that goal is now included
in agreements and budget plans.
 
 Monitoring Stockpiles and Reductions
 
 Progress is even slimmer in bringing transparency to the management of nuclear
weapons and nuclear materials, needed to lay the basis for effective long-term
                                                
 40 Report to the Congress on the Nuclear Cities Initiative, reprinted in Nuclear Cities Initiative: Status and
Issues, op. cit.
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cooperation on security and accounting, and for deep reductions in nuclear warhead and
material stockpiles.41  A variety of informal approaches have made some headway: both
sides (and particularly the United States) have unilaterally revealed substantial amounts
of information about their nuclear stockpiles and complexes, and the level of U.S. and
Russian access to the other side’s nuclear facilities as part of the MPC&A program, lab-
to-lab cooperation, and other programs that exists today would have been unthinkable as
recently as early 1994.  But formal transparency discussions between the two
governments have produced virtually nothing but a trail of unfulfilled agreements (see
“The Transparency That Never Happened,” p. 47).
 There have been three fundamental reasons for this lack of progress: (a) the legacy
of 70 years of Communist secrecy (and a millenium of tzarist secrecy before that) has
made Russia extraordinarily reluctant to open nuclear secrets; (b) many parts of the U.S.
government have also been reluctant to open key U.S. facilities and operations to Russian
examination (which has sometimes manifested itself in demands that Russia accept
inspections in return for U.S. assistance, with no reciprocity on the U.S. side—a “pay-per-
view” approach that has aggravated Russian suspicions of U.S. motives); and (c) the U.S.
government’s failure to offer any significant strategic or financial incentives that would
make it in the interest of the relevant Russian officials to do the difficult and politically
risky work of overcoming the many obstacles to moving forward with a broad nuclear
transparency regime.  In short, there is plenty of blame to go around on both sides—and
these problems will inevitably be even more difficult to address with souring U.S.-
Russian political relations, redoubled Russian reliance on nuclear weapons, and the
intense U.S. focus on protecting nuclear secrets in the wake of the China spying scandals.
But there remain opportunities, described below, for new transparency initiatives
incorporating targeted incentives designed to ensure that initiatives genuinely serve the
interests of both sides equally.  A new Russian President in firm control of the
government might be in a position to move in bold new directions, should he choose to
do so.
 Despite the lack of progress on the formal negotiating track, extraordinarily useful
lab-to-lab cooperation is underway to analyze and develop technologies and procedures
for confirming the dismantlement of warheads while protecting sensitive information.
The goal of this effort is to have jointly developed approaches already available when
                                                
 41 For a useful current discussion of the status and prospects in this area, see Oleg Bukharin and Kenneth
Luongo, U.S.-Russian Warhead Dismantlement Transparency: The Status, Problems, and Proposals,
Princeton, NJ: Center for Energy and Environmental Studies, Princeton University, Report 314, April 1999.
An overview of all the various U.S.-Russian programs in this area and how they fit together (or fail to) can
be found in Bunn and Holdren, “Managing Military Uranium and Plutonium,” op. cit.  For an official
description of the current priorities within DOE’s program, see Warhead and Fissile Material
Transparency Program: Strategic Plan, Washington DC: U.S. Department of Energy, May 1999.  For
discussions of what an overall transparency regime for warheads and fissile materials might look like, see
National Academy of Sciences, Committee on International Security and Arms Control, Management and
Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium, Washington DC: National Academy Press, 1994, Chapter 3;
Steve Fetter, “A Comprehensive Transparency Regime for Warheads and Fissile Materials,” Arms Control
Today, January/February 1999 (available at http://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/janfeb99/sfjf99.htm); and
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The Current Response 47
 
 formal transparency negotiations begin.42  DOE hopes to be able to establish new sites for
demonstrating technologies and procedures for transparent warhead dismantlement at the
two Russian nuclear weapons assembly and disassembly facilities now slated for closure,
and at a comparable facility in the United States, such as the Device Assembly Facility
(DAF) at the Nevada Test Site, and funding for this effort is included within the $10
million proposed for the two Russian nuclear weapons facilities in DOE’s FY2001 budget
request (see “DOE’s Proposed Long-Term Nonproliferation Initiative for Russia,” p. 70).
This lab-to-lab effort, which also encompasses a number of other transparency issues, is
perhaps the most promising U.S.-Russian transparency initiative now underway—but
                                                
 42For a discussion, see Warhead and Fissile Material Transparency Program: Strategic Plan, op. cit.
The Transparency That Never Happened
High level U.S.-Russian transparency commitments that have never been fulfilled, and initiatives
that have never been implemented, include:
January 1994: Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agree on the objective of ensuring
“transparency and irreversibility” of nuclear reductions and establish working
group to work out specific measures.  None of these measures have ever been
implemented.
March 1994: U.S. Secretary of Energy Hazel O’Leary and Russian Minister of Atomic
Energy Mikhailov agree to mutual reciprocal inspection (MRI) of fissile
materials from dismantled weapons beginning by the end of 1994.  The
inspections have never been implemented.
September 1994: Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agree to exchange data on warhead and fissile
material stockpiles by the end of the year.  The exchanges have never
occurred.
May 1995: Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin reaffirm their commitment to transparency and
irreversibility, to mutual inspections of material from dismantled warheads,
and to warhead and material data exchanges, and agree to have experts explore
several other transparency possibilities.  None of these measures have ever
been implemented, and the Russian side cut off talks in late 1995, never to
resume them during the remainder of Yeltsin’s tenure in office.
September 1996: Secretary O’Leary and Minister Mikhailov announce a “Trilateral Initiative”
with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to put excess fissile
material under IAEA monitoring.  (President Clinton had committed to place
U.S. excess material under IAEA monitoring as early as 1993, and President
Yeltsin had said in April, 1996 that he would place the Mayak storage facility
being built for Russian excess nuclear material under IAEA monitoring.)
While discussions continue, more than three years later no monitoring under
the Trilateral Initiative has been implemented.
 March 1997: At their Helsinki summit, President Clinton and President Yeltsin agree that a
START III agreement should include “measures relating to the transparency of
strategic warhead inventories and the destruction of strategic nuclear
warheads,” and that transparency measures related to sea-launched cruise
missiles, tactical nuclear weapons, and nuclear materials will also be explored.
Three years later, as a result of the Russian Duma’s failure to ratify START II
and the U.S. refusal to begin START III negotiations until START II is
ratified, no negotiations have begun, and it is expected that these issues will
probably be dropped from START III in the interests of getting at least an
initial framework agreement before President Clinton leaves office.
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here, too, souring political relations are contributing to difficulties relating to access to
information and facilities.
 Another informal initiative now in its early stages is the possibility of cooperation
to put together data on Russia’s current stockpile and historic production of weapons
plutonium, comparable to the data the United States has already released.43  Russian
officials have indicated an interest in pulling together comparable data, and the United
States sponsored a conference in Russia in which U.S. experts described for their Russian
colleagues the work involved in preparing the U.S. plutonium inventory report, and the
two sides discussed the work that would be involved in preparing a comparable Russian
document.  Open questions include whether Russia, if it did prepare such information,
would be willing to make it available to the United States, and whether the United States
would be willing to provide the financing needed to complete such a project.44
Accomplishing a plutonium inventory data exchange through such an informal
mechanism would provide a critically important precedent for additional transparency
initiatives in the future, as well as laying a crucial foundation for cooperation on
disposition of excess plutonium stockpiles.
 Transparency arrangements for the Mayak storage facility—virtually the only
formal U.S.-Russian transparency negotiation still underway as of late 1999—represent a
classic example of the problems with the “pay-per-view” approach.  The Russian side,
while agreeing in principle from early on that in return for its assistance the United States
could have access to this facility once it was built, delayed actually beginning
negotiations for years on end, and has repeatedly raised the issue of the lack of reciprocity
at similar U.S. facilities.  This is a particular problem in this case, since under the earlier
“mutual reciprocal inspections” (MRI) initiative, no longer being pursued, it was
precisely this type of facility to which reciprocal access was to have been granted.
Formal negotiations on Mayak transparency finally did get underway, and have largely
reached agreement on the straightforward measures that would be implemented at the
Mayak facility itself; but since Russia now plans to convert weapons components to metal
slugs before the material is placed in this facility, the United States, to confirm that the
material comes from weapons, is demanding transparency “upstream,” at the facility
where this conversion would be done.  The United States has suggested a variety of
measures to ensure that sensitive information about weapons component design would
not be revealed, and has offered to demonstrate the techniques it proposes in a joint
experiment on real U.S. weapons components, but has refused to offer reciprocal Russian
monitoring for large-scale weapon component conversion in the United States.  The
Russian side is balking on accepting these unilateral upstream transparency measures.45
Whether transparency measures will be developed and in place in time for the planned
opening of the facility in 2002 remains to be seen.
                                                
43 For the U.S. release, see Plutonium: The First 50 Years, Washington DC: U.S. Department of Energy,
1996 (available at http://www.osti.gov/html/osti/opennet/document/pu50yrs/pu50y.html).
44 Interviews with U.S. and Russian government and laboratory officials.
 45 For a discussion that is critical of the Mayak storage facility because of Russia’s refusal to grant this
upstream transparency, see General Accounting Office, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Effort to Reduce
Russian Arsenals May Cost More, Achieve Less Than Planned, GAO/NSIAD-99-76, Washington DC:
General Accounting Office, April 1999.  For a general description of the types of measurements the United
States is seeking, see Warhead and Fissile Material Transparency Program Strategic Plan, op. cit.
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 In parallel, the United States and Russia are also pursuing the concept of
international, rather than merely bilateral, verification for excess material, under a
“Trilateral Initiative” involving the United States, Russia, and the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA).  Under the Trilateral Initiative, the three parties are working to
develop a new verification regime that would allow the IAEA to confirm that fissile
material had been irrevocably removed from nuclear weapons programs—including
developing approaches to allow IAEA verification of material in classified forms, such as
plutonium or HEU weapons components, without revealing classified information.  The
verification approach would be different from traditional IAEA safeguards, as the purpose
would be focused on verifying reductions from stockpiles of thousands of nuclear
weapons in nuclear-weapon states, rather than verifying that enough material for a single
nuclear weapon has not been diverted in non-nuclear-weapon states.
 The parties have carried out a number of technical demonstrations of relevant
technologies (including a successful demonstration at Los Alamos in June 1999 of
instrumentation with “information barriers,” making it possible to confirm key attributes
of fissile material in classified forms while blocking any classified information from
being revealed to the inspector), and are working to draft a legal agreement outlining such
a verification regime.  Russia has indicated its intention to place the Mayak storage
facility under this IAEA verification regime when the facility and the regime are both
completed.  At the June 1999 Board of Governors meeting, the IAEA secretariat outlined
a number of options for funding such disarmament verification, including the creation of
a special nuclear disarmament fund for this purpose.46  Whether this initiative will come
to fruition remains uncertain, however: many security concerns over having international
inspectors monitoring such material have to be overcome, and funding remains a key
issue that could block final agreement—not only funding for the IAEA’s costs, but also
funding for Russia’s costs to host IAEA inspectors.  In the meantime, as described below,
the United States has been placing a modest portion of its fissile material under IAEA
safeguards as part of its voluntary offer agreement with the IAEA.
 Today, the only formal fissile material transparency measures actually being
implemented on a substantial scale are, not surprisingly, the only ones where there was a
large financial incentive to reach agreement—namely, the transparency measures for the
$12 billion U.S.-Russian HEU Purchase agreement, designed to provide confidence to the
United States that the LEU it is purchasing comes from HEU which in turn comes from
weapons, and confidence to Russia that the LEU it is selling is used only for peaceful
purposes.47  Indeed, it is worth noting that Russian agreement to the more intrusive
                                                
46 For a discussion of progress on the trilateral initiative, see “IAEA Verification of Weapons-Origin
Material in the Russian Federation and the United States,” IAEA Press Release, General Conference PR
99/10, September 27, 1999 (available at http://www.iaea.org/GC/gc43/gc_pr/gcpr9910.html); see also
Schiefer and Shea, “IAEA Perspectives,” op. cit.
 47 The specific transparency measures being implemented include: occasional U.S. observation of
measurements of containers said to hold HEU components of dismantled weapons, to confirm the presence
of HEU with a U-235 content of at least 90%; occasional U.S. observation of the oxidation of metal
shavings produced from these weapons components; checking of tags and seals of containers holding
purified HEU after shipment to the blending facility; continuous monitoring of the flow of HEU, blend-
stock, and blended material at the blending facility, with permanent U.S. presence there; and copying and
review of material accounting records provided by the Russian side.  Russia is able to observe the
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aspects of these transparency measures
was gained by using the leverage
provided by Russia’s need for large
cash pre-payments to provide the
funding needed to carry out the
operations to provide the LEU under
the deal.  For whatever reason, the
United States government has never
attempted to apply the basic lesson that
transparency success requires there to
be some incentive for the Russian side
to reach agreement to its broader
transparency objectives.
 
 In short, if the objective is only
to create one or two “transparency
islands” relating to specific projects,
such as the HEU Purchase Agreement
and the Mayak Storage Facility, a large
fraction of what is needed—perhaps 80
percent—is either already being
implemented or at least under
negotiation, as shown in Figure 1.  But
if the objective is to create a “sea of transparency” with only a few remaining “secrecy
islands”—that is, to build the kind of comprehensive transparency regime that would be
needed to help ensure security and provide a basis for deep reductions in nuclear warhead
and material stockpiles—then the effort has barely begun: 5 percent or less of what would
be needed can realistically be said to be underway.
                                                                                                                                                
processing of the LEU delivered to the United States at USEC’s enrichment plant, and fabrication of that
LEU into reactor fuel at U.S. fabrication sites.  As additional blending facilities have been added more
rapidly than transparency measures for each facility could be negotiated and implemented, the most
complete measures are so far only being implemented at the original blending facility, but are planned to be
implemented at the others in the future.  Because of this lack of complete implementation at the newer
blending facilities, and because there is not a complete “chain of custody” with tags, seals, and monitoring
ensuring continuity of knowledge throughout the entire process, there remain some skeptics who argue that
there are possible ways to defeat the transparency regime and provide HEU that did not come immediately
from weapons components, or even LEU that was not blended from HEU.  Given the wide range of
information available to the United States at different points in this chain, however, and given the minor to
nonexistent incentives for Russia to provide material other than what has been agreed to, and the enormous
financial risks to Russia of being caught violating the deal, there appears to be good reason for confidence
that the LEU being purchased is in fact blended from HEU, most of which came from dismantled weapons.
A brief discussion of these measures can be found in Janie Benton, et. al., “U.S. Transparency Monitoring
Under the U.S./Russian Intergovernmental HEU-LEU Agreement,” in Proceedings of the Institute of
Nuclear Materials Management, 40th Annual Meeting, Phoenix, AZ, July 25-29, 1999; see also Nuclear
Proliferation: Status of Transparency Measures for U.S. Purchase of Russian Highly Enriched Uranium,
GAO/RCED-99-194., Washington DC: General Accounting Office, September 1999.  (Unfortunately, some
of the more interesting transparency arrangements are the ones involving attempts to build confidence that
the HEU came from weapons, which are not treated in the unclassified version of the GAO report.)
Transparency measures for the U.S.-Russian HEU Purchase
Agreement include a permanent U.S. presence at the uranium
enrichment plant at Novoural’sk (formerly Sverdlovsk-44),
shown above. Transparency for the HEU deal—where there
was a large financial incentive to reach agreement—is the
only large-scale formal U.S.-Russian transparency initiative
for warheads or fissile material that are being successfully
implemented.  Source:  DOE
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 Ending Further Production
 
 Ending the continued growth in the stockpiles of weapons-usable fissile material
is another critical element of a comprehensive approach to managing these materials.
The United States and Russia agreed in May 1995 that no fissile material produced in the
future would be used in nuclear weapons.  The United States has not produced HEU for
weapons for decades (though HEU continued to be produced for submarine fuel until
much more recently), stopped producing weapons plutonium in 1988, and does not
produce either HEU or separated plutonium for civilian power or research purposes.
Russia has indicated that it has not produced HEU for weapons for some time, but Russia
still has three reactors producing weapons-grade plutonium—not because there is any
need for that plutonium, but because those reactors provide essential heat and power for
nearby communities.  The 1.5 tonnes per year of plutonium that continues to be produced
is stored in oxide form at the two reactor sites, Seversk (formerly Tomsk-7) and
Zheleznogorsk (formerly Krasnoyarsk-26).
 In 1994, the United States and Russia agreed to shut down these reactors by the
year 2000, and to cooperate in providing alternative sources of heat and power to these
communities.  Initial studies of alternative energy sources, however—which did not fully
explore all least-cost approaches, in part because of MINATOM’s insistence on
emphasizing nuclear replacement possibilities—suggested that the cost of replacement
power sources would be high.  In 1997 the two sides therefore agreed instead to convert
the reactors to a different fuel cycle in which the reactors would produce very little
plutonium, which would be of poor isotopic quality and embedded in spent fuel suitable
for long-term storage without reprocessing.  Appropriate monitoring would be put in
place to ensure both that the reactors are in fact converted and that plutonium produced
before then is not used in weapons.
 Unfortunately, however, this effort has been bedeviled by bureaucratic, technical,
safety, cost, and nonproliferation issues that have delayed progress and undermined
political support.  Early progress was delayed by bitter disputes between DOE and DOD
over funding and tactics, which ultimately resulted in DOD providing funding for the
project under the Cooperative Threat Reduction program and taking over its overall
management, even while DOE laboratory experts continued to play the lead technical
role.48  Fuel development has taken longer than expected.  Russia’s nuclear regulatory
agency has raised concerns that continuing to operate the production reactors at all poses
serious risks of a Chernobyl-style accident, and has also raised specific concerns over the
potential for the designs proposed for the converted reactor cores to contribute to the
probability of such an accident; these concerns have yet to be fully addressed.49  While
                                                
 48 For a useful summary of the early days of the plutonium reactor conversion program, see Todd Perry,
“Stemming Russia’s Plutonium Tide: Cooperative Efforts to Convert Military Reactors,” Nonproliferation
Review, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Winter 1997).  For an official description, see Cooperation to Stop Weapons-Grade
Plutonium Production in Russia: United States/Russian Federation Core Conversion Project, Richland,
WA: Pacific Northwest Laboratories, 1998 (available at http://insp.pnl.gov:2080/?coreconv/core_broch
_p1).
49 These reactors are the design on which the Chernobyl design was ultimately based.  They have no
containment vessels or emergency core cooling systems (though the one at Zheleznogorsk is deep
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The top of the operating plutonium production reactor at
Zheleznogorsk (formerly Krasnoyarsk-26), which produces
half a tonne of weapons-grade plutonium each year.  The
United States and Russia are cooperating to convert this
reactor and two more like it at Seversk (Tomsk-7) to a new
fuel cycle that no longer produces weapons-grade
plutonium, but the program is bedeviled by delays, cost-
overruns, safety concerns, and nonproliferation issues
related to the planned use of HEU fuel.  Source: PNNL
the initial plan was for the United States
and Russia each to pay half the cost of
the conversion effort, with the U.S.
share coming to approximately $80
million, the projected cost has since
doubled, and in the wake of the August
1998 financial crisis, Russia indicated it
would be unable to pay its share,
bringing projected U.S. costs to over
$300 million.
 Moreover, in the spring of 1999,
the U.S. government decided to fund
development of both LEU and HEU
fuels for this conversion program, and to
accept at least initially the Russian
preference to convert the cores to use
the HEU fuel if, as expected, the HEU
fuel becomes available first.  The
processing, fabrication, transport, and
storage of hundreds of thousands of
small, easily stealable HEU fuel
elements each year could create serious
proliferation risks if the most stringent
practicable MPC&A measures are not
applied throughout the process, and this
reliance on HEU fuel, at least initially,
                                                                                                                                                
underground, so that an accident would only contaminate the facility itself).  The Russian nuclear regulators
believe that continued operation of these reactors poses some of the most severe risks of a major nuclear
accident in Russia, in part because decades of irradiation is causing the graphite blocks that make up the
reactors’ structure to swell and crack; under severe pressure from the Ministry of Atomic Energy, the
regulatory agency granted the reactors a license to continue to operate for the time being in mid-1999, but
only at a reduced power level.  Although the conversion project includes a number of measures designed to
significantly improve safety, including the addition of emergency core cooling systems, the Russian
regulators question the adequacy of these measures, and argue that the proposed design could create new
accident risks of its own.  The specific design proposed for the converted cores involves alternating fuel
elements and absorber elements in the vertical fuel channels in the reactors, creating an extraordinarily
complex pattern of power and temperature highs and lows in each channel.  The regulators argue that at the
hottest points in this arrangement, the temperatures would come perilously close to those  that could cause
boiling of the coolant or melting of the coolant tubes, and that the computer models being used to analyze
the safety of this design are not adequate to model such a complex arrangement and do not accurately
replicate the current state of the reactors after decades of irradiation.  These concerns are particularly
credible as they are being raised by Alexander Dmitriev, deputy chairman of the Russian nuclear regulatory
agency, who was the chief engineer for the two reactors at Seversk (Tomsk-7) for many years, oversaw their
safety improvements after the Chernobyl disaster, and probably knows as much about their technical
characteristics as anyone alive.  Dmitriev again presented his concerns in written form to U.S. officials in
September 1999, but many of these issues have not been resolved.  The author is grateful to Frank von
Hippel for discussions of these issues and access to a number of unpublished analyses on the plutonium
reactor conversion program.
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has seriously undermined whatever support this program had in the U.S. nonproliferation
community.50  Finally, although the original agreement called for all the reactors to be
converted by the end of the year 2000, realistically it is now unlikely that any could be
converted before 2003-2004—by which time they may only have a few years remaining
during which the Russian regulators will continue to allow them to operate (after which
replacement heat and power sources will be needed in any case).
 Given the delays, skyrocketing costs, proliferation risks, and serious safety
hazards involved in the conversion program, a strong case can be made that the United
States and Russia should abandon the conversion effort and focus instead on least-cost
approaches to providing alternative sources of heat and power, allowing these reactors to
be shut down completely.51  In early 2000, it was reported that Russia’s Ministry of
Atomic Energy had reached the same conclusion, and suggested to the United States that
the funds slated for the conversion project should instead be spent to modify or complete
several fossil-fired plants to provide the needed heat and power for the two cities, arguing
that doing so would actually cost less—approximately $230 million—than current
estimates for the conversion effort.52  If, in fact, it can be confirmed that alternative
energy sources can be provided for comparable cost in a comparable timeframe, this
would be a dramatic breakthrough in this long saga, as this approach would address both
the nonproliferation issues and the safety issues—without entangling the United States in
supporting either the continued operation of fundamentally unsafe reactors, or the use of
massive quantities of weapons-usable HEU fuel.  At the same time, it would provide
these towns with long-term energy supplies rather than converted reactors that would only
last a few more years in any case.  The critical next step is to perform a credible but
quick-turnaround study of least-cost alternatives for providing the necessary heat and
power for these two towns.
 Meanwhile, as noted in Section II, Russia’s civilian reprocessing at the RT-1 plant
at Mayak also continues to separate plutonium—reactor-grade, but nonetheless weapons-
usable—from spent nuclear fuel, adding nearly a tonne every year to the roughly 30
tonnes of this material already stored on site.  In 1999, Minister of Atomic Energy
Evgeniy Adamov publicly proposed a worldwide moratorium on plutonium reprocessing
until new approaches that would not separate directly weapons-usable material are
developed.  At the same time, senior DOE officials were pursuing private discussions
with Adamov of the possibility of a moratorium on reprocessing spent fuel from civilian
power reactors.  MINATOM’s vision of its future is focused on playing a leading role in
an ever-expanding global nuclear energy enterprise, which they believe will only be
possible with reprocessing and recycling of plutonium, because of limitations on uranium
resources.  Moreover, hundreds of jobs, in a closed nuclear city with few other offerings,
are dependent on the continuing reprocessing at Mayak—an issue that had stymied any
                                                
 50 See discussion in Frank von Hippel, presentation to the 6th International Policy Forum: Management and
Disposition of Nuclear Weapons Materials, Exchange Monitor Publications, June 7-10, 1999.
51 For a summary discussion of some of these issues, see Michael Knapik, “U.S. Urged to Look at
Alternatives to Russian Reactor Core Conversion Project,” Nuclear Fuel, December 27, 1999.
52 See Michael Dobbs, “Russian Reactor Project Troubled: Moscow Asks to Halt Conversion to Civilian
Use,” Washington Post, February 13, 2000.  The Russian cost estimate for alternative energy is far lower
than the earlier estimates, in part because the Russians have greatly reduced their estimates of the amount of
heat and power that must be provided.
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Enormous Excess Stockpiles—And Still Larger Remaining Military Stocks
The United States and Russia have each declared enough fissile material for many thousands of
nuclear weapons excess to their military needs.  But the stockpiles of fissile material each country is
holding in reserve for military uses are even larger than the amounts declared excess—easily enough to
support stockpiles of well over 10,000 nuclear weapons.
As shown in Figure 2, the 174.3 tonnes of HEU the United States has declared excess represents
only about a quarter of its estimated 645-tonne HEU stockpile.1  All of the remainder is currently planned
to remain in the military stockpile, for use in weapons or as naval fuel (enough, by one unclassified
estimate of the average amount of HEU in modern thermonuclear warheads,2 for more than 20,000
nuclear weapons).  Indeed, with the exception of the first 10 tonnes of HEU declared excess, all of the
HEU the United States has declared excess is HEU that did not meet the specifications for use as naval
fuel; with that small exception, all of the material the Navy considered usable has been kept in military
reserve. This remaining military stockpile is more than 40 percent larger than the 325 tonnes that would
be needed to have both a stockpile of 10,000 weapons—as the United States reportedly plans to retain
under START II—and a 100-tonne additional stockpile for naval fuel (enough for several decades’
supply).  Russia’s excess declaration leaves it with an even larger remaining military stockpile of HEU,
amounting to 550 tonnes or more.
Much the same situation pertains with respect to plutonium.  While the United States has
declared more than half of its plutonium stockpile excess, 18 tonnes of this excess material is either
reactor-grade or fuel-grade, in spent fuel that was never separated, or in other forms so contaminated that
they were never likely to be used in the U.S. weapons stockpile in any case.  Of the 52.5 tonnes of excess
plutonium, 34.5 tonnes is both weapon-grade and close enough to being pure to be judged to require
substantial processing for disposition (and therefore to be included in the U.S.-Russian plutonium
disposition agreement now being negotiated); of this, only 25 tonnes is actually pure weapon-grade
metal—material directly suitable for use in nuclear weapons.3  Somewhat more than 21 tonnes of this—
less than half the material declared excess—actually came from recently dismantled nuclear weapons.4
The United States is retaining roughly 47 tonnes of weapon-grade plutonium for weapons use (believed to
be essentially all in clean metal form, representing nearly twice the amount of material in that form
declared excess).  By one unclassified estimate of the amount of material per weapon in modern
thermonuclear weapons,5 this represents enough for over 13,000 nuclear weapons.
 In Russia, the situation is slightly more complex, as in different statements at different times,
Russia has identified several categories of plutonium which it has pledged never to use in weapons.  The
50 tonnes included in Russia’s formal declaration of excess, unlike the U.S. excess material, is entirely
weapon-grade metal coming from dismantled nuclear weapons.  Because there is only 34 tonnes of
roughly comparable material in the U.S. excess declaration, however, only 34 tonnes of the Russian
excess will be covered in the U.S.-Russian disposition agreement now nearing completion, leaving 16
tonnes of the plutonium Russia has declared excess to be dealt with by some other means at a later time.
In addition, Russia has pledged never to use its stockpile of civilian separated plutonium in weapons (30.3
tonnes as of the end of 1998,6 growing by roughly a tonne per year as reprocessing continues), and it has
also pledged that plutonium produced at its three remaining plutonium production reactors since October
1994 will never be used in weapons (amounting to roughly 7.5 tonnes by the end of 1999, growing at a
rate of approximately 1.5 tonnes per year).  Thus, the total quantity of Russian plutonium pledged to non-
weapons use as of the end of 1999 stood at approximately 88 tonnes, out of a total estimated stockpile of
over 160 tonnes of separated plutonium, both military and civilian.  The 34 tonnes of plutonium to be
covered in the U.S.-Russian agreement represents only about one-fifth of the total stockpile of Russian
separated plutonium, and less than 40 percent even of the Russian plutonium already pledged to non-
weapons use.  If the 160-tonne total figure is roughly correct, it appears that Russia plans to retain over 70
tonnes of plutonium in its military stockpiles, enough for roughly 20,000 nuclear weapons.
______________________
1 The correct figure is actually less than one quarter, as the 645-tonne estimate is based on tonnes of equivalent 90%
enriched HEU; since most of the 174.3 tonnes is at substantially lower enrichment levels, the equivalent number of
tonnes of 90% enriched material would be much less than 174.3 tonnes.
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Figure Summary
Both the United States and Russia are retaining enough plutonium and HEU in military reserve to permit
a rapid return to Cold War levels of nuclear armament.  Substantial additional reductions in military
plutonium and HEU stockpiles would be needed to bring them down to levels equivalent to 2,000 or even
10,000 nuclear warheads. Like the declared excess plutonium, civilian plutonium and plutonium produced
since October, 1994 has been committed to non-weapons use. (This chart assumes 4 kilograms of
plutonium per warhead and 25 kilograms of HEU, allowing a small allotment for material in the weapons
maintenance pipeline compared to the 3.5 and 22.5 kilogram figures used in the text.  Except for officially
declared U.S. figures, all HEU figures are rounded to the nearest 10 tonnes, and all plutonium figures to
the nearest tonne.)
______________________
2
 Albright, Walker, and Berkhout, op. cit., provide an estimate of roughly 22.5 kilograms of HEU per weapon on
average for the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals (p. 414).
3 “U.S. Surplus Plutonium By Material Type and Disposition Pathway,” Department of Energy, Office of Fissile
Material Disposition, July 1999.
4 The material in storage at Pantex and a small amount of the weapon-grade metal at other sites comes from recently
dismantled nuclear weapons.  For the amount of excess material at Pantex, see Plutonium: The First 50 Years:
United States Production, Acquisition, and Utilization from 1944 to 1994, U.S. Department of Energy, 1996.
5 Albright, Walker, and Berkhout, op. cit., estimate 3.5 kilograms of plutonium per weapon (p. 414).
6 This is from the most recent official Russian declaration, which can be found in “Communication Received from
Certain Member States Concerning Their Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium,”
INFCIRC/549/Add.9/1, International Atomic Energy Agency, May 31, 1999 (available at http://www.iaea.org/
worldatom/infcircs/99index.html).
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 discussion on the topic since it was last raised in 1994.53  Hence, the idea of a moratorium
on reprocessing was an extraordinarily sensitive one for DOE to venture into—yet in
early 2000, senior DOE officials announced with their FY2001 budget that they believed
they had reached an oral understanding with Adamov on a reprocessing moratorium.  In
return, DOE would provide funding for storage for the fuel that would not be reprocessed,
and, if the U.S.-Russian disagreement over Russia’s nuclear cooperation with Iran can be
resolved, funding for joint research and development on advanced proliferation-resistant
approaches to nuclear energy and its fuel cycle (see “DOE’s Proposed Long-Term
Nonproliferation Initiative for Russia,” p. 70).
 After the initial press reports of a deal, Adamov denied that there was any
agreement, but acknowledged that there was “mutual understanding” on the subject of
halting the accumulation of separated plutonium.  There may still be difficult negotiations
ahead, however, to translate the private discussions that have taken place into a formal
agreement: Russian reprocessing advocates are already mobilizing, and are sure to raise
the issues of funding for re-employing the workers at the reprocessing plant,
compensation for termination of existing reprocessing contracts, and the like.54
(Ironically, while the Department of Energy proposes to provide funding to stop
reprocessing of civilian spent fuel at Mayak, the Department of Defense has entered into
contracts to pay for reprocessing of naval fuel to continue at Mayak, at least for an interim
period until adequate storage of fuel from decommissioned submarines can be provided.)
 At the same time, for years MINATOM has in fact been seeking to raise the funds
to finish construction of a huge new plutonium reprocessing plant known as RT-2.
Located at Zheleznogorsk (formerly Krasnoyarsk-26) RT-2 was designed to separate
tonnes of weapons-usable plutonium every year.  In recent years, MINATOM has been
seeking to modify Russian environmental laws so as to make it possible to accept foreign
spent fuel for storage, and use the profits from that to build and operate RT-2.  While at
this writing it appears likely that the modification to the law will be approved in some
form, it still appears highly unlikely that RT-2 will be built in the foreseeable future. 55
Indeed, some MINATOM statements have indicated that the plan for RT-2 is being
abandoned, in favor of developing new reprocessing technologies that do not fully
separate plutonium, and implementing these at other facilities decades in the future.56
                                                
53 In their January 1994 summit statement, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin called for measures to halt the
continued accumulation of fissile material.  In the spring of 1994, when U.S. negotiators tried to turn this
into a discussion of how to end the buildup of plutonium resulting from civilian reprocessing, they were told
that the issue was not ripe for discussion, and privately Russian negotiators emphasized the critical
importance of the jobs issue.
54 For Adamov’s public suggestion of such a moratorium, see, for example, Adamov’s prepared statement
for the “International Conference on Geologic Repositories,” U.S. Department of Energy, Denver, CO,
November 1-2, 1999; for a report that agreement had already been reached (premature, as it turned out), see
Judith Miller, “Moscow Takes Step to Ease U.S. Fears on Plutonium Use,” New York Times, February 7,
2000; for Adamov’s denial of either an agreement or negotiations on one, see Nuclear News, February 10,
1999.
 55 For a critical summary, see Igor Kudrik, “MINATOM Lobby for Spent Fuel Intensifies,” Bellona, April
23, 1999.
56 See Mark Hibbs and Ann MacLachlan, “MINATOM Ends Plans to Reprocess at Krasnoyarsk, Will
Upgrade Mayak,” Nuclear Fuel, November 2, 1998, reporting statements by First Deputy Minister of
Atomic Energy Valentin Ivanov.  Other statements suggest the plant is still planned.
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This latter approach would be consistent with the proposed reprocessing moratorium,
while the original RT-2 plan clearly would not. A number of analysts—including the
author—have proposed a different approach in which Russia would accept foreign spent
fuel for storage, but would use the revenue for nonproliferation and cleanup activities (see
“Generating New Revenue for Nuclear Security,” p.86).
 At the same time, there are no transparency or verification measures in place at
U.S. and Russian enrichment plants to confirm that no HEU is being produced—or, for
that matter, at U.S. and Russian reprocessing plants, to confirm that none of the
plutonium or HEU being separated is being used for nuclear weapons.  While a global
fissile cutoff agreement that would impose such verification—at least in the U.S.
conception—is being discussed at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, little
progress has been made, and the Russian position on this treaty would exempt most
relevant Russian facilities from verification.57
 
 In short, as suggested in Figure 1, if the goal is only to see the Russian plutonium
production reactors converted or shut down, planned budgets and agreements are in place
to carry out the large majority of the required work—though even there, much remains to
be resolved before success can be claimed. There are also new proposals from DOE to
address the continued separation of civilian plutonium in Russia.  Between them these
efforts represent a substantial fraction, perhaps half, of the work required to verifiably put
a stop to the continued growth of the vast stockpiles of weapons-usable plutonium and
HEU in Russia and the United States.  To complete the job will require putting in place
verification at all the reprocessing and enrichment facilities capable of producing such
materials in the two countries, a task that has not yet begun.
 
Reducing Fissile Material Stockpiles
 With the end of the Cold War and the consequent dismantlement of thousands of
nuclear weapons, both the United States and Russia have enormous stockpiles of
plutonium and HEU they no longer need.  These huge stockpiles will pose serious
proliferation and arms-reduction-reversal risks as long as they remain in readily weapons-
usable form.  As former Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Victor Mikhailov once said,
“Real disarmament is possible only if the accumulated huge stocks of weapons-grade
uranium and plutonium are destroyed.” 58
                                                
57 For a brief discussion of the status of the fissile cutoff talks, and information on the Russian position and
its implications, see George Bunn, “Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty: What Added Inspections Would it
Require of Civilian Nuclear Power Facilities?”  in Proceedings of Global '99: Nuclear Technology-
Bridging the Millenia, Jackson Hole, Wyoming, 30 August-2 September 1999, La Grange Park, IL:
American Nuclear Society, 1999.  See also, for example, William Walker, “Policies on Fissile Materials:
The Cutoff Treaty and Existing Stocks,” in David Albright and Kevin O'Neill, eds.: The Challenges of
Fissile Material Control, Washington DC: Institute for Science and International Security, March 1999, pp.
29−40, and the papers prepared for the “Fissile Material Information Workshop,” co-sponsored by the
Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) and the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United
Nations, Geneva, January 25-26 1999, Geneva, Switzerland (available at http://www.isis-online.org).
58 Address to the International Atomic Energy Agency, quoted by TASS, September 22, 1992.
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Russian Perspectives on Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium
The dominant perspectives on disposition of excess weapons plutonium among Russian
policymakers are strikingly different from those of U.S. policymakers—a fact that continues to require
delicate negotiation to build agreements that both sides see as serving their interests.
The U.S. approach to disposition of excess weapons plutonium can be summed up in five basic
principles:
• Excess weapons plutonium is primarily a security issue; because of the urgency of the security threats
it poses, this material should be transformed into forms that are no more attractive for recovery and
use in weapons than plutonium in spent fuel as rapidly as this can be safely and securely
accomplished.
• Disposition of Russian and U.S. excess weapons plutonium should proceed in a balanced way, ending
ultimately with roughly equal levels of material remaining in military stockpiles—meaning that at
some point Russia, which begins with a larger military stockpile of plutonium, will have to carry out
greater reductions in that stockpile.
• Excess weapons plutonium has no economic value, since the cost of using it to produce nuclear
energy is more than the energy is worth.  Indeed, it is a substantial economic liability, since all
options for its disposition will cost billions of dollars—but it is worth paying those costs for the
resulting decrease in security threats.
• Because of the security dangers posed by separated plutonium, and the high costs of separating and
managing it, civilian plutonium should not be reprocessed and recycled, even if some portion of
excess weapons plutonium is used as reactor fuel as the most effective way to meet the security
objectives of disposition.  The United States should not provide material support to recycling of
civilian plutonium, in Russia or elsewhere.
• Decisions on disposition of excess weapons plutonium and on the future of nuclear energy should be
made separately, since the stockpiles of excess weapons plutonium are tiny in the overall global
energy resources picture, and decisions on nuclear energy can be made over a period of decades,
while disposition of excess weapons plutonium is comparatively urgent.
The U.S. decision to undertake a multi-billion-dollar program in which some of its excess
weapons plutonium would be used as reactor fuel (once-through, with no reprocessing, and with the
plutonium fuel facilities to be shut and torn down after the excess weapons plutonium mission is
accomplished), and some would be immobilized with high-level wastes, was based on these basic
principles.
While the U.S.-Russian Independent Scientific Commission on Disposition of Excess Weapons
Plutonium, which included experts from both Russia and the United States, reached a consensus on
similar principles,1 the majority opinion among Russian policymakers, particularly within the Ministry of
Atomic Energy, is strikingly different.  This dominant Russian view is aptly summed up in an interagency
“concept” for disposition of excess weapons plutonium drawn up under MINATOM’s chairmanship in
1998.2  The view expressed in this official concept can be summed up in the following five principles:
• Excess weapons plutonium is primarily an energy issue: this plutonium has “significant energy
potential” and its production “required great investments in material, labor, and financial resources.”
It should be seen as an energy resource, along with civilian plutonium, and it is therefore acceptable
to keep storing the material for now, with disposition taking place over “several decades,” a timescale
“comparable with the timetables for the development and assimilation of new technologies in nuclear
energy.”
______________
1 Final Report of the U.S.-Russian Independent Scientific Commission on Disposition of Excess Weapons
Plutonium, op. cit.
2 Concept of the Russian Federation: Disposition of Plutonium Withdrawn During the Course of Nuclear
Disarmament, 1998.  The working group that prepared the document was chaired by First Deputy
Minister of Atomic Energy Lev Ryabev, and included representatives from most of the main departments
of MINATOM and a variety of MINATOM enterprises, as well as the Ministry of Defense and the
Kurchatov Institute.
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• Excess weapons plutonium does also have a “political aspect” relating to the irreversibility of nuclear
arms reductions (the issue of the risk of theft of such material is not mentioned as a reason to pursue
disposition, except in statements that it must be adequately protected from theft).  In accordance with
this irreversibility objective, a “basic condition” is that “disposition of withdrawn weapons plutonium
in Russia and in the USA must proceed in parallel”—and there should be equal reductions in U.S.
and Russian plutonium stockpiles, not reductions to equal levels.  “The quantities of plutonium that
will remain necessary for purposes of national security in Russia and in the USA may not coincide.”
• Excess weapons plutonium has enormous energy value, but at present its use as fuel would involve
substantial additional costs (estimated in the paper to be roughly $1.5 billion, although different
reactor options are presented that would have somewhat different costs).  Therefore, if for political
reasons other countries want Russia to carry out disposition sooner than it would make economic
sense to do so, they should pay the cost: “a condition for the implementation of the comprehensive
use of withdrawn weapons plutonium in the Russian nuclear power industry is that Russia’s added
expenditures be covered by the United States and other countries interested in the fastest and
guaranteed conversion of Russian weapons plutonium into forms unsuitable for use in nuclear
weapons.” (emphasis in original)
• Plutonium recycling, ultimately in fast-neutron breeder reactors, is a desirable and essential part of
the future of nuclear energy.
• Given the substantial energy content of the plutonium, decisions on disposition of excess weapons
plutonium must be an integral part of decisions about the future of nuclear energy.  “[T]he problem of
disposition of these fissile materials must be resolved within the framework of a national strategy for
the development of nuclear energy.  This strategy is aimed at the gradual transition to a closed fuel
cycle with the use of fast neutron reactors powered by plutonium.”
Given these principles, the concept concludes that “the aim of disposition of withdrawn weapons
plutonium is its use in the nuclear power industry,” and approaches such as immobilization that do not
make use of the energy value of the plutonium “will not be implemented.”  Disposition should include
“the development of production processes and technologies of a closed fuel cycle with fast reactors, all
the while observing international standards of safety and nonproliferation.”
The draft agreement now nearing completion is designed to accommodate most of both sides’
basic principles.  It commits Russia to move quickly on plutonium disposition, as the United States would
prefer—but only if funds to cover the extra costs become available from the United States and other
parties.  A MOX plant built with international assistance in Russia is to be used only for disposition of
excess weapons plutonium as long as that mission lasts—postponing the argument about what happens
then for decades into the future.  The United States will not help Russia finance and build new fast-
neutron reactors, but there is no prohibition on Russia doing so, if it can find the money somewhere. For
this first step, there will be equal reductions in plutonium stockpiles, but that does not resolve whether
ultimately there should be reductions to equal levels.  Russia will use all of its plutonium covered by the
agreement, but the United States will use some as fuel and immobilize the rest (though Russian opposition
to immobilization extended to seeking limits on the amount of U.S. plutonium that would be immobilized,
on the argument that immobilized material could more readily be recovered for use in weapons than
material that had been used as MOX3).  With flexibility, persistence, and a bit of luck, it may be possible
to continue to bridge these basic disagreements for the decades that will be required to complete
disposition of the U.S. and Russian excess weapons plutonium.
______________
3 This is more a talking point than a serious strategic concern, since the United States is holding far larger
quantities of material in reserve in the form of assembled warheads and plutonium pits ready to be
assembled into such warheads.  Moreover, as a variety of studies have concluded, it will cost more than a
billion dollars for the United States to immobilize its plutonium, and would probably cost nearly as much
to get it back out, should a decision be taken to do so, offering a substantial degree of “irreversibility” for
the process.  Indeed, plutonium that had been irradiated as MOX could also be recovered in similar
fashion; while its isotopics would have been degraded by reactor irradiation, nuclear weapons can be
made from such reactor-grade plutonium with yield, weight, and reliability comparable to weapons made
from weapon-grade plutonium.
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 Yet progress in accomplishing that
objective has been modest, to date.
 Recognizing the reality that their
fissile material stockpiles vastly exceed
their current military requirements, both
the United States and Russia have
designated hundreds of tonnes of their
fissile material stockpiles as being
“excess” to their military needs, and
pledged that this material will never again
be used in nuclear weapons.  The United
States has designated 52.5 tonnes of
plutonium as excess, along with 174.3
tonnes of HEU, for a total of just over 225
tonnes of excess fissile material.59  Russia
has designated “up to” 50 tonnes of
plutonium and 500 tonnes of HEU as
excess.60  The United Kingdom has also
declared more than 4 tonnes of plutonium
excess.61  Unfortunately, both the United
States and Russia are still retaining even
larger amounts of material in stockpiles reserved for military use—easily enough to
support a rapid return to Cold War levels of armament, and to pose enormous risks of
theft.  (See “Enormous Excess Stockpiles—And Still Larger Remaining Military Stocks,”
p. 54.)  Current programs designed to ensure that excess material is never again used in
weapons can make a major contribution to both countries’ stated goals of ensuring the
irreversibility of nuclear disarmament and preventing nuclear proliferation—but only if
                                                
 59 Feed Materials Planning Basis for Surplus Weapons-Usable Plutonium Disposition, Washington DC:
Department of Energy, Office of Fissile Material Disposition, April 1997.
 60 Boris Yeltsin, Message from the President of the Russian Federation to the Forty-First Session of the
General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, September 26, 1997. The actual Russian
language was that “up to” these figures had “become available through the nuclear disarmament process”
and would be “remove[d] gradually from military nuclear programs,” with the pace of this “dependent both
on progress with the dismantling of nuclear weapons pursuant to existing agreements on nuclear
disarmament, and on the creation of the necessary storage facilities for the material released from military
use.”
61The United Kingdom has declared 0.3 tonnes of weapons-grade plutonium, and 4.1 tonnes of non-
weapons-grade plutonium excess to its military needs, along with 9,000 tonnes of natural or low-enriched
uranium that had been held in military stocks for fueling military production reactors, and is placing these
materials under EURATOM safeguards; they are is available for IAEA safeguarding, but the IAEA has not
chosen to safeguard it because no funding is available to do so.  These are from declared total stockpiles
outside of safeguards of 7.6 tonnes of plutonium, 21.9 tonnes of HEU, and 15,000 tonnes of natural and
low-enriched uranium.  All of the HEU is to be held in military stockpiles for use either as weapons or as
naval fuel.  See “Communication Received from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland: United Kingdom Fissile Material Transparency, Safeguards, and Irreversibility Initiatives,”
INFCIRC/570, Vienna, Austria: IAEA, September 21, 1998 (available at http://www.iaea.org/worldatom
/infcircs/infcirc570.html), and discussion in Schriefer and Shea, “IAEA Perspectives on Excess Materials,”
op. cit.
A portion of the U.S. excess weapons plutonium is to be
immobilized with high-level radioactive wastes in the so-
called “can-in-canister” immobilization form, shown
here.  Cans of weapons plutonium immobilized in
ceramic are arrayed within a large canister, into which
molten glass mixed with high-level waste is poured,
making a massive, highly radioactive glass “log,”
protecting the plutonium from theft or recovery for use in
weapons.  Source: DOE
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they represent a first step toward dealing with much larger portions of the U.S. and
Russian fissile material stockpiles in the future.  As arms reductions proceed, these
stockpiles should be reduced in parallel to roughly equivalent levels in the United States
and Russia, suitable to support whatever agreed warhead levels remain, but not large
enough to permit a rapid return to Cold War levels of armament.
 
 DISPOSITION OF U.S. FISSILE MATERIAL
 
 The United States has publicly committed to place its excess material under IAEA
verification, to confirm that it will never be returned to weapons.  But as of the end of
1999, only a very small fraction of the material had actually been made available for
verification.62
 The excess HEU is being blended to LEU at U.S. facilities, for sale on the
commercial reactor fuel market (or disposal, in the case of material that is too
contaminated to have commercial value).  Blending of the first 14.3 tonnes of this
material (enriched to 75% U-235) was completed at USEC’s Portsmouth enrichment
plant in July 1998.  An additional 50 tonnes (enriched to 40 percent U-235) has been
transferred from DOE to USEC and is now being blended, with that process expected to
be completed in 2005.  Finally, DOE and the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) have
agreed that 38 tonnes of off-specification material (enriched to 65% U-235) will be
blended and burned in TVA plants over several years, with full-scale loading of the
blended material now expected to begin in 2003-2004.63  DOE is still making plans for
disposition of the remaining excess HEU.
 For the excess U.S. plutonium, a substantial program is in place to demonstrate
and implement two complementary disposition paths: a portion of it is to be burned as
 
                                                
 62 The United States had officially stated that 38 tonnes of material would be made available for IAEA
safeguards by the end of 1999 (see Fact Sheet: U.S. Commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons, op. cit.), but it appears that the actual amount made available by that time was roughly
half that figure.  The 38 tonne figure included 12 tonnes already under IAEA safeguards (2 tonnes of
plutonium at Hanford and Rocky Flats, and 10 tonnes of HEU at Oak Ridge), 13 tonnes blended at the
Portsmouth enrichment plant by 1998, and 13 additional tonnes of the 50 tonnes transferred to USEC from
DOE when USEC was privatized in 1998.  But of the 13 tonnes downblended at Portsmouth (ultimately
14.3 tonnes rather than the originally planned 13), the amount downblended during the verification
“experiment” the IAEA was permitted to perform (for technical reasons, the United States and the IAEA
determined that no genuine “safeguards” approach was feasible for that process at that facility) was only 3.7
tonnes, bringing the total verified by the IAEA to 15.7 tonnes as of the end of 1998.  While it is planned to
make the 50 tonnes transferred to USEC available for IAEA verification as it is downblended, under current
plans it would not be made available for verification while in storage awaiting downblending, and only a
small (undisclosed) amount had been downblended as of the end of 1999.  For discussions of these
amounts, see Schriefer and Shea, “IAEA Perspectives on Excess Materials,” op. cit.; Amy B. Whitworth,
“Implementation of International Inspections in the United States,” in Proceedings of the Institute of
Nuclear Materials Management, 40th Annual Meeting, Phoenix, AZ, July 25-29, 1999, and Nevile E.
Whiting and Will Theis, “Portsmouth:  The Conclusion,” in the same volume.
63 See John Longenecker and Ron Witzel, “Enrichment in a World of Privatization,” Nuclear Engineering
International, September 1999; “Megatons to Megawatts Program Status as of August 1998,” press release,
U.S. Enrichment Corporation (http://www.usec.com/Structure/Navigation/ThirdTier/newsreleases/09-22-
98.htm); and Wayne Barber, “Plans for HEU Reloads Moving Slowly Through DOE, TVA,” Nuclear Fuel,
December 27, 1999.
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 uranium-plutonium mixed oxide (MOX) fuel in existing U.S. reactors, and the remainder
is to be immobilized with high-level wastes.64  Recovering plutonium for use in weapons
                                                
 64 For a detailed discussion of the options for plutonium disposition and the status as of 1997, see Bunn and
Holdren, “Managing Military Uranium and Plutonium,” op. cit., and sources cited therein; see also Final
Report of the U.S.-Russian Independent Scientific Commission on Disposition of Excess Weapons
Plutonium, Washington DC: Office of Science and Technology Policy, June 1997 (available at
http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/BCSIA/Library.nsf/atom).  A variety of current official program documents
and briefings are available at the program website, at http://twilight.saic.com/md/; a particularly useful short
official overview can be found in Laura S.H. Holgate, “Plutonium Disposition: A Case Study of Nuclear
Materials Management,” in Proceedings of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, 40th Annual
Meeting, Phoenix, AZ, July 25-29, 1999.
The Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative
In his January 19, 1999 State of the Union address, President Clinton announced an Expanded
Threat Reduction Initiative (ETRI), saying “we must expand our work with Russia, Ukraine, and the other
former Soviet nations to safeguard nuclear materials and technology so they never fall into the wrong
hands. Our balanced budget will increase funding for these critical efforts by almost two-thirds over the
next five years.”
Unfortunately, it soon became clear that the claimed two-thirds increase in spending for these
programs to “safeguard nuclear materials and technology” was illusory.  This was a peculiarly
Washington kind of “increase”—judged not by comparing proposed spending to current spending, but by
comparing proposed spending to previously planned deep cuts in spending.  In reality, under the proposal,
funding for most programs related to safeguarding nuclear materials and technology was to remain
roughly flat, not increase. Much of what “increase” there was went to worthy efforts unrelated to
safeguarding nuclear material, from providing civilian jobs for biological weapons experts to dealing with
left over conventional ammunition in the Trans-Dniestr area of Moldova.1
The budget for the MPC&A program—the main program most directly dealing with
safeguarding nuclear materials—tells the story.  In FY1999, when the scope of the nuclear material
emergency following the August 1998 financial meltdown became clear, rather than reprogramming
additional funds for nuclear material security, DOE took funds away, redirecting $12 million of the $152
million Congress had appropriated for work on other projects.  The much-vaunted “increase” for MPC&A
in the Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative was a request for FY2000 of $145 million—$7 million less
than Congress had appropriated the year before (though more, to be sure, than DOE had once planned to
request, when the program had been slated to decline rapidly toward zero).  A substantial amount of
bureaucratic infighting was required even to bring the budget to that “not quite flat” level.  The gap
between the Administration’s rhetoric and its budgeting could hardly be more stark.
Overall, the Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative package called for $4.2 billion dollars in
spending on a wide range of programs over 5 years, compared to $2.5 billion that had been previously
planned for that period, or somewhat over the $3 billion that would have been spent had FY1999
expenditures (except for one-time initiatives such as the Domenici HEU and plutonium funding) been
kept constant for five years.2  Roughly two-thirds of the planned spending is for programs related, in one
way or another, to warhead and fissile material control—but few of these are substantially increased
compared to the FY1999 funding that existed before the initiative was launched.  The table below
compares: (a) appropriated funding for these programs for FY1999, before the initiative, (b) the
Administration’s request for FY2000, the first and largest year of the new initiative;
________________
1 See Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative, op. cit.
2 Alternatively, the $4.2 billion can be compared to over $3 billion, which would have been the result of keeping
previous spending levels constant for the five-year period, making the result closer to a one-third increase than a two-
thirds increase.
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 from the massive, highly radioactive waste forms from either of these processes would be
roughly as difficult and unattractive as recovering it from the vastly larger quantities of
ordinary commercial spent nuclear fuel that already exist—the so-called “spent fuel
standard.”  A final record of decision outlining DOE’s plans to implement both of these
approaches was issued in January, 2000.65  For either of these approaches, plutonium will
have to be converted from weapons components or other forms to oxide; a prototype
                                                
65 See Record of Decision for the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Final Environmental Impact Statement,
Washington DC: U.S. Department of Energy, January 4, 2000; and Surplus Plutonium Disposition Final
Environmental Impact Statement (3 vols. and summary), DOE/EIS-0283, Washington DC: U.S.
Department of Energy, Office of Fissile Materials Disposition, November 1999.
 (c) Congressional appropriations for that year; and (d) the Administration’s request for FY2001, when it
proposed some new efforts focused on security and monitoring of nuclear materials (see “DOE’s
Proposed Long-Term Nonproliferation Initiative for Russia,” p. 70). As can be seen, the ETRI request
held most of the programs roughly constant; the most substantial increases were for science cooperation
programs that provide grants to former weapons scientists (including the International Science and
Technology Centers, the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention, and the Civilian Research and
Development Foundation), many of which go to biological, chemical, or aerospace experts rather than
nuclear experts.  When these efforts are excluded, the Administration’s request for programs related to
safeguarding warheads and fissile materials for FY2000 was only 5 percent more than Congress
appropriated in FY1999.
After fights over a variety of specific issues, Congress in the end approved a large fraction of the
first year’s funding for ETRI.3 For programs related specifically to warhead and fissile material security,
Congressional action increased funding.
As the following year’s budgets were being prepared, with a presidential election underway,
senior White House officials paid only modest attention to any organized attempt to set nuclear security
priorities.   In January, 2000, ETRI went unmentioned in President Clinton’s longest State of the Union
speech yet, and safeguarding nuclear material rated only a few-word phrase—though the actual budget,
released two weeks later, included a $100 million new initiative devoted to that objective (see “DOE’s
Proposed Long-Term Nonproliferation Initiative for Russia,” p. 70).  At the same time, however, the
Administration requested less than it had projected the year before for various other parts of ETRI, so the
overall size of the ETRI effort did not increase significantly with this new proposal. 4
In short, the Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative provided a modest amount of additional
funding for warhead and fissile material control efforts, as well as for other worthy endeavors, and it
deserves continuing support.  But it fell far short of what is needed to address the urgent proliferation
threats posed by nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union, and far short of what the President
announced to the nation.  Even the new initiative unveiled in February, 2000, while a useful step in the
right direction, is only a fraction of what needs to be done to address the urgent security risks the United
States now faces.
______________
3 For a detailed accounting of Congressional authorization and appropriation actions in FY2000 for programs in the
Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative, see Russian Nuclear Security and the Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative:
A Summary of Congressional Reaction, Washington DC: Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council,
forthcoming (2000).
4 For a description of the latest initiative, see “Fact Sheet: Long-Term Nonproliferation Program for Russia,” U.S.
Department of Energy, February 7, 2000.  Reductions in other areas include, for example, a budget for DOD’s
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program roughly $50 million less than had been projected in the 1999 Expanded
Threat Reduction Initiative proposal, a Nuclear Cities Initiative budget that is more than $12 million less than
projected, an Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention budget that is over $7 million less than projected, and so on
(FY2001 budget documents).
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facility for that purpose was dedicated at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in
September, 1998, and a full-scale facility at Savannah River is expected to begin
operations in fiscal 2006.  A commercial contract for the initial design stages of the MOX
portion of the program—with options for later stages—was signed in March 1999, with a
full-scale MOX fuel fabrication facility at Savannah River also expected to begin
operations in 2006 (after initial MOX test assemblies are fabricated at Los Alamos).  Full-
scale “hot” (radioactive) tests of the immobilization approach are expected in a few years,
with operation of a full-scale plant to follow in 2008.  While the disposition of the HEU
will return funds to the U.S. Treasury from the material’s commercial value, plutonium
has no value in the current market, as noted above, and hence the U.S. plutonium
disposition program is expected to cost in the range of $4 billion (roughly twice earlier
estimates).66
 The immobilization track has faced technical difficulties that have delayed its
progress and increased its cost, including the failure of the previously planned process for
vitrifying high-level waste at the Savannah River Site.  (The vitrified high-level waste is
to provide the radiation barrier to deter theft in the planned “can-in-canister” disposition
concept, in which the plutonium would be immobilized in ceramic, and small cans of this
ceramic would be arrayed in the large canisters into which intensely radioactive high-
level waste glass is poured.67)  The MOX track, meanwhile, has been criticized by a
broad range of non-governmental organizations on grounds of undermining the U.S.
opposition to civilian plutonium recycling.  Defenders have countered that what the U.S.
has long opposed is making more separated, weapons-usable plutonium, and that using all
the available means to reduce stockpiles of separated plutonium is completely consistent
with this policy.68  The politics of the use of plutonium in U.S. reactors remains deeply
problematic, however, and it remains to be seen whether DOE will succeed in carrying
out this part of the program.  It was precisely because of the likelihood of technical
                                                
 66 These planned dates and cost estimates are from Plutonium Disposition Life Cycle Costs and Cost-
Related Comment Resolution Document, DOE/MD-0013 Rev. 0, Washington DC: U.S. Department of
Energy, Office of Fissile Materials Disposition, November 1999.  The $4 billion figure is an undiscounted
total life cycle cost in 2000 dollars.  For earlier official estimates, see  Cost Analysis in Support of Site
Selection for Surplus Weapons-Usable Plutonium Disposition, Rev. 0, Washington DC: Department of
Energy, Office of Fissile Materials Disposition, July 22, 1998; and Technical Summary Report for Surplus
Weapons-Usable Plutonium Disposition, Rev. 1., Washington DC: U.S. Department of Energy, Office of
Fissile Materials Disposition, November 1996 (which provided an estimate of roughly $2 billion for a
similar hybrid option).  All of these reports are available at the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition web
page, at http://twilight.saic.com/md/.
67 For discussions of the can-in-canister concept and how difficult it would be retrieve plutonium
immobilized in this way, see Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment, op. cit.; and John P. Holdren
(chair) et. al., Interim Report, Panel to Review the Spent-Fuel Standard for Disposition of Excess Weapons
Plutonium, Committee on International Security and Arms Control, National Academy of Sciences
July 1999.
 68 For a summary of the critics’ view, see Edwin S. Lyman and Paul Leventhal, “Bury the Stuff,” Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists, March-April 1997; for a summary of the supporters’ view, see John P. Holdren, John
F. Ahearne, Richard L. Garwin, Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky, and Matthew Bunn, “Excess Weapons
Plutonium: How to Reduce a Clear and Present Danger,” Arms Control Today, November-December, 1996.
For a direct response to the main criticisms, see Matthew Bunn, “The Case for a Dual-Track Approach—
And How to Move Forward From Here,” Nuclear Materials Monitor, Vol. 1, No. 5, July 14 1997 (available
at http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/BCSIA/Library.nsf/atom).
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obstacles for the immobilization track and political obstacles for the MOX track that a
panel of the National Academy of Sciences originally recommended pursuing both in
parallel, so that each could serve as a backup to the other.69
 
 DISPOSITION OF RUSSIA’S EXCESS HEU: THE HEU PURCHASE AGREEMENT
 
 Disposition of Russia’s 500 tonnes of excess HEU from dismantled weapons is
covered by the U.S.-Russian HEU Purchase Agreement, under which this material is
being blended to LEU and sold to the United States for re-sale on the commercial reactor
fuel market.  This is perhaps the most important and creative single U.S.-Russian fissile
material control program.  At one stroke, the HEU purchase provides financial incentives
to dismantle thousands of warheads, destroys hundreds of tonnes weapons-usable
material that could otherwise pose risks of proliferation or arms-reduction reversal,
provides employment to thousands of Russian nuclear workers, and provides hundreds of
millions of dollars a year to the desperate Russian nuclear complex—all (until recently) at
virtually no net cost to the U.S. taxpayer.  By the end of 1999, almost 75 tonnes of
HEU—enough for thousands of nuclear weapons—had been blended to LEU and
delivered to the United States.70
 This HEU deal has been plagued with a series of problems, however—serious
enough to interrupt blending and deliveries for months at a time.  Indeed, there has never
yet been a year in which as much HEU was actually blended and delivered as had been
agreed for that year.  These problems were largely caused by placing the deal in the hands
of the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC), which has had no profit incentive
to implement it efficiently, as the large-scale imports of Russian enriched material
compete with its own production, preventing it from running its plants at the most cost-
effective production level.71  The Clinton administration then compounded the error by
privatizing USEC in the summer of 1998, thereby placing a critical national security
initiative at the whim of the commercial market—a step that was taken even after it had
become clear that changes in the uranium and enrichment markets since the initial
decision to privatize made it inevitable that a privatized USEC seeking to maximize
profit would have to attempt to undermine the HEU deal, and even after the
administration was warned in detail of the likely security impact of privatization. 72  This
                                                
69 See NAS 1995, op. cit.
 70 For  an overview of the HEU deal, and a discussion of the problems that beset it in its early years, see
Richard Falkenrath, “The HEU Deal,” Appendix C in Allison et. al., Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy, op. cit.
For a more optimistic official view, see U.S. Enrichment Corporation, “Chronology of the Megatons to
Megawatts Contract (as of January 1, 2000)” (available at http://www.usec.com/Structure/Navigation/
ThirdTier/newsreleases/08-31-98.htm).
71 The material brought in under the HEU deal represents a substantial fraction of the total U.S. market for
enrichment services, greatly reducing the amount of its own production USEC requires to meet the market
demand.  Moreover, because of oversupply in the enrichment market, enrichment prices have fallen to the
point that under the current contract, USEC is buying material from Russia at just above the price at which
it can sell the material, wiping out any profit it was once making on the deal.
 72 For an overview of privatization and its early impact, see Thomas L. Neff, “Privatizing U.S. National
Security: The U.S.-Russian HEU Deal at Risk,” Arms Control Today, August/September, 1998 (available at
http://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/augsep98/tnas98.htm); the earlier background can be found in depressing
detail in Falkenrath, “The HEU Deal,” op cit.
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episode certainly ranks among the most egregious national security blunders of the
Clinton team.
 As predicted, USEC privatization caused another rupture in the deal, stopping
deliveries for months.  This impasse was temporarily resolved only after Congress, with
the leadership of Senator Pete Domenici (R-NM), provided a taxpayer subsidy of $325
million to save the agreement in the fall of 1998.  Even then, a final agreement that
allowed deliveries to restart was not reached until March 1999, after difficult
negotiations.73
 As expected, however, that “fix” was temporary: by the summer of 1999, USEC
was actively seeking to get out of the five-year contract (running to the end of 2001) it
had signed with its Russian partner while still government-owned, demanding either that
Russia accept prices far below those that had been agreed in the contract, or that the U.S.
government give USEC a subsidy of $200 million to compensate for its claimed lost
profits in continuing to implement the contract.  USEC threatened to pull out of its
agreement with the U.S. government to serve as the “executive agent” for the HEU
purchase agreement if its demands were not met.  This dispute boiled over into
disagreements over delivery schedules and canisters for shipping the uranium, and by
early fall, the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy indicated that with USEC unwilling to
agree on delivery schedules, it had no choice but to cease blending HEU.  After an
intensive round of discussions between DOE, USEC, and the Russian partners in the deal,
deliveries were resumed and USEC announced on December 1, 1999, that it would
continue as executive agent even though neither Russia nor DOE had agreed to USEC’s
demands.74  Most analysts expect, however, that this resolution too will be temporary,
and that continued U.S. government intervention will be needed as long as the deal
remains solely in USEC’s hands, with no competition to ensure a fair market price.
                                                
73As the HEU deal is currently structured, the uranium and enrichment work represented by the low-
enriched uranium Russia delivers are handled separately, with different commercial arrangements.  The
March 1999 deal involved the United States government buying the uranium component of the material
Russia had already delivered in 1997 and 1998—and agreeing to hold both that material and a substantial
quantity of its own material off the market for a decade, to reduce the oversupply in the uranium market
(which was caused in part by the U.S. decision to privatize USEC with a huge stockpile of uranium in its
possession). Three Western companies—Cameco, Cogema, and Nukem—reached a simultaneous
commercial contract with Russia giving them options to buy the uranium component from subsequent
deliveries.  Uranium the three companies did not choose to buy would be returned to Russia.  In the end, the
deal only addressed the uranium part of the HEU purchase agreement, not the enrichment part—which is
more fundamental to USEC’s interests as an enrichment supplier—and since all the three companies were
buying were options, which they would not take up if the price declined, the uranium part of the deal was
not permanently stabilized either.  For a useful explication of this rather complex agreement, see “The U.S.-
Russia HEU Agreement,” UI Trade Briefing, Issue 1, London: Uranium Institute, August 1999.
74 See “USEC to Continue as Executive Agent for Megatons to Megawatts Program,” USEC press release,
December 1, 1999.  Unfortunately, no comprehensive account of the maneuvering that led up to that point is
yet available; much of this summary account is based on interviews with U.S. government officials.  For
discussions of portions of it, see, for example, Michael Knapik and Ray Silver, “USEC Looking to
Administration, Congress For Help, Officials Weigh Comprehensive Fix,” Nuclear Fuel, October 18 1999,
and Michael Knapik and Wayne Barber, “Glitches in HEU Deal Coloring Debate in Washington Over
USEC Subsidy,” November 1, 1999.  The author is grateful to Thomas L. Neff  (author of the first
published suggestion for the HEU deal) for extensive discussions of the HEU deal and access to a number
of unpublished analyses.
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Indeed, USEC has continued to call
for changes in the deal or U.S.
subsidies for continuing in it, as its
stock price plummets, its corporate
credit rating declines, and it
continues to lay off workers.75
 Even if it were implemented
smoothly in the future, the HEU deal
as it now stands certainly does not
resolve all the key issues posed by
excess HEU in Russia.  As described
in Section IV, there are strong
arguments for blending and buying
more HEU, and faster.  The 75 tonnes
blended over the six years since the
deal began represents less than 7
percent of the Russian HEU stockpile;
although the pace is now going to
increase to 30 tonnes per year (if all
goes well), a decade hence it will still
be true that only about a third of the
Russian HEU stockpile will have been
addressed.  Indeed, the entire 500-
tonne deal represents less than half of
Russia’s total HEU stockpile.  Moreover, the deal involves bulk processing and transport—
steps that create new vulnerabilities to possible theft—of tens of tonnes of weapons-usable
material a year, yet there have not yet been any substantial upgrades to security and
accounting at the areas of facilities where the HEU is being blended and processed.
 
 DISPOSITION OF RUSSIA’S EXCESS PLUTONIUM   
 
 Still less progress has been made in dealing with Russia’s excess weapons
plutonium.  The basic options available—use as reactor fuel or immobilization—are the
same as in the United States.  But Russia lacks both the money to pay for either of these
options and the number of modern, safe reactors needed to burn the material rapidly as fuel.
Moreover, Russia refuses to consider the immobilization option, considering the plutonium
as a valuable national asset produced with thousands of man-years of labor, not something
to be thrown away as waste (see “Russian Perspectives on Plutonium Disposition,” p. 58).
At their September 1998 summit, President Clinton and President Yeltsin signed an
agreement in principle to carry out disposition in stages of fifty tonnes of plutonium on each
side, and called for negotiation of a more specific and binding government-to-government
agreement laying out how this would be done by the end of 1998.
                                                
75 See, for example, Martha Hamilton, “Uranium Firm to Cut 20% of Jobs,” Washington Post, February 4,
2000.
These four VVER-1000 reactors at Balakovo are the most
modern nuclear reactors in Russia, and could be modified to
burn plutonium fuel in perhaps a third of their reactor cores.
Existing Russian reactors can probably be modified to burn
roughly two tonnes a year of weapon-grade plutonium, but
doubling that rate at a later state, as called for in a draft U.S.-
Russian agreement, would require shipping plutonium fuel to
reactors in other countries, extensive modifications to
existing Russian reactors, or disposing of some plutonium as
waste. Source: PNNL
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Budgets for Warhead and Fissile Material Control
Before and After the Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative1
FY1999
(app.)
FY2000
(req.)
FY2000
(app.)
FY2001
(req.)
Preventing Theft and Smuggling
     MPC&A     $140M2       $145M    $150M    $172M3
     DOE “Second Line of Defense”     $    3M       $    3M    $    3M    $    3M4
     DOD/FBI/Customs Nuclear Smuggling     $    4M       $    4M    $    5M    $    6M 5
     Mayak Storage Facility     $  61M       $  64M    $  64M    n.a.
     Nuclear Warhead Security     $  52M       $  55M    $  99M    n.a.
     BN-350 Spent Fuel Security     $  15M       $  16M    $  15M    $  16M
Stabilizing Nuclear Custodians6
     Nuclear Cities Initiative     $  15M7       $  30M    $    7M    $  17M
     Closure of Penza-19 and Avangard           --             --          --    $  10M
     IPP     $  22M8       $  30M    $  22M    $  22M
     ISTC+STCU     $  22M       $  95M    $  59M    $  45M
     CRDF     $  10M       $  23M    $  15M    $  23M
Monitoring Stockpiles and Reductions9
     HEU Purchase Transparency     $   14M       $  16M    $  16M    $  15M
     DOE+DOD Transp. Development10     $   24M       $  26M    $  23M    $  28M 11
     Trilateral (U.S.-Russia-IAEA) Support12     $     3M       $    3M    $    2M    $    2M
Ending Further Production
     Pu Reactor Shutdown/Conversion     $   30M       $  20M    $  32M    $  32M.
     Ending Civilian Pu Production            --             --          --    $  38M
Reducing Excess Stockpiles13
     Plutonium Disposition     $   28M       $  25M    $  30M    $  40M
     Converting Plutonium Components     $     9M       $    9M    $    9M     n.a.
Add’l New Nonproliferation Initiatives
      Joint proliferation-resistance R&D            --             --          --    $  20M
      Joint waste disposal R&D            --             --          --    $    5M
      Return of HEU to Russia            --             --          --    $    3M
      Crisis Center            --             --          --    $    2M
Total     $ 452M       $ 564M    $ 551M    $669M14
% change from FY99 funding            --       +25%    +22%    +48%
Total excluding science cooperation15     $ 398M       $ 416M    $ 455M    $579M
% change excluding science cooperation            --       +5%    +14%    +45%
________________
1 Compiled from budget documents for the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State, supplemented with
internal budget data provided by officials of these departments.  Table does not include funding for
implementation of similar measures reciprocally in the United States, such as funding for the U.S.
plutonium disposition program.  For a detailed accounting of Congressional authorization and appropriation
actions in FY2000 for programs in the Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative, see William Hoehn, Russian
Nuclear Security and the Clinton Administration’s Fiscal Year 2000 Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative:
A Summary of Congressional Action, Washington DC: Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory
Council, forthcoming (March 2000); for additional information on the FY2001 request, see Matthew Bunn
and William Hoehn, “The Clinton Administration’s Fiscal Year 2001 Budget Requests for Nuclear Security
Cooperation With Russia,” Washington DC: Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council,
forthcoming (March 2000).  All figures are rounded to the nearest million.
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2 This represents the amount actually made available to the program by DOE; Congress appropriated $12M
more, but DOE shifted $4.5 million to the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program and $7.5 million
to the Nuclear Cities Initiative.
3 DOE’s request includes $150 million in the MPC&A line-item, an additional $15 million explicitly for
MPC&A as part of the $100M new “Long-Term Nonproliferation Program for Russia” and an estimated $7
million for MPC&A at the Mayak facility in the part of the new long-term program related to a cessation of
reprocessing of civilian power reactor fuel at Mayak.
4 This funding, and the FY2000 funding, is being provided by the Department of State.
5 This program has traditionally been funded by reprogrammings from other accounts within the
Department of Defense, so specific amounts are not identified in the FY2001 budget—though it may soon
receive its own line-item.  The FY2001 and final FY2000 figures are estimates based on interviews.
6 With the exception of the Nuclear Cities Initiative, all of the programs in this category fund a range of
activities many of which are not directly related to nuclear issues.  IPP and ISTC both fund projects that
employ former chemical and biological weapons scientists, as well as former missile and aerospace
scientists, in addition to nuclear experts; CRDF supports civilian science in the former Soviet Union in
general, and only a very small portion of its funds support work at major nuclear facilities.  Thus, the
inclusion of the total budgets for these programs exaggerates the total amount of funds being directed to
nuclear security efforts—budget breakdowns year-by-year for each project that would make it possible to
include only the nuclear portion are not consistently available.
7 Congress provided only authorization to find funds elsewhere; these funds included $7.5 million from the
MPC&A program and $7.5 million in other program’s prior-year balances.
8 This included $15 million appropriated by Congress, $4.5 million taken from the MPC&A program, and
$3 million from other arms control and nonproliferation functional areas.
9 These programs were not officially included within the Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative, but are
included here for completeness.
10 The budget for DOE’s Warhead and Fissile Material Transparency program was $9.5 million in FY1999.
In addition, a joint DOE-DOD Integrated Technology Plan to evaluate transparency technologies for
START III, Mayak Transparency, and the Trilateral Initiative was begun in FY1999, funded at just under
$20 million (with $4.85 million of that total coming from DOE’s $9.5 million transparency program, and
the remainder from accounts in the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and DOE’s nonproliferation and
verification research and development division).  DOE requested $16 million for its Warhead and Fissile
Material Transparency  program in FY2000, but expected that the combination of those funds and
contributions from DOD and elsewhere in DOE to the technology plan effort would total $26 million; in the
end, the total came to just over $22.5 million (interviews).  For discussion of some of these initiatives, see
Warhead and Fissile Material Transparency Program Strategic Plan, op. cit.
11 DOE requested $16 million for its transparency analysis and negotiations program in FY2001, but the
total contributions to the overall integrated transparency technology plan will not be determined until later
in fiscal 2000.  This estimate is based on assuming that the contributions from outside the known account at
DOE remain the same in FY2001 as they were in FY2000.
12 While these funds support a joint effort with Russia and the IAEA to develop the procedures for placing
excess nuclear material under IAEA verification, essentially all of the funds are spent in the United States,
not in Russia.  Additional funds spent to support IAEA verification of excess materials in the United States
are not included on this chart.
13 This does not include the one-time FY1999 Congressional add-ons of $325 million for the HEU deal and
$200 million for plutonium disposition work with Russia.  In addition, it includes only funds targeted to
support disposition of Russian excess plutonium, not the funds intended to support disposition of U.S.
excess plutonium and HEU.
14 Although specific budget figures for FY2001 for the Mayak storage facility, warhead security projects,
and conversion of warhead components are not available, the total proposed for these activities is $170
million.  See Bunn and Hoehn, “The Clinton Administration’s Fiscal Year 2001 Budget Requests,” op. cit.
15 As noted above, a significant portion of the funds for IPP, ISTC, and CRDF fund projects that have
nothing to do with nuclear matters, and therefore a somewhat more accurate sense of the overall budget
trend for nuclear material security can be found by excluding the budgets for these programs.
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 While negotiations since September 1998 have been much slower than expected, by
the end of 1999 a draft agreement on plutonium disposition was nearly finished, and was
expected to be signed in the first half of 2000.  The draft agreement as it has taken shape
calls for disposition of 34 tonnes of plutonium on each side in the first stage, not 50—
because the U.S. excess declaration includes only 34 tonnes of relatively pure weapons-
grade plutonium, and the Russian side was not willing to carry out disposition of 50 tonnes
of genuine weapons-grade plutonium coming directly from dismantled weapons while the
United States carried out disposition of 34 tonnes of comparable material and 18.5 tonnes of
fuel-grade plutonium, reactor-grade plutonium, and plutonium in what some have called
“ash and trash” (see “Enormous Excess Stockpiles—And Still Larger Remaining Military
Stocks,” p. 54).  There is recognition in the agreement, however, that additional plutonium
stockpiles may be added to the process as nuclear arms reductions continue.  The agreement
does not, however, address whether the long-term goal should be equal reductions or
DOE’s Proposed Long-Term Nonproliferation Initiative for Russia
In its budget request for fiscal year 2001, the Department of Energy (DOE) proposed a $100
million new “Long-Term Nonproliferation Initiative for Russia,” as an additional component of the
continuing Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative (ETRI).  Unlike the original ETRI, the new proposal
finally calls for real increases for programs to reduce the urgent security threats posed by weapons-usable
nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union, including new initiatives to accomplish that objective.  In
effect, the new initiative would increase the total funds for programs directly related to controlling these
threats by about 20 percent.  The specific initiatives covered by this new proposal are urgently needed and
deserve strong support—though the proposal remains far smaller than the doubling or tripling of funding
for these efforts called for in this report (and substantially smaller than the amount DOE suggested at the
outset of the Administration’s internal budget debates).
The specific initiatives in the new proposal include:1
• A halt to the accumulation of weapons-usable civilian separated plutonium.  As described
elsewhere in this report, a critical part of DOE’s new initiative is an effort to reach agreement with
Russia on a moratorium on separating plutonium from spent fuel from civilian power reactors. Cutting
off the continued piling up of ever more weapons-usable plutonium—accompanied by massive bulk-
processing of plutonium in a facility without accurate accounting systems for the material in place—is
an extraordinarily important effort.  Toward that end, DOE proposes to provide $38 million to assist in
building dry-cask storage for the spent fuel that would otherwise be reprocessed, and $7 million for
further security and accounting improvements at the Mayak facility.  In addition, DOE proposes to
finance joint U.S.-Russian R&D on more proliferation-resistant approaches to nuclear energy (see
below).  DOE officials report that they have reached an oral understanding with MINATOM on such a
reprocessing moratorium.  Approval of the requested funding however, is likely to be essential to
reaching final written agreement with MINATOM on a reprocessing halt.
• Accelerated nuclear material security and accounting improvements.  DOE’s proposal includes
$15 million targeted for further MPC&A work, including funds for accelerating the small program to
consolidate and blend down small stockpiles of HEU from particularly vulnerable facilities, and
additional work to secure HEU naval fuel at sensitive Russian navy facilities.  Both of these are
urgently needed steps—though the amount of funding that would be required to move them forward as
quickly as possible is substantially larger than the amount DOE proposes, particularly in the case of the
consolidation and blend-down effort.
____________________
1 Fact Sheet: Long-Term Nonproliferation Program for Russia, U.S. Department of Energy, February 7,
2000, and interviews.
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 reductions to equal levels—a critical point for the longer-term future, given the much larger
initial Russian plutonium stockpile.
 Under the draft agreement, Russia’s excess weapons plutonium and at least 25
tonnes of the U.S. excess weapons plutonium is to be burned in reactors as MOX.  In an
initial phase beginning by 2007, Russia is to carry out disposition of 2 tonnes of plutonium
per year (the most that can plausibly be accomplished with modest modifications of
Russia’s existing reactors, as described below), while in a subsequent phase (which might
involve reactors in other countries), this rate is to at least double, to the roughly 4-ton-per-
rate planned for the weapon-grade portion of the U.S. program.
 Under the agreement, the cost of Russian plutonium disposition is to be covered by
contributions from Western countries, including the United States; if adequate funding is
not forthcoming, the parties are no longer obliged to carry out the disposition of 34 tonnes
of plutonium.  The agreement calls for specified transparency and monitoring measures, and
• Accelerated closure of weapons assembly facilities.  DOE proposes to spend $10M to help
accelerate the closure of two of Russia’s four nuclear weapons assembly and disassembly plants.  If
successful, this project could, in a short period of time, significantly reduce Russia’s nuclear weapons
manufacturing capacity.  In addition, if agreement can be reached with Russia, some of these funds
would go to establish sites for demonstrating technologies and procedures for verifying warhead
dismantlement without revealing classified information—a key element of U.S. long-term nuclear arms
reduction objectives.
• R&D on proliferation-resistant nuclear energy and waste disposal.  Developing new approaches to
nuclear energy that pose less of a nuclear proliferation threat serves both U.S. and Russian interests.
DOE proposes to spend $20 million to finance joint R&D with Russia on such proliferation-resistant
nuclear energy systems.  MINATOM is eager in particular to study fuel cycles that make more efficient
use of uranium resources than do typical light-water reactors on a once-through fuel cycle, but do not
involve fully separating directly weapons-usable plutonium—and funding for joint work on such
systems is likely to be critical to MINATOM’s agreement to a reprocessing moratorium, as
MINATOM sees that moratorium as only a temporary halt until improved, proliferation-resistant
reprocessing technology is developed.  U.S. funding for joint proliferation-resistance R&D, however,
would not be made available unless the United States and Russia can reach agreement on the
contentious issue of Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran.   In addition, DOE has proposed $5 million
in joint R&D on disposal of nuclear wastes—a problem facing both countries, where each has data
from its own past efforts that would be useful to the other’s program.
• Returning research reactor HEU to Russia.  A particularly important new initiative in DOE’s
proposal is an effort to begin work on returning Soviet-supplied HEU to Russia.  As described
elsewhere in this report, given Iraq’s effort to use the HEU from its research reactor for a nuclear
bomb, it is important to work to get rid of the HEU fuel in research reactors in such countries at
Yugoslavia, North Korea, Libya, and Vietnam as rapidly as possible.  Russia is willing to encourage
these countries to shut down their research reactors or convert them to proliferation-resistant LEU fuels
(being developed in Russia in another U.S.-sponsored effort), and to take the HEU they now have back
to Russia, but cannot afford to pay the costs of such an effort.  The $3 million DOE proposes to spend
in this area is only a fraction of what is needed—enough to get initial studies and preparations
underway, but not enough to actually package and ship the HEU from these facilities back to Russia.
• A nuclear crisis center.  Finally, DOE proposes to spend $2 million on continuing operation of a joint
U.S.-Russian nuclear crisis center, allowing the two sides to communicate in real time in managing any
nuclear safety or security emergencies that may arise.
Each of these proposals is an important and useful initiative in its own right—but even if fully funded, they
still fall well short of what would be required to reduce the security threats posed by the Cold War legacy of
nuclear warheads and materials as rapidly and effectively as there are now opportunities to do so.
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commitments that during the disposition period, any MOX plant built to carry out the
agreement will not be used for civilian plutonium, exports of plutonium-bearing fuel will
only be carried out by mutual agreement, and there will be no reprocessing of any of the
resulting spent fuel or immobilization wastes.76
 Two fundamental obstacles need to be overcome for this first-step effort to begin
eliminating Russia’s excess weapons plutonium to be successful.  The first problem is
financing: Russia has made it clear that it cannot afford to pay the cost of disposition of its
excess plutonium (unknown at this time, but likely to be in the range of $1-$3 billion), but
other countries have pledged only a small part of the required funds.  Under Senator
Domenici’s leadership, the Congress put a $200 million down-payment on this cost into the
fiscal 1999 budget—a move which made clear to Russia that there was a real prospect of
substantial U.S. financial contributions toward the cost of disposition, and was therefore
absolutely essential to Russian willingness to negotiate the draft agreement described
above.77  The Administration has requested an additional $200 million over five years in its
Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative.  In the spring of 1999, Japan made a pledge of $200
million for submarine decommissioning, re-employing weapons scientists, and plutonium
disposition in Russia—but it is expected that only a small fraction of that amount will be for
plutonium disposition (focused on part of the work of converting the BN-600 fast reactor to
burn partial cores of plutonium), leaving the financing arranged to date still far less than
what is needed.
 Discussions of contributions to finance Russian plutonium disposition are under
way under a group initiated by the Group of Eight—whose leaders pledged at the Cologne
summit in 1999 to “review potential in our own resource commitments” prior to the next
summit, scheduled for Okinawa in July 200078—but as of early 2000, no substantial
additional pledges had been made, and it remained highly uncertain whether pledges
remotely sufficient to the task would be forthcoming in Okinawa.
 The second major obstacle is the lack of sufficient Russian reactors to burn the
Russian plutonium.  If all seven of Russia’s most modern light-water reactors, the VVER-
1000s, and its only operational fast-neutron reactor, the BN-600, were converted to burn
partial cores of MOX fuel—which may or may not be possible in the case of some of the
older plants—they could burn roughly 2 tonnes of plutonium per year.79  At that rate,
even after the years required to get going, it would take 25 years—substantially longer
than the remaining operational lives of these reactors—to burn the 50 tonnes of
plutonium Russia has included in its formal declaration of excess, to say nothing of the
                                                
76 Interviews.  See also Holgate, “Plutonium Disposition,” op. cit.
77 This $200 million is available until expended, so it need not be spent in any particular year, and indeed
very little of it has been spent to date.  It will be spent to support the facilities needed to carry out the 34-
tonne agreement, but will not be sufficient for that purpose; exactly which portion of the various activities
envisioned would be paid for with this increment of $200 million has not yet been definitely determined.
78 G-8 Summit: Cologne Communiqué 1999, Cologne, Germany, June 20, 1999 (available at http://www.
state.gov/www/issues/economic/summit/99communique.html).
 79 Current thinking is that only these reactors could be modified at reasonable cost to be safe enough to burn
plutonium fuels.  If only the four most modern VVER-1000s could be modified to burn plutonium, and they
and the BN-600 could only handle plutonium fuels in about one-third of their reactor cores, these five
reactors would consume roughly 1.3 tonnes of plutonium per year.  If, on the other hand, all seven VVER-
1000s could handle plutonium fuels, this figure increases to approximately 2 tonnes per year.
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huge quantities of civilian separated plutonium it has also committed never to use in
weapons, or the even larger amounts that may become excess as disarmament proceeds.
Moreover, whether it will be politically, technically, and economically feasible to modify
and use such a large number of Russian plants for disposition of excess weapons plutonium
remains highly uncertain.  Concepts for an international consortium that would buy MOX
made from Russian weapons plutonium and market it to reactors in Ukraine, Western
Europe, Japan, and Canada are being considered, but no genuinely credible scheme has yet
been put in place.  Another possibility which is being examined is to carry out more
extensive modifications on some of the Russian reactors, so as to allow them to burn MOX
in larger fractions of their reactor cores; this could make it possible to achieve the goal of at
least four tonnes per year specified in the draft U.S.-Russian agreement using only existing
Russian reactors (two additional VVER-1000 reactors are close to completion, but whether
and when MINATOM will find the funds to finish them remains uncertain).
 Alternative concepts which have been proposed, but which are not currently being
actively pursued, include (a) building additional reactors in Russia, such as the BN-800 fast
neutron reactors MINATOM has long hoped to build, or the high-temperature gas reactors
being developed in a Russian-U.S.-French-Japanese joint program (an approach criticized
in U.S. studies because of the extra costs and delays involved in building new reactors); (b)
shipping the excess plutonium to storage facilities outside of Russia, regardless of whether
it can be used in the near term, as the quickest means to address the security threats it poses;
(c) fabricating the Russian plutonium into fuel in existing European MOX fabrication
plants, instead of the civilian plutonium they are currently planning to fabricate during that
period; and (d) purchasing the Russian excess plutonium and shipping it to the United
States for incorporation into the U.S. disposition program.  Russia has made clear that it
would very much prefer to build the new BN-800 reactors and use those to burn the excess
weapons plutonium, but it is unlikely that the international community would provide the
funds for this.  Russia has also made clear that it will not accept any option that involves
shipping the plutonium abroad in forms other than fabricated fuel.
 In the meantime, the United States, France, Germany, Canada, and Japan each have
programs to cooperate with Russia in analyzing, developing, and testing the technologies
needed for disposition of Russia’s excess weapons plutonium.  The U.S. program of
technical cooperation, funded at roughly $25 million per year, is by far the most extensive
of these efforts, and includes efforts related to safe use of MOX fuel in Russia’s VVER-
1000 reactors, conversion of the BN-600 breeder reactor to a plutonium “burner” reactor
that would consume more plutonium than it produces, immobilization of plutonium,
stabilization of unstable forms of plutonium, and conversion of metallic plutonium from
weapons into oxides suitable for use as MOX.  The U.S. and Russian teams reached
agreement on a technical workplan for plutonium disposition in late 1999.  The French and
German efforts have largely focused on initial feasibility studies followed by detailed design
work on a modest-scale MOX plant suitable for supplying four of Russia’s VVER-1000
reactors and the BN-600 (though the French have also funded joint work on conversion of
metallic weapons plutonium to oxide).  The Japanese program focuses primarily on
conversion of the BN-600 reactor, while the Canadian program focuses on studies of the use
of weapons plutonium as MOX in Canadian CANDU reactors.
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 In short, substantial programs are in place to address each of the five areas of threat
outlined in Section II.  These programs are making significant progress, and deserve strong
support.  But far more remains to be done than has yet been accomplished—and the pace of
progress to date simply does not match the scale and urgency of the threat.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 IV. THE NEXT WAVE: URGENTLY NEEDED NEW STEPS
 
 Major action is urgently needed to rapidly reduce the proliferation and arms
reduction risks posed by the insecure, oversized, and unmonitored nuclear stockpiles and
nuclear complex in the former Soviet Union.  The basic principle of an expanded
program should be to provide the resources and leadership necessary to reduce these
security threats as rapidly as it is practicable to do so.
 Such an accelerated and expanded program should be guided by a set of strategic
objectives and timetables for achieving them.  A program unconstrained by resources,
with sustained leadership from the highest levels of the U.S. government, should be able
to achieve the following seven strategic objectives within roughly five to seven years:
• Substantially reduce the number of sites and buildings where fissile material is stored,
and install effective security and accounting systems for all the remaining buildings;
• Put in place a structure of resources, incentives, and organizations needed to achieve
and sustain security for all fissile material in the former Soviet Union for the long haul;
• Blend all Russian and U.S. excess HEU (potentially including far more than just the
500 tons of Russian HEU covered by the current U.S.-Russian HEU Purchase
Agreement) to forms that can no longer be used in weapons;
• Begin large-scale disposition of U.S. and Russian excess plutonium, with agreements
and budgets in place to cover the financing of the disposition program and provide
adequate reactor and/or immobilization capacity to get the job done;
• Substantially reduce the Russian nuclear weapons complex’s capacity for new
weapons production, and re-employ thousands of the scientists and technicians no
longer needed in that complex;
• Put in place a system of reciprocal data exchanges, monitoring, and transparent
warhead dismantlement that will begin laying the basis for deep, transparent, and
irreversible nuclear arms reductions; and
• Reach agreement with Russia on reducing total warhead stockpiles, and reducing
fissile material stockpiles to the levels needed to support the agreed warhead levels.
Each of these objectives is ambitious.  But objectives of this kind are what the
security threats posed by the vast Cold War stockpiles of warheads and fissile material
demand.  It is possible that some of them would not be achieved within five to seven
years even with substantially increased resources and sustained high-level attention.  But
without those critical ingredients, it is likely that none of these objectives will be
achieved in a timely way, and huge security risks will remain.
New steps are needed in each of the five areas outlined in the previous section.  A
comprehensive strategy including specific proposals in each of these areas is detailed
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below.  The strategy can be summarized (see table) as a six-point plan requiring the
expenditure of $1−$1.5 billion a year for each of the next five years—roughly a doubling
or tripling of currently planned funding for programs related to safeguarding warheads
and fissile material. This would represent roughly one half of one percent of the U.S.
defense budget.
 
Preventing Theft and Smuggling
 
 A revised and expanded MPC&A program is urgently needed, focused on
accomplishing three strategic goals as rapidly as practicable:
• consolidating nuclear material at fewer buildings and fewer sites;
• upgrading security and accounting systems at both the facility level and the
national level, while providing the needed training and services to allow these
systems to be effectively used; and
• sustaining effective security over time.
 A program to reduce the proliferation risk posed by insecure materials as quickly
as technology and cooperation with the former Soviet states would allow, unconstrained
by funding, would require substantially larger budgets than are currently planned.
Roughly $250 million per year—an increase of roughly $100 million per year over the
current program budget—for roughly half a decade, while the initial consolidations and
upgrades are implemented, is a conservative estimate of what is needed.1 While the pace
at which security can be improved is constrained by factors other than money—including
the degree of cooperation Russia is willing to permit, the number of experienced U.S. and
Russian experts available to carry out the needed programs, and the U.S. and Russian
ability to manage the efforts effectively—constrained budgets should not be allowed to
slow progress, as is now the case.  To protect the U.S. investment, the program should be
continued at a modest level—perhaps $50 million per year—for a considerable period
after the initial upgrades are accomplished, to ensure that security and accounting systems
are sustained and improved, and to maintain cooperation and communication concerning
the state of MPC&A.
 To be successful, a revised and expanded program will have to reinvigorate the
sense of partnership between U.S. and Russian participants, and between DOE
headquarters and the U.S. laboratories.  Ultimately, while the program is being carried out
primarily with U.S. funds, the materials are Russia’s to protect, and thus integrating a
Russian perspective in the design and implementation of all the needed programs is
essential.  At the same time, however, to maintain budgetary support in the United States,
it is critical to focus on implementing the steps that offer the most “bang for the buck” in
improving security and accounting as rapidly as practicable, and this will inevitably
                                                
 1 No detailed analysis has yet been done of what such a funding-unconstrained program would cost; the
Department of Energy should undertake such an analysis immediately.  The $250 million per year estimate
arises from adding three figures: planning for the originally planned $150 million budget for FY1999 made
it clear that at least that amount could be effectively spent installing upgrades and providing associated
training, while unpublished analyses by participants in the MPC&A program suggest that that substantial
consolidation and sustainability programs might each cost $50 million per year.  Some period would be
needed to scale up the effort from the current $140 million a year level.  Information from interviews.
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An Agenda for Action: Summary of Key Proposals
Proposal Approximate Cost Over Five Years (est.2)
Expand nuclear material security and
accounting program to level not
constrained by funding
$1.3 billion3
Pay costs and financial incentives to blend
all excess HEU to LEU within a few years $1 billion4
Finance disposition of excess Russian
plutonium $2 billion
Help shrink Russian nuclear weapons
complex, and re-employ excess scientists
and technicians
$0.5 billion
Offer to finance transparent dismantlement
of thousands of warheads, with reciprocity $0.5 billion
Expand available revenue for nuclear
security through spent fuel storage, HEU
purchases, debt swaps, and/or lifting
restraints on legitimate exports5
$0-$2 billion
Total: $5-$8 billion
 require some patient negotiation to bridge differences between the U.S. and Russian
perspectives.6  Key steps toward achieving each of the three strategic goals are described
below.
 CONSOLIDATION
 
 Consolidation of nuclear materials is an urgent priority: protecting fewer buildings
and fewer sites means that higher levels of security can be provided at lower cost over the
long run.  When material is removed from facilities completely, the risk of theft at those
facilities is eliminated entirely.  While the Russian Ministry of Defense has reduced the
number of nuclear warhead storage sites from over 500 to less than 100, as discussed
above, there has been very little consolidation of weapons-usable material sites.  Since
 
                                                
2 These are central estimates of five-year cumulative expenditures, based on the author’s judgment of total
costs.  Since, in many areas, substantial programs are already underway funding a portion of these costs, the
additional costs of the proposed program compared to the already planned program would be perhaps $1-
$2 billion less.  Further analysis with the resources available to the government would be required to
develop more precise and budget-ready estimates.
3 Assumes an MPC&A budget increased to roughly $250 million per year, as described in the text.  The
additional cost beyond funding levels already planned would be only $500 million over five years.
4 The actual cost of the blending would likely be substantially less than this, but this figure includes
financial incentives for Russia to agree to undertake the blending as well.  Of course, it is possible that even
larger financial incentives would be required. The U.S. government could recoup a portion of the cost later,
if the payments were in the form of pre-payments against future deliveries.
5 See “Generating New Revenue for Nuclear Security,” p. 86.
6 For further discussion of these issues, see Bukharin, Bunn, and Luongo, Renewing the Partnership, op. cit.
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 late 1998, however, DOE has begun placing increased emphasis on consolidation, and in
the aftermath of the August 1998 financial crisis, MINATOM has recognized the need to
consolidate its complex to reduce costs, and a significant cooperative consolidation effort
is now planned.  This effort will focus on both consolidating material at large sites in a
smaller number of buildings and areas within the site, and removing material entirely
from some smaller sites.  While such an effort will greatly reduce long-run costs, it will
involve significant short-run costs for preparing and transporting material, preparing
facilities to receive it, blending it to LEU in some cases, and the like.  Many sites—or
even individual research areas within sites—are likely to be reluctant to give up the HEU
or plutonium they have in stock, given this material’s present and historic association
with high-level nuclear research; in many cases, financial incentives are likely to be
needed.  A consolidation program should include:
• Financing for preparing and transporting nuclear material, and rapidly providing
secure storage facilities to which it could be shipped;
Purchasing Vulnerable HEU Stockpiles
The United States is purchasing 500 tons of HEU from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons—
which may be among the most secure HEU in the former Soviet Union.  It is time to add an accelerated
effort to purchase the most vulnerable HEU stocks as well.
Scattered through the former Soviet Union are nearly two dozen small, underfunded civilian
nuclear research facilities possessing HEU in amounts ranging from a few kilograms to hundreds of
kilograms or more.1  Some of these are within Russia, but there are research facilities that still have
weapons-usable HEU in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Latvia, and Uzbekistan as well.  Many of these
facilities no longer have the money to protect the HEU appropriately, or to do the research that once
required HEU.  Indeed, it was at sites like these that some of the worst desperation was observed after the
August 1998 financial crisis—guards leaving their posts to forage for food, electricity being cut off
because bills had not been paid, and the like.
Simply purchasing the HEU from these facilities offers an opportunity to rapidly eliminate the
serious proliferation risks they pose.  Many of the managers of these facilities would probably be very
happy to part with their HEU in return for a rapid infusion of money for their facility and a modest
amount of assistance for the facility to conduct other research not requiring HEU.  Because the presence
of HEU has come to be associated to some degree with status and funding for the institutes, it is likely that
to get agreements to clear out the HEU from the largest possible number of facilities as rapidly as
possible, integrated packages of incentives will need to be tailored to the needs of each facility.
Past efforts to purchase vulnerable HEU stockpiles, such as Project Sapphire, have taken many
months of preparation and cost tens of millions of dollars each—partly because of the considerable
political and technical headaches of moving material to the United States or some other country outside
the former Soviet Union.  A faster, simpler, and cheaper approach for a broader purchase program would
be to purchase the HEU and have it blended to proliferation-resistant LEU within Russia—either at the
facilities now blending HEU on a large scale for the HEU purchase agreement, or at other facilities that
have capabilities for small-scale blending of specialty materials like these HEU reactor fuels, such as the
Luch Production Association at Podolsk, near Moscow, and the Institute of Atomic Reactors in
Dmitrovgrad.  Indeed, as described in the text, the MPC&A program has initiated an initial “pilot”
program in which the United States pays Russia to bring HEU from potentially vulnerable sites and blend
it down at Luch and Dmitrovgrad.  The United States pays Luch and Dmitrovgrad for the blended LEU,
and these blending facilities and MINATOM are responsible for working out arrangements with the sites
from which the HEU is shipped.  In its FY2001 budget request, DOE proposed to increase the funding
level for this effort, to make it possible in principle to remove material from as many as 2 facilities per
year over the next several years.
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• An intensive program to purchase small, vulnerable HEU stockpiles that exist at small
research reactors throughout the former Soviet Union (see “Purchasing Vulnerable
HEU Stockpiles,” p. 78);
• Increased financing to help HEU-fueled research reactors and critical assemblies shift
to using LEU fuels (joint development of such fuels for Soviet-designed research
reactors is already underway);
• Financing to help some facilities shift away from research requiring either HEU or
LEU, or to close facilities completely and provide alternative employment for their
workers; and
• Extensive briefings for senior MINATOM officials and site managers on the dramatic
savings in safeguards and security costs that are being achieved through consolidation
in the United States.
The time has come to drastically expand and accelerate this effort, with the goal of getting all of
the HEU out of as many vulnerable facilities in the former Soviet Union as possible within a few years.
This includes both facilities in Russia and in the non-Russian states.  Moreover, there are HEU-fueled
research reactors supplied by the Soviet Union in countries ranging from Yugoslavia to North Korea to
Libya.  Given the example of Iraq’s “crash” nuclear weapons program planning to use HEU from its
HEU-fueled research reactor—and concern over Yugoslavia’s stocks in the aftermath of the recent air
campaign—extremely high priority should be given to getting this material out of these countries as soon
as possible.  In its FY2001 budget request, DOE included $3 million to fund initial work toward a Russian
HEU fuel take-back program to bring this material back to Russia.  But that is not enough to actually fund
the transport of this material back to Russia, or to provide the needed incentives to these facilities to let it
go; a substantially increased funding level, in the range of a few tens of millions of dollars a year until the
job is accomplished, is an urgently needed nonproliferation investment.2
The total amount of HEU at the smallest and most desperate former Soviet facilities where a
purchase would be most urgent is probably less than two tons.  The amounts at the facilities outside the
former Soviet Union are measured only in tens of kilograms.  If the price negotiated were similar to the
$24 million-a-ton price originally negotiated for the HEU purchase agreement, buying all of these stocks
would cost in the range of $50 million.  Conceivably, other costs relating to transport, blending, and the
like, and additional assistance for these facilities to pursue other research, could double this cost—but
ensuring effective security at these many facilities over the long term would inevitably cost still more, and
could never provide absolute assurance that thefts would be prevented.  One hundred million would be a
very small price to pay for permanently eliminating the theft risk at many of the most vulnerable facilities
in the former Soviet Union, and the risks that the material in non-Soviet states would be used in weapons.
This concept has been recommended before—indeed, a 1997 National Research Council study
recommended seeking to purchase and eliminate every former Soviet stockpile of HEU outside of
Russia.3  The time to act is now—no one can know how long the world has before some of this HEU
might be stolen or diverted to a weapons program.  While the Administration’s recent request is a useful
first step, Congress should step in and direct DOE to launch a greatly accelerated and expanded purchase
initiative, and provide the funds to do so.
________________
1 Most of these facilities are listed under the categories “Reactor-Type Facilities” and “NIS and the Baltics”, in
MPC&A Strategic Plan, op. cit., p. 17.
2  During the course of 1999, initial discussions of the possibility of U.S. funding for such a Russian HEU-fuel take-
back program got underway.  For one account of IAEA discussions in this area, see Anne MacLachlan, “IAEA
Hopes Meeting Will Lead to Solution for ‘Orphan’ Russian-Origin Fuel,” Nuclear Fuel, October 4, 1999.
3 Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and
Technologies in the Former Soviet Union, op. cit.
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Several approaches to rapidly providing appropriate secure storage space for
consolidated material can be envisioned.  Modest stockpiles of HEU could be shipped to
facilities with the capacity to take it out of fuel elements and blend it to proliferation-
resistant LEU (such as the Luch Production Association in Podolsk—also the site at
which some of the most impressive progress in intra-site consolidation has been
accomplished—and the Institute of Atomic Reactors at Dmitrovgrad).  Where storage
buildings with effective security and accounting systems and available space already
exist, these could be used.  Moreover, technology exists for rapidly deployable secure
storage facilities (developed to support deployment of military forces equipped with
nuclear weapons), and these types of facilities could be put in place within weeks or
months, should a major effort be made to do so.  Some such facilities have already been
used.  Alternatively, some facilities in the Russian complex have large empty spaces in
secure areas, where additional storage facilities could be built quickly and cheaply.7
Finally, the current legislative restriction limiting the fissile material storage facility at
Mayak to hold only materials from weapons could be modified—at least for a portion of
the facility—allowing that facility, when completed, to store vulnerable weapons-usable
material even if it does not come from dismantled weapons.
 UPGRADES
 
 Installing effective security and accounting systems has been the central focus of
the MPC&A program to date.  A vast amount of work remains to be done—even if the
consolidation effort is extremely successful.  In many cases, a greater emphasis is needed
on quickly implementing simple, low-cost steps—bricking over windows, piling rocks in
front of doors—allowing time later for follow-up with more sophisticated (and
expensive) approaches.  At the same time, however, the initial emphasis on such physical
protection upgrades has to be complemented with increased emphasis on improving
material accounting and control.  As a first step, the United States should work with
Russia to put in place a program in which Russia would immediately identify, count, tag,
and seal all containers and items with weapons-usable nuclear material throughout the
Russian nuclear complex, creating at least a comprehensive record of all the materials
that exist; the slower and more expensive process of performing actual measurements of
the nuclear material in those myriad containers and items can proceed in parallel.
(Russian secrecy concerns will make it impossible for the United States to have full
access to this comprehensive record; the key is for Russia to have an accurate record of
all its own materials.) Redoubled support is also needed for getting an effective national
accounting system in place as rapidly as possible.
 Finally, it is critical to remember that the job is not over when the initial upgrades
are declared “complete”: not only must the security afforded by the initial upgrades be
maintained, but further improvements are inevitably going to be needed to offer effective
security at most of these sites.  Essentially none of the sites declared completed so far
would meet the MPC&A standards to be granted a license to operate in the United States;
                                                
 7 See, for example, the discussion of the football-field sized concrete-lined underground facility at
Krasnoyarsk-26, once intended for an additional reprocessing area, in Bunn and Holdren, “Managing
Military Uranium and Plutonium,” op. cit.
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virtually all are still potentially vulnerable to a well-placed and knowledgeable insider
working with a small group of outsiders. 8
 Hence, while DOE will probably continue to regularly hold “commissioning”
ceremonies when the initial upgrades at a site are completed, these ceremonies should not
be taken as the end of the job, by any means.  The past policy of installing initial upgrades
and essentially walking away is already being reversed, which is a welcome development;
but it is important to ensure that this policy is reversed for all the sites with proliferation-
sensitive quantities of plutonium and HEU in the former Soviet Union, including the non-
Russian sites whose support has been passed from the MPC&A program to DOE’s
International Safeguards program.  These non-Russian sites should also be a key focus of
consolidation efforts.9
 
 SUSTAINABLE SECURITY
 
 Installing modern equipment will not provide a long-term security benefit if that
equipment is not operated, maintained, and improved over time; if the people guarding
the material and using the equipment are unpaid, untrained, and have no real incentives
for good performance; and if there is no “safeguards culture” in which everyone
understands that no corners can be cut when it comes to security and accounting for
nuclear material.  Foreign financial assistance cannot continue indefinitely, and Russian
officials and facility managers will ultimately have to be convinced to allocate their own
scarce resources to these tasks.  The problem of how to move from installing equipment
to actually achieving sustainable long-term security is absolutely central to the MPC&A
program’s long-term success, but is by far the most difficult intellectual and policy
challenge facing the program.  The sustainability efforts being undertaken so far within
the MPC&A program,10 focused primarily on ensuring that spare parts and maintenance
services are available to maintain equipment, procedures are in place to use it effectively,
and people are trained to use these systems and procedures, are absolutely necessary, but
are not likely to be sufficient.   Achieving sustainable long-term security will require
changes in ingrained habits, ways of thinking, and priorities among thousands of people
in the former Soviet Union, from President Putin down to workers on individual
processing lines handling nuclear material.  Those changes will have to come from those
individuals concluding that such changes are in their interests and the interests of their
facilities, organizations, and countries; exactly how the United States and other
international partners can best encourage such changes remains open to debate.11  Further
                                                
 8 Interviews with U.S. and Russian MPC&A program participants.
 9 Although all of the non-Russian facilities “completed” in the MPC&A program have been handed over to
DOE’s International Safeguards program, that division simply did not have the resources to seriously
support further upgrades, or even sustainability measures for the existing systems.  As one DOE MPC&A
official put it, “our program has walked away.”  DOE is now considering providing additional funding to
sustain upgrades at these sites—a much-needed step.  Information from interviews.
10 For descriptions, see Smarto et al., “MPC&A Site Operations and Sustainability,” op. cit.; and Haase et.
al., “Material Protection, Control, and Accountancy (MPC&A) Sustainability,” op. cit.
 11 For a particularly useful discussion of the impediments to sustainability and steps the United States could
take to overcome them, see Potter and Wehling, “Sustainable Nuclear Material Security in Russia,” op. cit.
For other useful discussions of the challenges of MPC&A sustainability, see, for example, James E. Doyle
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These enormous concrete blocks, with interlocking steel bars,
have been intalled with U.S. assistance to protect tons of
plutonium beneath them from theft, at the Mayak plant in
Ozersk.    The MPC&A program should be given thefunding
and personnelresources to accomplish the mission of
reducing the proliferation risk posed by insecure nuclear
material as rapidly as technology and cooperation with the
	
states will allow.  Source: DOE
complicating the policy challenge is
the inevitable problem of balancing
near-term upgrade measures that are
urgently needed to address immediate
risks of theft with long-term
measures needed to build a
sustainable base for the future.
 What is needed is to increase
the former Soviet states’ sustainable
capacity to manage nuclear materials
securely, and convince them to use
that capacity for this purpose.
Unfortunately, experience with U.S.
and international “capacity-building”
programs—designed to improve
recipient states’ abilities to carry out
tasks ranging from tax collection to
providing public health services—is
littered with programs that had little
or no long-term benefit because they
focused only on providing the
technical equipment and training needed to carry out the specific task at hand (as the
MPC&A program has generally done to date).  For lasting benefit, experience suggests
that broader problems such as the authority, resources, and organization of the institutions
carrying out the task, their effectiveness in hiring and retaining qualified personnel and
providing incentives for good performance, the communications among the relevant
players working on the task, the presence or absence of mechanisms for regular
assessment and critique of performance, and the like must also be addressed.  Yet these
broader issues are frequently seen as being “beyond the scope” of the assistance program,
as they generally have been in the case of MPC&A.12
 Today, facilities in the former Soviet states lack both the resources (money,
appropriate equipment, appropriately trained personnel, appropriately functioning
                                                                                                                                                
and Stephen V. Mladineo, “Assessing the Development of a Modern Safeguards Culture in the NIS,”
Nonproliferation Review, Winter 1998; Oleg Bukharin, Achieving Safeguards Sustainability in Russia,
Princeton, NJ: Center for Energy and Environmental Studies, Princeton University, Report No. 305, March
1998; Perry, “From Triage to Long-Term Care,” op. cit.; and Perry, “Securing Russian Nuclear Materials,”
op. cit.
 12 In general, there is much to be learned for the MPC&A program from other experiences in providing
assistance to build a state’s capacity to carry out particular government functions.  The necessary systematic
program of reform requires a thorough understanding of how the system whose capacity is to be built
actually functions, which the MPC&A program and related efforts are just beginning to have.  See Merilee
S. Grindle, ed.: Getting Good Government: Capacity Building in the Public Sectors of Developing
Countries, Cambridge, MA: Harvard Studies in International Development, Harvard University Press,
1997.  For a provocative application of these lessons to the problems of nuclear material management in the
former Soviet Union, see Stacy VanDeveer, “Cooperative Security and Capacity Building in the Former
Soviet Union,” Cambridge, MA: Managing the Atom Project Discussion Paper, Harvard University,
forthcoming.
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organizational structures, etc.) needed for effective security and accounting for nuclear
material over the long haul, and the incentives to use what resources they have for this
purpose.  Spending on safeguards and security creates no additional products or revenues
(“safeguards don’t make kilowatts,” as the saying goes), so in the absence of effective
regulation imposing stringent security and accounting requirements, facility managers in
the former Soviet Union facing desperate budget crises have every incentive to skimp on
providing the needed funding for effective MPC&A.  Beyond the individual facilities is
an overall context of dysfunctional governments, depressed economies, rampant crime
and corruption, and modest high-level attention devoted to MPC&A, all of which makes
sustainable security far more difficult to achieve.
 An expanded MPC&A sustainability effort should focus on three key areas:
resources, incentives, and organizations.
 
 SUSTAINABILITY RESOURCES.  The United States should:
• Expand and plan for funding of “emergency measures” where needed—funding to
keep guards on the job, keep security systems running temporarily, provide backup
electricity supplies, and the like—as DOE did on a small scale in the winter and
spring of 1998-1999.
• Finance the first 2-3 years of operations and maintenance of systems installed with
U.S. assistance, as an initial settling-in period, with work during that period to reach
firm commitments that Russia will pay to keep the systems operational after that.13
• Put increased reliance on indigenous personnel and firms to design, build, operate,
upgrade, and operate MPC&A systems, building up the indigenous capacities to carry
out these missions in the former Soviet states.  In particular, the work of designing
and building MPC&A systems at individual sites could increasingly be shifted to
Russian firms (perhaps initially capitalized with U.S. funds if appropriate firms do not
yet exist), with continued oversight by experts from the United States and in-depth
cooperation between the firms and the individual sites—increasing consistency in the
approaches taken at different sites, increasing indigenous capacity, and reducing costs
for and burdens on U.S. personnel.14
• Fund the establishment and use of Russian teams to carry out realistic tests of both
outsider and insider threats at Russian facilities—with wide dissemination of test
results and lessons learned, and funding for fixing problems identified.15
                                                
13 DOE is currently working to ensure that installed systems have “extended warranties,” and that adequate
servicing capabilities and supplies of spare parts are available, but the proposal to simply pay for the full
cost of operations and maintenance during the initial settling in period would expand this approach
substantially.
14 The author is grateful to Christopher Paine of the Natural Resources Defense Council for this suggestion.
A Russian team from the Kurchatov Institute has already played a central role of this kind in the program to
upgrade MPC&A for Russian Navy facilities, and the MPC&A groups at Sarov and Snezhinsk are
beginning to play roles in working with other sites in their areas as well.
15 Realistic testing is critically important, as the performance of a system in the real world is almost always
different from its performance on paper.  Moreover, in the U.S. system spectacular failures in realistic tests
have proven to be an excellent mechanism for convincing high-level officials that more funding for security
really was required.  See discussion of the importance of performance testing in Bukharin, Bunn, and
Luongo, Renewing the Partnership, op. cit.
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• Help finance transition costs (recruitment, training, equipment, and the like) for a
shift to more professional guard forces for nuclear material—either highly trained
officer-dominated forces comparable to those that guard nuclear weapons, or (at least
at civilian facilities) commercial firms such as those that guard Russian banks, or
nuclear facilities in the United States.16
• Finance expanded training programs designed to build the cadre of qualified MPC&A
personnel, including regular training at individual sites as well as the existing national
training effort, with a focus not only on technical MPC&A but also on the critical
importance to Russia and the world of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, and
the key role of effective MPC&A in that effort.
• Explore possible new revenue streams that could finance robust security and
accounting program for nuclear material in the former Soviet Union after international
assistance (see “Generating New Revenue for Nuclear Security,” p. 86).
 
 SUSTAINABILITY INCENTIVES.  Here the appropriate goal has been aptly explained by
others: “everyone involved in MPC&A planning, implementation, and oversight must
know what they should do, receive rewards for doing it correctly, and expect penalties for
doing it poorly or not at all.”17  Toward that end, the United States should:
• Put nuclear security and accounting at the top of the U.S.-FSU nonproliferation
agenda, as a fundamental requirement for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons,
which all states handling weapons-usable nuclear material must meet.  This issue
should be accorded an importance at least comparable to that of ratification of arms
control treaties and enforcement of effective export controls.  The United States
should make clear that this is a fundamental requirement for improved nuclear
relations, something to be emphasized at every level on every occasion until the
problem is adequately addressed (as is now done with issues such as cooperation with
Iran, to take one example)—and work with other leading nuclear powers to convince
them to take a similar approach.
• Increase the priority devoted to strengthening regulation of MPC&A. A realistic
prospect of being fined or shut down if MPC&A did not meet stringent standards
would create a major incentive for facility managers to invest scarce resources in
                                                
16 Currently there is an ongoing transition in Russia in the opposite direction: to reduce costs at some sites,
guard forces from the Ministry of Interior are being replaced with private guards that are regarded as being
much less capable.  See, for example, First Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy Valentin Ivanov, “Status and
Future Role of Nuclear Material Safety Within MINATOM’s System,” remarks presented at Global '99:
Nuclear Technology— Bridging the Millenia, Jackson Hole, Wyoming, 30 August−2 September 1999.
Ivanov’s prepared text remarks that “due to insufficient funding, a significant number of the guards from the
Ministry of Internal Affairs [were] replaced by institutional guards, whose proficiency compares badly to
that of the guards from the Ministry of Internal Affairs.”  Similarly, Alexander Dmitriev, deputy chairman
of the Russian nuclear regulatory agency, told Duma hearings in 1996 that the replacement of troops with
“security personnel not affiliated with any ministry or government agency,” or even the elimination of guard
forces, leaving “no security whatsoever,” was becoming “quite widespread,” and warned that “there’s
simply no comparison between a real armed security officer and some guy of ours who occasionally gets
called out to the shooting range to take a couple of shots.”  See “We Cannot Preclude the Possibility of
Nuclear Materials Theft,” op. cit.
17 Potter and Wehling, “Sustainable Nuclear Material Security in Russia,” op. cit.
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ensuring adequate security and accounting. 18   The weaknesses of the regulatory
organizations in the former Soviet states require a redoubled effort in regulatory
support, including working with the highest levels of the governments of these states
to ensure that adequate resources and authority are devoted to regulation, assistance in
drafting and implementing appropriate regulations and rules, provision of training and
equipment to regulatory bodies, and helping them with organizational reform (see
below).  MPC&A regulatory support programs need to be beefed up with additional
funding and personnel, a new sense of strategic mission, and new ideas, focusing not
only on Gostatomnadzor (the Russian independent nuclear regulatory agency) but also
on the Ministry of Defense regulatory body that regulates military-related facilities,
and on internal self-regulation within MINATOM.  In particular, DOE should provide
the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission with the funding it needs to continue and
expand its regulatory support work in the former Soviet Union.
• Write requirements for MPC&A operations and maintenance, and realistic testing,
into MPC&A contracts with facilities, with incentives written into the contracts to
fulfill these commitments.
• Give preference to facilities with good MPC&A in all U.S. government contracts, and
use the leverage provided by such contracts to pursue MPC&A objectives.  Over time,
facility managers in the former Soviet Union should come to understand that excellent
MPC&A is a basic “price of admission” for doing business with the United States,
just as refraining from transfers of sensitive technology to potential proliferators is—
and the United States should work with other leading nations to convince them to take
the same approach.  At the same time, the United States should seek to use the
considerable leverage that funds flowing to Russian facilities from U.S. programs
provide to seek additional MPC&A progress—for example, using the fact that some
large Russian facilities receive most of their cash income from the HEU deal to
convince them cooperate in ensuring stringent standards of security and accounting
for their nuclear material.19
• Make achievement of high standards of MPC&A a prerequisite for U.S. support for
new efforts involving bulk processing or transport of fissile material, which would
otherwise increase, rather than decrease, the risks of theft and proliferation.  At the
same time, the United States should place high priority on working with Russia to
upgrade MPC&A for those bulk processing and transport programs that are already
under way with U.S. support, such as the HEU deal.
• Consciously attempt to identify and support individuals at facilities and within
organizations who are working to change their institution’s approach to MPC&A for
the better—known in the managerial literature as “change agents.”20
                                                
18 For more on the importance of MPC&A regulation, see Morris et al., “Creating the Regulatory Base for
MPC&A in the Russian Federation,” op. cit.
19 Remarkably, although some of the Russian facilities that receive most of their total income from the HEU
deal have been among the least cooperative with the MPC&A program, the United States has never sought
to link the two.
20 For a useful discussion of the essential role of such indigenous “change agents” in changing how an
organization deals with MPC&A, see Margaret A. Barnham, Charles F. Sanders, and Thomas A. Gafford,
“Providing Technical Assistance for the Development of MPC&A Systems,” in Proceedings of the Institute
of Nuclear Materials Management, 40th Annual Meeting, Phoenix, AZ, July 25-29, 1999.
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Generating New Revenue for Nuclear Security
To date, essentially all of the funding for nuclear security in the former Soviet Union has come
from government budgets—either the governments of the former Soviet states or foreign governments
(mainly the United States) providing assistance.  This is likely to continue to be the dominant source of
funding for these activities in the future as well.  But given the substantial cost of many of the
nonproliferation and arms reduction tasks that are urgently needed, the desperate budget situation facing
many of the former Soviet states, and the increasing “donor fatigue” among the states providing
assistance, it is critically important to find new sources of revenue that could help pay for key programs in
the near term, and help the former Soviet states afford the cost of maintaining effective security for all
their nuclear material over the long haul.  Such additional revenue sources could also help pay for other
critical problems posed by the former Soviet Union’s Cold War nuclear legacies, such as the huge cost of
cleaning up the deadly radioactive contamination at Russia’s nuclear sites (a job that is costing $6 billion
a year in the United States’ smaller and less contaminated nuclear complex).
Spent Fuel Storage.  A variety of approaches have been proposed in which Russia would
establish an international storage facility for spent nuclear fuel from a variety of countries, and some
portion of the profit would be set aside for purposes ranging from security for nuclear material to
disposition of excess plutonium to defense conversion in the nuclear cities, to nuclear cleanup.  (This
differs substantially from MINATOM’s proposed approach, in which the profit would be set aside to
build and operate a large reprocessing plant.)  One of these concepts, put forward by a U.S. entity known
as the Nonproliferation Trust, involving a large-scale spent fuel storage facility with over $10 billion in
projected revenue to be devoted to various nuclear security and cleanup projects, has reached the point of
detailed discussions of actual contracts.1  The U.S. and Russian governments have established a joint
panel chaired by Undersecretary of Energy Ernest Moniz and First Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy
Valentin Ivanov to explore such approaches.  The income from spent fuel storage should be sufficient to
ensure that the storage would be safe and effectively safeguarded, so that the stored spent fuel itself would
not contribute significantly to the proliferation or safety hazards posed by nuclear material in Russia.
While concepts of this kind have significant support from some sectors of both the U.S. and Russian
governments, implementing them would require (a) modifying Russian environmental laws to allow
importing spent fuel for storage or disposal in Russia, (b) a U.S.-Russian agreement to permit spent fuel
over which the United States has consent rights (the majority of the world’s spent fuel, even outside the
United States) to be shipped to Russia, an agreement that is likely to be difficult to reach because of the
U.S.-Russian disagreement over Russian nuclear cooperation with Iran; (c) convincing the Russian public
to accept such a scheme and allow it to be implemented; and (d) convincing the foreign utilities whose
spent fuel would be stored of the credibility and legitimacy of the enterprise. As an alternative, part of the
revenues from an international storage site or repository somewhere else might be directed to nuclear
security in Russia, as has been suggested by the Pangea group, which is hoping to develop such facilities
in Australia and possibly other countries as well.2
Additional HEU Sales.  As suggested in the text, the United States should seek to buy
additional quantities of excess Russian HEU, above and beyond the 500 tons it is currently purchasing.
As part of such an additional purchase, the United States should require that a substantial fraction of the
_______________
1 Non-Proliferation Trust, Inc., Long-Term Fissile Materials Safeguards and Security Project:
Agreement, Draft, May 5, 1999.  For a somewhat similar concept limited to funding disposition of excess
weapons plutonium, see Matthew Bunn, Neil J. Numark, and Tatsujiro Suzuki, A Japanese-Russian
Agreement to Establish a Nuclear Facility for MOX Fabrication and Spent Fuel Storage in the Russian
Far East, BCSIA Discussion Paper 98-25, Cambridge, MA: Kennedy School of Government, November
1998.
2 For a discussion of the benefits, risks, and obstacles to such proposals, see Atsuyuki Suzuki (chair), “An
International Spent Fuel Facility and the Russian Nuclear Complex,” in Nunn, Managing the Global
Nuclear Materials Threat, op. cit.
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proceeds be spent on specified nuclear security purposes—ensuring nuclear guards and workers are paid,
operating and maintaining security and accounting systems, and the like.  (If the idea is presented
carefully, MINATOM may be favorably disposed to agree to such a requirement, as it would help
MINATOM ensure that the funds stay within MINATOM, rather than going to the rest of the Russian
government.)  While confirming that the funds were spent as agreed would be an issue, there are past
precedents of U.S.-Russian agreements with similar requirements.  Conceivably, such revenue could even
be deposited in a separate fund with auditable accounts.  If Russia agreed to spend half the proceeds from
the purchase of an additional 50 tons of HEU on nuclear security, this would make available some $500
million for these purposes.
A “Debt for Security” Swap.  Russia is heavily burdened with foreign debt.  Some
restructuring of that debt is likely to be essential to economic recovery.  In many less developed countries,
foreign governments or organizations have negotiated “debt-for-nature” or “debt-for-environment” swaps,
in which either a specified area of land is set aside as protected area, or a certain quantity of money is set
aside in a fund for environmental purposes, in return for forgiveness of a certain quantity of debt.  Some
of these have already been successful in the former Communist states.  For example, in 1991 the creditor
nations of the Club of Paris agreed to a substantial debt-for-environment swap with Poland, in which a
portion of Poland’s debt was cancelled, and in return, Poland made contributions to a newly established
independent foundation, the Ecofund, so that the expenditure of the money on the agreed environmental
purposes could be easily verified.  Under current debt swap agreements with the United States, France,
Switzerland, Italy, and Sweden, the Ecofund is managing $545 million in funds to be spent over the 1992-
2010 period.3  A similar approach could be taken for nuclear security, with a certain portion of Russian
debt being forgiven in return for Russia agreeing to set aside funds for nuclear security into a similar
independent fund.  As with past debt-for-environment swaps, the amount of money to be placed into the
fund each year would be less than the payments due on the forgiven debt, and would be paid in local
currency rather than hard currency, increasing Russia’s ability to pay.  If Western governments were
willing to forgive a substantial quantity of Russian debt, this could potentially provide a large enough
revenue stream to support the hundreds of millions of dollars per year that it will ultimately cost Russia to
ensure high levels of security and accounting for all of its nuclear weapons and fissile material.  Such an
initiative should be included in the current international discussions of Russia’s foreign debt.
Nuclear Exports Within Proliferation Constraints.  Much of the revenue the Russian Ministry
of Atomic Energy now receives comes from exports of nuclear material, services, and technology, with
MINATOM officials estimating that their total exports now amount to over $2 billion per year.  (The
division of this revenue between MINATOM and the Russian central government is not well understood
outside Russia.)  At the moment, however, because the United States and other Western countries have
imposed stringent trade restraints on Russian exports to their markets, and Western firms dominate many
of the markets in states with sound nonproliferation credentials, the growth of MINATOM’s export
income is sharply constrained, and much of the current income derives from exports to nations of
proliferation concern that have been shunned by Western suppliers, such as Iran and India.  It would be
highly desirable for Western countries to take a number of steps to reduce the barriers to expanded
Russian exports to markets with good nonproliferation credentials, in return for specific commitments
from MINATOM to apply particular fractions of the resulting revenue to identified nuclear security
endeavors.  These steps would include: (a) easing trade restrictions on Russian uranium and enrichment
exports, (b) encouraging an expansion of Russian fuel fabrication service exports, and (c) eventual joint
design of a new generation of safer, more proliferation-resistant reactors (such as the current Russian-
Japanese-French-U.S. cooperation to develop a new high-temperature gas-cooled reactor).  All of these
would be sensitive, as every piece of market share Russia gains would presumably be lost by a Western
supplier.  Given the limited nuclear market and the stiff competition for it, MINATOM’s vision of
exporting a new generation of simple, cheap reactors to countries all over the world is not likely to be
realized.  But there remain promising opportunities for action to unlock additional export revenues that
could be applied to strengthening nuclear security.
_____________
3 See, for example, the Ecofund’s web page, at http://www.ekofundsz.org.pl/eng/index-us.htm
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SUSTAINABILITY ORGANIZATION.  The United States should work with Russia and the
other former Soviet states on a systemic program of reform of the organizations involved
in MPC&A, designed to ensure that:
• Each facility with weapons-usable nuclear material has a designated office for
MPC&A, with appropriate personnel and authority;
• Each national institution that controls facilities with weapons-usable nuclear material
has institutional procedures and regulations for managing this material, and a
designated office for MPC&A, with appropriate personnel and authority;
• The facility offices communicate appropriately with each other, and with the national
authorities;
• There are clear and authoritative laws and regulations in place requiring MPC&A
measures which, if complied with in their entirety, would ensure an effective system;
• The regulatory authorities have the authority, independence, personnel, equipment,
and procedures required to carry out effective MPC&A regulation, including the
authority to impose fines or close facilities for failure to comply with MPC&A
regulations;
• There are recruitment, compensation, promotion, and training procedures in place to
ensure that highly qualified people are available for all aspects of MPC&A, and have
incentives for good performance; and
• There are effective mechanisms in place for interagency coordination, joint action,
and dispute resolution on MPC&A issues.
These are obviously long-term goals, which must be approached incrementally,
and working with a foreign government on such organization issues is far more
challenging than simply providing equipment and training.  But these issues are critically
important to sustainability.  As a first step, DOE should fund a study by non-
governmental or laboratory experts to consider what measures toward these ends are most
needed and what such programs might cost.
At the same time, governments rarely carry out their functions as well as they
might without close oversight.  In the U.S. case, embarrassing investigations by
journalists, non-government advocates, and the Congress provided a major part of the
impetus for substantial security improvements during the 1970s and 1980s.  U.S. non-
governmental organizations—perhaps with some funding from DOE—can play a
critically important role in fostering the growth of non-government organizations
involved in these issues in the former Soviet states, and encouraging journalists and
legislators in these states to play an active role in monitoring what is being done and
lobbying for change when that is necessary.21
NUCLEAR SMUGGLING
While the consolidation, security, and accounting measures described above are
the highest priority parts of a program to reduce the risk of potential nuclear theft, new
                                                
21 Under the direction of William Potter, the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute
of International Studies has already done exemplary work in this area, as have several U.S. foundations,
supporting efforts such as the Russian journal Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control), but there is certainly
more that can and should be done.
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measures are also needed to interdict nuclear smuggling—the “second line of defense” if
nuclear materials are stolen.  What is most needed now is a well-funded strategic plan
integrating the various U.S. and international anti-smuggling efforts, specifying what
organizations in what countries should have what capabilities by when, and what
resources will be needed to accomplish that objective.  It will not be possible to
accomplish everything that might be done at once.  Hence, there should be an in-depth
examination of where the greatest weaknesses and the highest leverage points for
improving the response to nuclear smuggling lie.  In particular, goals should include:
• Establishing trained police units to deal with nuclear smuggling. Each key country
should have at least a small unit of law enforcement officers capable of investigating
nuclear smuggling cases.  These officers would have the training and equipment to
distinguish between, for example, intensely radioactive cesium and weapon-usable
plutonium, or between relatively innocuous low-enriched uranium and weapon-usable
highly-enriched uranium.  Other forces that might encounter a nuclear smuggling
incident—police, intelligence, border patrols, customs—should be made aware of the
existence of this specialized unit, and how and when to contact it.  Key states could be
helped to establish, train, and equip such units relatively rapidly, for a cost in the
range of a few millions to a few tens of millions of dollars.
• Increased intelligence and police cooperation.  All of the principal successes in
finding and recovering stolen weapons-usable nuclear materials have been the result
of informers and sting operations—which is to say, they have resulted from the efforts
of police, intelligence, and “special services.”  Some nuclear materials have been
seized in random searches carried out by border guards and customs agents, but these
have been relatively inconsequential in comparison.  The lesson is the importance of
intelligence, of knowing where to look.  Therefore, despite the enormous hurdles
faced by any effort to increase cooperation and exchange of information related to
sensitive investigations and sources, increased police and intelligence cooperation
across borders must be a top priority.  For example, the FBI's office in Moscow
should include a cadre of experts on nuclear smuggling, who could cooperate with
Russian counterparts.
• Training and equipping border patrols and customs.  The immense volume of traffic
that crosses international borders every day, and the vast and sparsely-populated
length of the borders between some of the key countries, makes the task of
interdicting nuclear materials as they cross international borders extremely difficult—
as evidenced by the massive flows of drugs and other contraband that governments
have so far been unable to stop.  Nevertheless, border guards and customs agencies in
each of the key potential source states and transit states should be provided with
sufficient equipment and trained personnel to monitor at the least the main border
crossings and international exit/entry points.  The steps taken in this direction so far
have covered only a few border points in a few states, with little long-term strategic
planning of what capabilities should be in what places by what time.  For a cost in the
range of $10 million, for example, all of the 22 identified key border points in Russia
could be appropriately equipped and customs officials trained, in only a year or two.22
                                                
22 Information from interviews.
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• Providing regularized mechanisms for forensic analysis of seized nuclear material.
For several years, an international team of experts has been reviewing methods for
forensic analysis of seized packages containing nuclear material, analysis that can
help identify where the material came from and where it has been since.  Only a few
labs in the world have the right capabilities for all the various analyses that may be
critical.  It would be useful to set up more regularized procedures for transferring
seized material across international boundaries when necessary for effective forensic
analysis.
 
 Stabilizing Nuclear Custodians
 
 To reduce the proliferation risk posed by neglected, underpaid, and demoralized
nuclear weapons scientists and workers, and the potential threat posed by the enormous
weapons production capacity of the Russian nuclear weapons complex, new steps are
needed to cooperatively reduce Russia’s nuclear weapons complex to a size Russia can
afford to maintain, appropriate to its post-Cold War missions, and re-employ the
scientists and technicians displaced by that downsizing.  A substantial investment
(running at perhaps $100 million per year for five years)23 in this effort is needed, focused
on four critical areas:
• Fostering private sector job growth in the nuclear cities;
• Employing former nuclear weapons scientists on nonproliferation and arms control
policy analysis and technology development;
• Funding Russian, rather than only U.S., scientists to develop technologies for nuclear
cleanup, along with other energy and environmental technologies; and
• Shrinking the Russian nuclear weapons complex.
The last of these objectives is particularly critical.  Russia will likely remain a nuclear
power and require a significant nuclear weapons complex to maintain its arsenal for as
long as the United States does.  But Russia simply cannot afford the level of upkeep
required to ameliorate all of the proliferation risks of its complex if the complex remains
its current size.  And the U.S. Congress has become increasingly unwilling to provide
funding for jobs programs for Russians, without some specific metric by which the
nonproliferation or arms reduction payoff can be judged.  What is likely to be necessary is
to work out a deal under which Russia would commit itself to a specific plan (which it
would devise, perhaps in consultation with U.S. experts) for substantially shrinking its
weapons complex and the capability of that complex to produce nuclear weapons. The
United States, in turn, would commit to provide assistance in that downsizing at
dramatically higher levels than the puny $7.5 million Congress provided for the Nuclear
Cities Initiative in FY2000—so that in effect, it can be said that “for this much money,
we can shut down this much weapons production capability.”  This would provide a
readily quantifiable performance metric similar to the Cooperative Threat Reduction
                                                
 23 As noted earlier, DOE has estimated that the cost of providing sustainable employment for 50,000 excess
workers in the Russian nuclear weapons complex—possibly an underestimate of the number of people
likely to excess—would be in the range of $550 million.  See Report to Congress on the Nuclear Cities
Initiative, op. cit.
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The interior of one of the buildings being converted to
civilian purposes at Avangard, one of Russia’s four nuclear
weapons assembly and disassembly facilities.  The United
States should provide substantial funding to help close and
convert Russian nuclear weapons complex facilities and
reemploy thousands of scientists and technicians, in return
for Russian agreement to reduce the complex’s ability to
mass produce new nuclear weapons and components.
Source: Los Alamos
program’s focus on the number of missiles dismantled, warheads deactivated, and the
like.
PRIVATE SECTOR JOB GROWTH
    Neither the U.S. government nor the Russian government has the money to keep
paying nuclear workers who are no longer needed forever.  In the long run, therefore, a
combination of private job growth in the nuclear cities, movement of people elsewhere to
work, and retirement as existing workers age is the only answer.  Given the current
economic collapse in Russia,
however, fostering private-sector
growth and attracting foreign
investment anywhere in Russia is a
major challenge, and doing it in
Russia’s nuclear cities will be an
extraordinarily difficult task for the
near term.  These cities face a huge
number of obstacles to private sector
growth: in addition to the political
risks and structural problems that
plague private sector activities in
Russia in general, the nuclear cities
are physically isolated, their closed
status makes access difficult (45 days
advance permission is typically
required for a foreign visit), their
populations have virtually no
experience with private businesses or
a market economy, and they have
virtually no business infrastructure
(not having needed it in the past).
But the cities offer potential
opportunities as well, principally a large number of highly skilled scientists and
engineers, willing to work at wage rates far below those that prevail in western countries.
To overcome these obstacles and seize these opportunities, the traditional approach of
most past U.S. efforts related to defense conversion, focused on funding high-tech R&D
and providing some business training, will be helpful but will not be enough.  The full
spectrum of tools that have been used to promote private-sector growth in other areas (in
Russia and elsewhere)—business centers, loan guarantees, political risk insurance, start-
up capital for new enterprises, tax incentives, and the like—are likely to be necessary.
While DOE, which is managing the Nuclear Cities Initiative, is not well suited to
employ all of these tools, other U.S. and international agencies are, and it will be essential
to draw in their experience and resources.  The Regional Investment Initiative established
under what was then called the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission has been designed to
target a broad range of types of assistance on particular regions; a similar approach can
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and should be taken with the nuclear cities (though their economic prospects are much
more problematic than those of the regions chosen for the Regional Investment Initiative).
It will be critical for the U.S. government to work closely with the private sector—
particularly those large firms that have already been involved in the nuclear cities or have
explored involvement, such as Microsoft, Intel, and Sun, among others—to find out what
forms of support would be needed to leverage larger private sector commitments.
Companies such as these should be asked the question: “what would have to happen for
you to conclude that it would be in your business interest to put significant quantities of
your money into projects in these cities?”  Working with other governments—such as the
governments that contribute to the International Science and Technology Centers, and the
European governments now considering a European Nuclear Cities Initiative—to target
similar efforts on these cities is also likely to be key to success.
It appears likely that the areas that have the most promise for a small amount of
government investment to lead to substantial private growth and job creation are (a) low-
tech small and medium-sized enterprises within the cities, largely providing products and
services needed within Russia, and (b) approaches in which Western firms hire nuclear-
city experts as knowledge workers (mathematicians, computer programmers, etc.), so that
access to secret production lines, transportation of goods, etc. are not major issues.  With
the shortage of software experts and other engineers in the United States, U.S. firms are
increasingly putting together global teams including engineers around the globe, in which
experts from the nuclear cities would be prime candidates for participation.24
Many of the efforts being pursued in the Nuclear Cities Initiative are focused on
these kinds of objectives.  The Open Computer Centers being established at Sarov and
Snezhinsk, for example, are designed to make it possible for experts from the nuclear
cities to work on unclassified civilian software and other engineering projects without
ever leaving their home cities.  But there is certainly much more that can and should be
done, which would be possible with greater financing.  To take just one example, even
once an enterprise has a viable business concept that meets a real market demand, and a
reasonable business plan, it is likely to need start-up capital.  The Nuclear Cities Initiative
has provided support to make it possible for firms from three of the nuclear cities to
compete for the pool of small-business loans available for Russian firms from the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)—but with additional
funds, a pool of start-up capital (in the form of equity investments, grants, or loans) could
be earmarked specifically for the startup of enterprises within the nuclear cities.
NONPROLIFERATION AND ARMS CONTROL
Shifting some former nuclear weapons scientists to nonproliferation and arms
control activities should also be a fundamental part of the Nuclear Cities Initiative.  In a
sense, this doubles the “bang for the buck,” in that it provides jobs for nuclear scientists
while at the same time accomplishing objectives that the United States would want
accomplished in any case.  While there is no prospect for employing tens of thousands of
workers on nonproliferation, for the small cadre of top scientists this can be an important
                                                
24 See, for example, Zachary G. Pascal, “The Rage for Global Teams,” Technology Review, July/August
1998.
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avenue of employment: in the U.S. case, it appears likely that there are significantly more
former weapons scientists that have successfully “converted” to work on nonproliferation
and environmental analysis and R&D than there are who are employed by commercial
high-tech firms spun off from the labs.  If initial U.S. funding helps establish
nonproliferation centers of excellence at the Russian weapons labs while providing
tangible deliverables to justify the U.S. spending, it can be hoped that, over time, as the
Russian government budget improves and the centers establish the importance and value
of the work they do, the Russian government itself will ultimately pick up the tab for their
continued operation.  There are dozens of examples of nonproliferation and arms control
issues crying out for the application of additional expertise of the kind nuclear weapons
scientists could bring to bear—from developing databases of key technologies on which
to base nuclear export control decisions, to developing means to verify deep reductions in
nuclear warhead and fissile material stockpiles.  Recently, a collaboration between U.S.
non-government organizations and foundations and the U.S. government has provided
start-up funding for new nonproliferation and arms control analysis centers at Sarov
(formerly Arzamas-16), Snezhinsk (formerly Chelyabinsk-70), the Kurchatov Institute in
Moscow, and the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering at Obninsk, but there is far
more that could be done.25
NUCLEAR REMEDIATION, ENERGY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGIES
The United States certainly does not have the funds to pay for cleanup of the
Russian nuclear complex, or for broad-scale deployment of new energy and
environmental technologies in Russia.  But these are all areas where the United States
government funds hundreds of millions of dollars of R&D annually—a small portion of
which might be done by experts from Russia’s nuclear cities.  This would be a win-win-
win approach: the United States would get the work done for less (given the low wage
rates in Russia), Russian nuclear experts would get challenging and interesting work
making use of their skills, and both sides would be able to make use of the resulting
technologies.  Development of nuclear cleanup technology, in particular, is a “natural” for
conversion in the nuclear cities: both the United States and Russia face massive nuclear
cleanup problems in their nuclear complexes, and Russian experts can bring a range of
fresh ideas to the U.S. cleanup R&D program at low cost—as well as heavily
contaminated sites where the technologies they develop could be tested.  More broadly, it
would make sense for the Secretary of Energy to pull together all the leaders of DOE
programs that sponsor substantial R&D programs and ask them to prepare lists of projects
in their areas that could be accomplished cost-effectively by contracting efforts to experts
from the Russian nuclear cities. 26  By this means, tens of millions of dollars in near-term
funding for real jobs in the Russian nuclear cities could be arranged in a manner that
                                                
25 These centers were established at the initiative of RANSAC, particularly by Kenneth N. Luongo and
Frank von Hippel.  For further discussion of nonproliferation and arms control programs that could be
pursued, see, for example, Bunn et. al., “Retooling Russia’s Nuclear Cities,” op. cit.
26 The author is grateful to Siegfried Hecker for suggesting this concept; Hecker and others at the Los
Alamos, Livermore, Sandia, and Pacific Northwest laboratories have elaborated this idea in a “Contract
Research Initiative” now being considered by the Department of Energy.
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would contribute to, rather than detracting from, the other priorities of the U.S.
government.
SHRINKING THE RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX
Today, Russia’s still maintains a massive nuclear weapons infrastructure,
capable—if Russia had the funds—of producing thousands of nuclear weapons
components and nuclear weapons a year.  The United States, by contrast, has downsized
its complex to the point that it no longer has the capability to produce more than a few
hundred nuclear weapons or components annually (if that).  With the end of the Cold
War, Russia has no need for a nuclear weapons complex of this scale, and maintaining it
is a drag on Russia’s scarce economic resources.  Thus, it is in both the U.S. and Russian
interest to substantially reduce the capacity of the remaining weapons production
infrastructure in Russia.  Russia has already announced that it will close two of its four
nuclear weapons assembly and disassembly facilities in the next few years (the two
smallest, the Avangard plant at Sarov, and the plant at the closed city of Penza-19); the
NCI should work with Russia not only to provide alternative employment for the workers
at these facilities, but to ensure that the weapons assembly facilities themselves are
destroyed or demonstrably converted to other purposes.  More broadly, the United States
should encourage Russia to develop a coherent plan for the transition to a greatly down-
sized nuclear complex, working informally on a lab-to-lab basis to provide information
on the U.S. experience of planning the downsizing (which Russia has requested), and
perhaps even working together to sketch out plans for a slimmed-down, sustainable
complex for the future—a “MINATOM 2010,” as some have called it.
While the future of Russia’s closed nuclear cities is critically important, it must
also be remembered that there are many nuclear facilities with potentially vulnerable
nuclear material which are not in the closed cities, whose future must also be addressed.
Russia’s civilian nuclear complex, like its nuclear weapons complex, is larger than is
likely to be sustainable over the long haul—yet the managers of each facility would like
to keep their facility open. Little high-level planning has gone into thinking about what
facilities should stay on their present course, what facilities should be redirected to other
missions, and what facilities should be closed.  Wherever there are facilities with
weapons-usable material or weapons-related information, there are U.S. interests at stake,
and the United States should work with Russia to initiate a sustainable transition to a
smaller complex, with appropriate alternative employment for the excess nuclear experts.
Dealing with the excess personnel and infrastructure of the Russian nuclear
complex is critical to U.S. objectives in security cooperation with Russia, and these issues
should be factored into all U.S.-Russian programs.  The MPC&A program, for example,
is spending tens of millions of dollars a year in Russia; efforts should be made to ensure
that this spending also contributes to employing excess personnel from the nuclear
facilities and other potentially vulnerable nuclear facilities.  Similarly, the plutonium
disposition program will require large-scale plutonium processing facilities: serious
consideration should be given to converting the existing plutonium processing facilities
designed to fabricate components for nuclear weapons to convert those components to
oxide and fabricate the oxide into fuel.
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 Monitoring Stockpiles and Reductions
 
 The ultimate goal of U.S.-Russian transparency efforts should be an integrated,
comprehensive regime that would provide confidence that each side was reducing its total
nuclear warhead and fissile material stockpiles to low levels, and that these stockpiles
were safe and secure.27  With U.S.-Russian relations as they are in the wake of the
bombing of Yugoslavia, however, that goal is a long way off; U.S.-Russian political
tensions and renewed concerns over protecting nuclear secrets on both sides are likely to
make near-term progress on nuclear transparency extraordinarily difficult.  Paradoxically,
it appears that the best hopes would be for initiatives that were either very large (so that
they might have some chance of addressing Russian security concerns and shifting the
political environment in favor of cooperation) or very small (so that they could be
pursued informally without drawing undue political attention in either country).  A few of
the steps that should be pursued are listed below.28
 
 NUCLEAR MATERIAL STOCKPILE DATA EXCHANGES
 
 Achieving a better understanding of the actual quantities, forms, and locations of
fissile material in each country is fundamental to cooperative efforts to secure, monitor,
and reduce these dangerous stockpiles.  The United States has openly published data on
its plutonium stockpile and plutonium production, and is preparing to publish similar data
concerning its HEU stockpile.  As noted in Section III, preliminary U.S.-Russian
discussions suggest that it may be possible to work out an informal arrangement under
which Russia would provide data on its plutonium stockpile comparable to the data the
United States has already published on its own stockpile, and the United States would
provide the funding Russian experts need to compile the data.  This informal approach, if
successful, could then be applied for HEU inventories, once the United States releases
that data.  This would provide a rapid means to accomplish a substantial part of the
stockpile data exchange agreed to by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin in 1994 on a
contracting basis, without requiring high-level formal negotiations that would draw
widespread political attention.  The cost would likely be only a few million dollars.
 
 INTERNATIONAL MONITORING OF EXCESS FISSILE MATERIAL
 
 A key issue in the U.S.-Russian-IAEA “Trilateral Initiative” described in Section
III is who will pay the costs of monitoring materials in Russia.  (To date, the United
States has been paying both its own costs and the IAEA’s costs of monitoring the small
amount of excess material that is under IAEA verification so far in the United States.)
Russia is very unlikely to be able or willing to provide the funding to pay these costs, a
                                                
 27 See, for example, discussion in Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium, op. cit.
 28 For an excellent recent discussion of transparency measures, with some similar suggestions, see Oleg
Bukharin and Kenneth Luongo, U.S.-Russian Warhead Dismantlement Transparency: The Status,
Problems, and Proposals, Princeton, NJ: Center for Energy and Environmental Studies, Princeton
University, Report 314, April 1999 (available at http://www.princeton.edu/~ransac).
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problem that could stop the initiative in its tracks.  The IAEA has proposed the creation
of a special disarmament fund to pay for such costs, which might ultimately receive funds
from mandatory assessments; the United States could kick-start the effort with an initial
voluntary contribution to the fund, and could agree to pay for Russia’s costs to host the
IAEA inspections (a cost category very unlikely to be covered by an international fund).
U.S. agreement to pay these costs could enable a significant nonproliferation and
disarmament initiative to go forward, at a very modest cost (probably a few million
dollars per year initially, and less after
the arrangement is established).
 
 A MAJOR TRANSPARENT WARHEAD
REDUCTIONS OFFER, WITH ASSISTANCE
FOR TRANSPARENT WARHEAD
DISMANTLEMENT
 
     With the current state of U.S.-
Russian relations, there is very little
chance that the START II treaty will be
ratified and formal negotiations
completed on a START III treaty
incorporating the unprecedented
transparency measures for the
dismantlement of warheads envisioned
in the Helsinki statement of 1997 before
President Clinton leaves office.  Even in
the unlikely event that a framework
agreement on START III and national
missile defenses can be achieved by the
end of President Clinton’s term,
dismantlement transparency measures
are likely to be postponed or included
only as initial small-scale demonstrations.  Informal reciprocal-unilateral initiatives—
such as those launched by President Bush and Soviet President Gorbachev in 1991, which
resulted in the pull-back and dismantlement of many thousands of nuclear weapons,
without requiring formal negotiations—represent the only near-term hope for a
breakthrough in transparent nuclear arms reductions. To gain acceptance on both sides in
the current political environment, such an initiative would have to address concerns each
side has about the other’s nuclear stockpile.  For example, President Clinton could offer
to place a large fraction of the U.S. strategic reserve and tactical nuclear warheads
(stockpiles unregulated by arms control to date, and which will represent the vast majority
of the total U.S. warhead stockpile under START II) in secure storage open to Russian
monitoring, and commit them to verifiable dismantlement (with specific procedures to be
worked out later), if Russia would do the same with its comparable warhead stockpiles.
This could address Russian concerns about the U.S. maintenance of a large stockpile of
reserve strategic warheads that could be rapidly returned to missiles, and U.S. concerns
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about the huge Russian tactical warhead stockpile.  Within a few months, the majority of
all the warheads in both sides’ nuclear arsenals could be under reciprocal monitoring, and
committed to dismantlement.29  Indeed, technology exists that would make it possible to
permanently and verifiably disable these warheads, pending their eventual dismantlement,
rather than only subjecting them to monitoring.30  As part of this package, the United
States could offer to provide financial assistance for warhead dismantlement (e.g., $90
million per year for a dismantlement rate of 3,000 per year, or roughly $30,000 per
warhead)  in return for Russian agreement to a transparency package  that would also be
implemented reciprocally at the Pantex dismantlement facility in the United States.  The
transparency measures would have to be designed jointly by U.S. and Russian experts, to
give both sides confidence that while the measures could help confirm that dismantlement
was taking place, they would do so without revealing sensitive information or unduly
interfering with maintenance of each side’s nuclear stockpile.  As noted earlier,
preliminary U.S.-Russian lab-to-lab work in designing such measures is already under
way; U.S. experts have already produced reports on the impact of a variety of
dismantlement transparency approaches at U.S. facilities, and it would make sense for the
United States to help finance a Russian effort to do the same with respect to Russian
facilities.31
 
 Ending Further Production
 
As discussed in Section III, while the program to convert Russia’s remaining
plutonium production reactors has faced mounting safety, nonproliferation, cost,
technical, and schedule issues, there may now be an opportunity to pursue a superior
approach—shutting these reactors down and providing other sources of heat and power to
replace them.  If this can in fact be accomplished at comparable cost and in a comparable
time, such a shut-down-and-replacement strategy would better serve both the
nonproliferation objectives and the safety objectives held by both sides.  Indeed, this was
the approach originally favored by both parties, and called for in the 1994 agreement; it
was only doubts about its cost that drove the parties in the direction of conversion.
The United States should provide the funding necessary for a new, in-depth
examination of least-cost possibilities for replacing the heat and power provided by these
nuclear reactors.  Both cities have partially completed fossil fuel plants, and as the
Ministry of Atomic Energy suggests, completing some coal and oil-fired plants and
expanding others may turn out to be the cheapest approach.  Other possibilities should
also be examined, however.  Seversk is in a region with substantial supplies of natural
gas, and if a pipeline can provide gas to the town at reasonable cost, a combined-cycle gas
                                                
 29 For a description of this concept, see Matthew Bunn, “Act Now, Mr. President,” Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, March/April 1998.  For a similar proposal applying to active-duty strategic forces, see Admiral
Stansfield Turner, Caging the Nuclear Genie: An American Challenge for Global Security, Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 1997.  See also Committee on Nuclear Policy, Jump-START: Retaking the Initiative to
Reduce Post-Cold War Nuclear Dangers, Washington DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, February 1999
(available at http://www.stimson.org/policy/jumpstart.htm).
 30 See Matthew Bunn, “`Pit-Stuffing’: How to Disable Thousands of Warheads and Easily Verify Their
Dismantlement,” F.A.S. Public Interest Report, March/April 1998.
 31 See discussion in Luongo and Bukharin, “U.S.-Russian Warhead Dismantlement Transparency,” op. cit.
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plant with cogeneration to provide the needed heat might very well be the least-cost
alternative.  Zheleznogorsk is in a region with a significant excess of hydropower
capacity—some of which could potentially be used to produce heat as well, either through
electrical heating of buildings or through running the existing centralized district steam
heating system with electricity.  In both cities, there are enormous opportunities to reduce
energy needs through efficiency improvements at low cost, thereby reducing the amount
of energy required and the cost of providing it.  In short, while an in-depth study of the
options is urgently needed, there are good reasons for optimism that approaches can be
found for replacing these reactors for a cost comparable to that of the conversion project.
 Three other key issues relating to fissile material production remain to be
addressed:
• The United States should work with Russia to develop and implement reciprocal
transparency measures at U.S. and Russian enrichment facilities to confirm that
neither country is producing HEU.  These measures could provide a test-bed for
approaches to verifying a fissile cutoff treaty, at a cost likely to be in the range of $10
million per year, or less.
• The United States should offer to finance the costs of verification of an international
fissile material production cutoff at Russian reprocessing plants.  Older reprocessing
plants never designed for safeguards—as exist in both the United States and Russia—
are likely to be the biggest verification challenge for a cutoff, and are likely to cost
more than Russia will be willing to pay in the near term, but putting such verification
in place would be a sensible security investment, contributing to a global cutoff while
improving material control and accounting at Russian reprocessing plants.  It would
also make sense to begin immediately to carry out small-scale cooperative
experiments at U.S. and Russian reprocessing plants to demonstrate technologies and
procedures for such verification.
• If, as seems likely to be the case, Russia resists the proposal for a reprocessing
moratorium in the absence of other employment for the workers at its commercial
reprocessing plant, the United States should offer a cooperative program that would
provide alternative employment for these workers.  This effort, while linked to a
reprocessing moratorium, should be an integral part of the broader program to re-
employ excess nuclear weapons scientists and technicians described above.
 
 Reducing Excess Stockpiles
 
 Finally, the vast stockpiles of HEU and plutonium built up over decades of Cold
War must be rapidly, safely, and securely reduced, to levels sufficient to support whatever
agreed warhead stockpiles remain, but which can no longer support a rapid return to Cold
War levels of armament.  The immediate priorities are to provide safe and secure storage
for these materials, and place them under bilateral or international monitoring to confirm
that they will never be returned to weapons—both discussed above.  But even once those
goals are achieved, far more needs to be done to physically transform these materials into
unclassified forms (allowing more intensive monitoring), and ultimately into forms that
can no longer be readily used in nuclear weapons, as quickly as practicable.
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 Highly Enriched Uranium
 
 For both HEU and plutonium, the first needed steps are to take the actions
necessary to complete and implement the existing agreements.  In the case of the HEU
deal, while the current approach of slapping one temporary band-aid after another on a
basically flawed implementation strategy may suffice to keep the deal moving for the
time being, there are likely to be continuing crises, delays, and requirements for U.S.
government intervention as long as (a) USEC remains the sole executive agent, with no
competition to create incentives for the material to be purchased at fair market prices; and
(b) trade restraints continue to tightly restrict the amounts of Russian uranium and
enrichment work that can be brought into the United States and other major Western
markets.  The time has come for a fundamentally new approach, involving new executive
agents and loosened trade restraints.  Whatever approach is taken, keeping this deal
moving deserves extremely high priority: given the amount of material and money
involved, and the incentives the deal creates for dismantlement of weapons and
destruction of fissile material, this deal is probably the single most crucial U.S.-Russian
fissile material control initiative.
 But in addition to keeping the existing deal on an even keel, it is crucial to begin
pursuing new uranium agreements—both faster blend-down of HEU and new purchases
going beyond the original deal.  Negotiations toward the following objectives should be
pursued immediately.
 
 FINANCE RAPID EXCESS HEU BLEND-DOWN.  There is an enormous opportunity to drastically
accelerate the rate at which HEU is blended to LEU that can no longer be used in
weapons, which has not yet been thoroughly explored.  The current 30-ton-per-year pace
of blending for the HEU purchase agreement was determined by what the commercial
market could bear, not by what would best serve U.S. or Russian security interests.  From
a security perspective, it would be desirable to blend all Russian and U.S. excess HEU to
non-weapons-usable form—perhaps to an intermediate enrichment level of 19%—
immediately, resolving the key nonproliferation and disarmament issues this material
poses, even while it continues to be released onto the commercial market at a much lower
pace.  It would be essential to take care that the blending approach did not interfere with
achieving the isotopic mix in the LEU ultimately desired for a commercial product.32
U.S. experts visiting Russian facilities have concluded that nearly all the facilities needed
                                                
32 Currently, the HEU is not being blended with depleted uranium or natural uranium, but rather with
slightly enriched uranium (1.5 percent U-235), in order to reduce the U-234 concentrations in the final LEU
product to meet the standards used by Western reactor fuel manufacturers. To meet this objective after an
initial blending step as described in the text, either the initial blending would also have to be done with 1.5
percent enriched material, or the initial blending might be done with natural or depleted uranium and later
final blending done with material of somewhat higher enrichment than 1.5 percent.  Another complicating
factor is that the material also requires chemical purification to meet Western standards, and capacity for
this process appears to be among the principal limiting factors on the blending rate, suggesting that this
capacity would either have to be increased, or purification would have to be done after the initial blend-
down (which would require that several times as much material be purified).  The author is grateful to
Thomas L. Neff (who published the first proposal for the HEU deal in 1991), Oleg Bukharin, and Richard
L. Garwin for discussions of what would needed to accomplish a rapid blend-down of HEU to non-
weapons-usable levels.
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to blend HEU at twice the current
rate are already in place; the
remaining required capabilities
could be installed for a capital
investment of only about $1
million.  Doubling the blending
pace would mean the destruction of
enough additional HEU for
thousands of nuclear bombs every
year.  No one has yet studied in
detail what additional blending
capacity might be available for
investments of $10 million, or $20
million, or $50 million.  In
principle, the goal should be to
work with Russia to blend down
both the 500 tons declared to date
and any additional HEU Russia can
be convinced to declare excess, of
the vast military reserve of HEU
that remains, within a very few
years.
 Gaining Russian agreement to such a rapid blend-down plan—which would
involve blending far more material each year than the market could be expected to
absorb—would require offering substantial financial incentives.  The United States could
offer to pay the costs of this early blending as an investment in security, employing
hundreds or thousands of additional MINATOM nuclear workers, and making later
preparation of the material for sale on the open market essentially free for MINATOM.
The total price, including paying MINATOM’s costs and other financial incentives, has
not been examined in detail, but might be in the range of $1 billion—a remarkable price
to pay for permanently resolving the security hazards posed by excess HEU in Russia.
Russia might well be concerned that once the material was blended to a non-weapons-
usable form, so that it no longer posed a security hazard, U.S. officials would cease to put
very much effort into fixing the continuing problems with its release onto the commercial
market, which is where the biggest money for this material lies.  That concern might be
addressed, for example, by having a substantial portion of the U.S. payment for the early
blend-down be in the form of a pre-payment against future deliveries—so that the U.S.
government would have a substantial financial incentive to keep the material flowing
onto the commercial market so as to get its money back.
 DOE has undertaken some preliminary discussions with Russia concerning the
possibility of additional HEU blending; Russia’s principal concern has been over whether
it would be possible to sell more material on the market than is now being blended.  To
date, the U.S. government has not offered to pay the cost of rapid blending from U.S.
government funds, obviating the need to find an immediate market for the additional
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blended material.33  DOE should immediately undertake a study, in cooperation with
Russia, of what would be required, how much it would cost, and how long it would take.
Once the HEU has been converted to forms that could potentially be sold on the market
(and thus have commercial value without requiring further work), there may also be
opportunities for using the blended-down material as collateral against which Russia
could borrow, which should also be considered in such a study. 34  The U.S. government
should then move rapidly to negotiate and implement an agreement with Russia to blend
all the excess HEU in both the United States and Russia to non-weapons-usable form as
quickly as practicable.
 
 BUY ADDITIONAL QUANTITIES OF EXCESS HEU.  Russia clearly has far more HEU that is
excess to its needs for its military stockpile than the 500 tons it has formally declared
excess to date.  (Indeed, some Russian facilities have raised with U.S. counterparts the
possibility of selling additional HEU above and beyond the 500 tons covered by the HEU
deal.)  The United States should offer to buy additional stockpiles of excess HEU, up
front rather than at the end of the current deal, with government funds rather than money
from commercial firms.  These additional purchases should be up-front because offering
to buy more material at the end of the current deal, in 2013, has little meaning to Russian
ministries and facilities struggling to pay the bills through 2002; it should be done with
government money because (unless there are drastic changes in the restrictive trade
policies of the major nuclear markets) the commercial market is already absorbing all the
excess Russian HEU it can bear.  The material could be held off the market as a strategic
uranium stockpile (rather than flooding the market immediately with this additional
HEU).
 As a first step, the United States should offer to buy an additional 50 tons of HEU
(at a cost of roughly $1 billion at the prices currently pertaining in the deal), while
stipulating in the contract that a substantial portion of the proceeds be placed in a fund to
pay for nuclear security measures (see “Generating New Revenue for Nuclear Security,”
p. 86).  If this first step succeeded, it would make sense to continue with additional
purchases, ultimately buying all the excess HEU Russia was willing to make available
(with transparency to confirm that additional HEU was not being produced, as discussed
above).  In addition, if Russia was willing, it is worth considering purchasing some of this
material as HEU, to be shipped to the United States for blending (after any classified
information had been removed), rather than blending it all in Russia—as former Minister
of Atomic Energy Victor Mikhailov once proposed.  This would get that portion of the
HEU out of Russia more rapidly, and reduce the cost to Russia of the blending—but
would also raise issues of security during the intercontinental transport, and would mean
                                                
33 Information from interviews.
34 This concept was suggested to the author by David Pentz, chairman of Pangea, a firm which is seeking to
build an international nuclear waste repository in Australia.  Commercial banks are typically unwilling to
accept uranium stocks as collateral for loans unless contracts are in place for their sale, since the banks do
not want to be stuck having to market the uranium themselves in the event of foreclosure; but Russia now
has such a sales contract for the natural uranium resulting from the HEU deal for years to come.  Moreover,
such blended uranium stockpiles might provide acceptable collateral for governments or institutions such as
the IMF to make loans (or pre-payments against future deliveries).  The author is grateful to Thomas L.
Neff for discussions of these points.
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that American rather than Russian workers would get the blending jobs.  Russia may
legitimately no longer be interested in such an approach.
 If Russia were willing to sell an additional several hundred tons of HEU (while
still maintaining a large enough reserve to support its reduced nuclear warhead stockpile),
the cost could mount to as much as $10 billion.  The rapid blend-down and additional
purchase concepts could be combined, so that the U.S. government actually purchased
only a fraction of the material blended to
LEU, leaving the rest to continue being
metered onto the commercial market at
roughly current rates, and thereby
substantially reducing the total purchase
cost to the U.S. government.  As an
integral part of any such expanded
purchases, monitoring should be put in
place (in both the United States and
Russia) to confirm that no new HEU is
being produced.
 
 Plutonium
 
 In the case of plutonium, the
essential first steps (beyond ensuring
that it is secure and accounted for, and
placed under international monitoring)
are to put in place the financing and the
additional reactor capacity needed to
implement the nearly completed U.S.-Russian draft agreement, and to carry out the
engineering and institutional steps needed to begin.35  As with HEU, however, there is
also a need to move rapidly toward disposition of additional material, and to consider
fallback plans if current approaches do not succeed.
 
 FINANCE RUSSIAN PLUTONIUM DISPOSITION.  Following on the lead Senator Domenici
provided with the $200 million down-payment for Russian plutonium disposition in the
fiscal 1999 budget, the United States should offer to cover the costs of disposition of
Russian plutonium, allowing this effort to finally move forward.  The $1-$3 billion cost is
small by comparison to the magnitude of the security stakes in eliminating Russia’s huge
excess plutonium stockpile.  To date, talks with other countries on sharing this cost have
made little progress—and the additional complication of involving more countries in the
process may be more than the contributions that can reasonably be expected are worth.
This funding would cover the construction or modification and operation of the facilities
needed to convert Russian plutonium weapons components to oxide, fabricate that oxide
into fuel, and irradiate that fuel in reactors.
                                                
 35 For a comprehensive set of next steps for excess plutonium, agreed by a panel of U.S. and Russian
experts, see  Final Report of the U.S.-Russian Independent Scientific Commission on Disposition of Excess
Weapons Plutonium, op. cit.
Uranium-plutonium mixed oxide (MOX) fuel pellets for
nuclear reactors, made from excess weapons plutonium.
The United States should offer to finance the costs of
disposition of Russia’s excess plutonium, as the $1-$3
billion cost of the project is small by comparison to the
security risk posed by this dangerous stockpile.
Source: Los Alamos
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 NAIL DOWN COMMITMENTS FOR ADDITIONAL REACTOR CAPACITY FOR DISPOSITION.  As described
earlier, the United States and Russia are negotiating a plutonium disposition agreement
that would ultimately require disposition of at least 4 tons of Russian plutonium per year,
yet with the approach currently envisioned, existing modern Russian reactors could not
irradiate more than 2 tons of plutonium per year, if that much.  The United States should
put redoubled priority on putting together a specific plan, and negotiating agreements
with all the relevant parties that would allow it to be implemented, within the next year.
This would include agreements on whether Russian, Ukrainian, Canadian, European,
and/or Japanese reactors would be used, and in what combination.  If that is not
accomplished, Congressional unwillingness to fund construction of U.S. plutonium
disposition facilities without a Russian plutonium disposition program proceeding in
parallel could cause the entire plutonium disposition effort to come unraveled—and it
would then be quite difficult, after years of delay, to convince a future Congress that it
was suddenly urgent to provide the funds needed to begin again.
 
 CONSIDERING ADDITIONAL APPROACHES.  There are several additional approaches to the
plutonium problem that deserve serious consideration:
• Pursuing alternative financing arrangements.  Convincing Congress to provide
full funding for disposition of Russian plutonium—or convincing other states to make
much larger contributions than they have to date, as the U.S. government currently
hopes to do—would require a substantial investment of presidential leadership.  If the
White House fails to provide such leadership, alternative approaches to providing this
funding that might involve less on-budget government expenditure will have to be
pursued.  One possibility would be to finance plutonium disposition with additional
HEU sales.  In one concept, for example, a joint venture between MINATOM and
various Western fuel cycle and construction firms would be established for the
purpose of building and operating the needed plutonium disposition facilities in
Russia.  MINATOM would provide this joint venture 100 tons of HEU (above and
beyond the 500 tons covered by the HEU purchase agreement), and Western countries
would agree to modify their uranium and enrichment trade restraints enough to allow
this additional increment of material could enter their restricted markets.  The joint
venture would then have an asset worth roughly $2 billion—enough to pay for
blending and delivery of the uranium, as well as construction and operation of the
plutonium disposition facilities.  The MOX produced would be marketed at prices
well below the prices paid by utilities for LEU fuel, to give the utilities an incentive to
take it—prices which would be sufficient to cover operations costs for fuel
fabrication, but not to pay back any of the initial cost of the plant.  By this means, it
would be possible to get rid of both Russia’s excess plutonium and an additional 100
tons of HEU, without the need for additional government appropriations.36  Another
approach would be to use revenue generated from commercial storage of spent fuel in
                                                
36 See Matthew Bunn, “Getting the Plutonium Disposition Job Done: The Concept of Joint-Venture
Disposition Enterprise Financed By Additional Sales of Highly Enriched Uranium,” in V. Kousminov and
M. Martellini, ed., Science for Peace Series Vol. 1: International Conference on Military Conversion and
Science: Utilization-Disposal of the Excess Fissile Weapons Materials: Scientific, Technological, and
Socio-Economic Aspects, Como, Italy: UNESCO Venice Office, 1996.
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Russia for disposition of excess plutonium (see “Generating New Revenue for
Nuclear Security,” p. 86).37
• Buying Russian Plutonium.  Although plutonium has no value on today’s
commercial nuclear fuel market, for national security reasons it would make sense to
explore with Russia the possibility of buying Russia’s excess plutonium.  Since
plutonium has the same energy value as HEU, but is more costly to actually use as
fuel, there would be no reasonable argument for a per-ton price any higher than the
United States is paying for HEU, resulting in a price of no more than $1 billion for the
50 tons declared excess to date.  The most plausible approach would probably be to
leave the material in Russia after it was purchased, in a facility owned and operated
by the United States; shipping it to the United States would raise extraordinarily
difficult political and legal issues in both Russia and the United States.  Wherever the
material was located, the United States would then have to pay the cost of storage and
disposition as well, which could add $1-$3 billion to the cost, as discussed above.  In
some public statements, Russian officials have indicated that Russia would never sell
its plutonium; in some private discussions, however, some senior Russian officials at
MINATOM and elsewhere have been willing to at least consider the possibility.
Because the United States has never made a serious effort to explore the issue with
Russia, no one really knows what Russia’s reaction to a real offer would be—and the
answer might depend substantially on how the offer was made, and details of how the
transfer of classified information would be avoided, and where the plutonium would
eventually end up.  A somewhat similar proposal is to offer a substantial financial
incentive, perhaps $10,000 per kilogram ($500 million for 50 tons) for Russia to
deposit its plutonium in a facility in Russia with international (rather than purely
national) guards and monitors, and, for reciprocity, have the United States deposit its
excess plutonium in a facility in the United States under similar arrangements.38  A
more radical idea is to set up a single facility in some third country, where all the U.S.
and Russian excess material—and perhaps excess warheads as well—would be
stored.39  Obvious obstacles to that concept include obtaining the agreement of
Russia, the United States, and the third country.
• Using MOX Plants That Already Exist. In Europe, large MOX plants already exist
that are fabricating civilian plutonium into fuel, and reactors are already licensed and
operating with MOX fuel.  If the complex political obstacles could be overcome,
therefore, by far the fastest approach to disposition of excess weapons plutonium
would be to ship both U.S. and Russian excess plutonium to Europe as rapidly as it
could be converted to unclassified forms, and have these existing facilities (which
                                                
37 For a proposal along these lines, see Matthew Bunn, Neil J. Numark, and Tatsujiro Suzuki, “A Japanese-
Russian Agreement to Establish a Nuclear Facility for MOX Fabrication and Spent Fuel Storage in the
Russian Far East,” BCSIA Discussion Paper 98-25, Cambridge, MA: Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University, November 1998.
38 For a description of this “plutonium bank” idea, see Ashton B. Carter and Owen Coté, “Disposition of
Fissile Materials,” in Graham Allison, Ashton B. Carter, Steven E. Miller, and Philip Zelikow, eds.,
Cooperative Denuclearization: From Pledges to Deeds, CSIA Studies in International Security No. 2,
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993.
39 See Brian Chow, Richard H. Speier, and G.S. Jones, A Concept for Strategic Material Accelerated
Removal Talks, DRU-1338-DOE, Washington DC: RAND Corporation, 1996.
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are now fabricating some 10 tons of
plutonium into MOX every year)
fabricate MOX from weapons
plutonium instead of fabricating it
from the civilian plutonium they are
scheduled to use.  This could be done
as a “plutonium swap,” in which
Russia and the United States would
effectively give the Europeans title to
the excess weapons plutonium, in
return for receiving title to the civilian
plutonium that would be displaced by
fabricating the excess weapons
plutonium.  Thus, Russia and the
United States (as well as the
Europeans) would each own just as
much plutonium as before—but the
plutonium owned by the United States
and Russia would be reactor-grade,
and stored in highly secure, well-paid
for facilities in Europe under
international safeguards, thereby
virtually eliminating both the risk of theft and the risk that it would be returned to the
U.S. and Russian arsenals, more rapidly than other schemes could match.  When this
concept was publicly broached by Senator Domenici, however, the Europeans
strongly opposed it (largely on grounds that it might disrupt their ongoing plutonium
recycling plans—though there is no technical reason why it need do so), and it has
never been pursued further.40  But if a significant level of U.S. leadership and some
money were put behind such a scheme, the outcome might be very different.
• Immobilization of Russian Plutonium.  Russia has refused to consider throwing its
plutonium away as waste, and therefore, except for some modest joint
experimentation on related technologies, there has been little serious pursuit of the
immobilization option for Russian plutonium.  But even more than in the U.S. case,
there are significant risks that the MOX track for Russian excess plutonium could fail,
making it critical to have a backup plan in place.  If the difficulties in finding enough
reactors to burn the Russian plutonium continue to mount, and the costs that would
have to be borne by the United States or the international community continue to
increase, immobilization may provide a cheaper and simpler alternative.  Given
official Russian opposition to any plan that does not provide them some benefit for
the “value” of their plutonium, perhaps the only possibility for immobilization to
move forward on a substantial scale would be for the United States to simply buy the
                                                
40 For a description of the basic approach, see Thomas L. Neff, presentation to the 5th International Policy
Forum: Management and Disposition of Nuclear Weapons Materials, March 24, 1998; for a press report of
the results of Domenici’s discussions with the Europeans on this subject, see Dave Airoso, “Finding
Europeans Disinterested, Domenici Gives Up on ‘Global Burn’,” Nuclear Fuel, July 27, 1998.
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plutonium from Russia (thereby gaining the right to decide what should be done with
it) and then pay to have it immobilized in Russia (which would probably be simpler in
a variety of respects than shipping it to the United States to become part of the U.S.
plutonium disposition program).  Given that Russia has an operational high-level
waste immobilization facility, and large plutonium weapons component fabrication
facilities that might conceivably be modified for plutonium immobilization, it is at
least possible that the combined costs of purchasing Russia’s plutonium and paying
for it to be immobilized would be the same or less than the cost of pursuing the MOX
approach as currently planned, and that possibility should be actively examined.41
Deeper Reductions in Fissile Material Stockpiles
Finally, reductions in these stockpiles need to go far deeper than either the United
States or Russia presently plan, if the goals of substantially reducing theft risks and
ensuring the irreversibility of deep reductions in nuclear arms are to be achieved.  The
quantities of fissile material the United States and Russia have declared excess to date
leave enough material in reserve to support a rapid return to Cold War levels of nuclear
armament (see “Enormous Excess Stockpiles—And Still Larger Remaining Military
Stocks,” p. 54).  If genuine irreversibility is to be achieved, new agreements will have to
address these “extra,” reserve stockpiles.  The United States and Russia should work
toward putting in place agreements to reduce their total stockpiles of nuclear warheads—
not just those deployed on active strategic systems—to low levels, and to reduce their
fissile material stockpiles to the levels necessary to support the agreed remaining number
of warheads.  As noted above, verifying the total stockpiles of warheads and fissile
materials will be a difficult task, requiring major breakthroughs in transparency and
openness.  This already tall order will be further complicated by the fact that Russia has
larger stockpiles of warheads, plutonium, and HEU than the United States, requiring a
shift from the equal reductions in plutonium stockpiles envisioned in the first plutonium
disposition agreement to the START concept of “reduction to equal levels, not equal
reductions.”
                                                
41 For a provocative discussion, see Adam Bernstein and Allison MacFarlane, “Canning Plutonium: Faster
and Cheaper,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 1999.
 V. CONCLUSION: A TIME FOR LEADERSHIP
Unfortunately, there is no single “silver bullet” that will address the myriad risks
to international security posed by the gigantic nuclear stockpiles and complex of the
former Soviet Union.  A broad “next wave” of new measures to reduce these risks is
needed, representing roughly a doubling or tripling of current funding for programs
devoted to reducing these security threats.  Such an expanded effort can only succeed in
close cooperation with the states of the former Soviet Union, who will have to play a
central role in its design from the very outset.  While important progress is already being
made in nuclear security cooperation with these states, at the current pace there can be no
confidence that a proliferation catastrophe will be averted, or the foundation laid for
transparent and irreversible nuclear arms reductions.
To reinvigorate these efforts with new initiatives, to make them work as a
package, to coordinate, prioritize, and integrate them into a strategic plan, and to
negotiate them with Russia and the other former Soviet states, will require a dramatic
increase in sustained leadership from the highest levels of the U.S. government.  Too
often in recent years, President Clinton has said a few words about the high priority of
these issues, and then has failed to follow through with the sustained commitments of
money, personnel, and political attention needed to get the job done.  President Clinton,
Vice President Gore, and their White House staff have allowed myriad other events to
distract attention from the fundamentally important task of ensuring that the essential
ingredients of nuclear weapons do not fall into the wrong hands.
There is still time to correct this situation—and if President Clinton fails to do so,
the next President must act.  In addition to a sea change in sustained presidential
leadership on these issues, two fundamental steps are necessary: the appointment of a
senior official with direct access to the President, with full-time responsibility to carry out
and coordinate these efforts, and the development of a strategic plan setting priorities,
targets, and timetables, and identifying the key synergies among the many efforts being
pursued.
A SENIOR COORDINATOR
The current organizational structure of the government, with programs scattered
through many departments and no senior leadership engaged on a daily basis at the White
House, is simply not suited to the task of managing this broad range of crucial
nonproliferation and arms reduction efforts.  Today, no one is in charge: there is literally
no one in the White House or anywhere else in the government with full-time
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responsibility for coordinating the many efforts described in this report—as opposed to
having this responsibility as one of dozens of other responsibilities.  Each project is being
pursued in its own little “stovepipe,” with only ad hoc (and frequently ineffective) efforts
at coordination with the many other related programs underway.  Effective and
coordinated action to reduce these risks will require designating a senior, full-time point
person for the effort, with appropriate staff and resources, and with both authority
deriving directly from and direct access to the President—on the model of former
Secretary of Defense William Perry’s return to government to reshape the U.S. approach
to the North Korean nuclear and missile threat, or even on the model of Gen. Barry
McCaffrey’s White House office leading U.S. anti-drug efforts.  It is crucial that this be a
full-time assignment, and not simply another in the myriad tasks facing the Vice President
or the National Security Advisor; otherwise, other distractions will inevitably intervene.
It is also crucial that such a coordinator have direct access to the President—both to give
the coordinator the ability to rapidly raise key policy matters for immediate resolution
when necessary, and to keep the President’s attention on these issues—and the authority
needed to get the job done.1  Preventing nuclear material from falling into the hands of
states like North Korea or Iraq is certainly no less critical to U.S. security than drugs or
the North Korean nuclear program itself; indeed, the entire global effort to prevent the
spread of nuclear weapons depends on it.
A STRATEGIC PLAN
The wide range of programs recommended in this report have many common
purposes; the potential for synergy among them is enormous.  Some programs require
nuclear experts, to design and build systems to secure, monitor, and reduce nuclear
stockpiles; other programs are seeking to provide jobs for nuclear experts.  Some
programs require facilities to process plutonium or uranium; other programs are seeking
to convert plutonium and uranium processing facilities once used for the weapons
program to new missions.  Many are dealing with the same Russian nuclear institutions
and facilities, often with the same individuals.  Mistakes made by one program will color
Russian attitudes and affect other programs, just as good will generated by one program
                                                
1 For a detailed discussion of the organizational problems facing nonproliferation efforts in the U.S.
government, see John Deutch (chair), Report of the Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal
Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Washington DC: July 14, 1999
(available at http://www.senate.gov/~specter/).  The Commission recommended a senior coordinator similar
to that recommended here, but covering all nonproliferation issues throughout the government; unless such
a coordinator had a substantial staff, comparable to the White House drug office, such a broad coordinator
might be swamped with too many critical issues to be effective.  From its earliest days, the Clinton
Administration established the office of Senior Director for Nonproliferation on the National Security
Council staff, and the holders of that position have significantly improved nonproliferation coordination
within the government—but they have too few resources for too many issues to be able to give the “loose
nukes” problem the attention it requires.  In late 1995, a new position of Director for Nuclear Materials
Security was created on the NSC staff, reporting to the Senior Director for Nonproliferation and the Senior
Director for Russian and Eurasian Affairs.  This position was mandated in a Presidential Decision Directive
to be focused exclusively on the issues addressed in this report, but in fact the holders of the office were
very quickly swamped with other tasks, and in recent years have spent the majority of their time working on
issues related to Russia’s nuclear and missile cooperation with Iran.
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may make it easier for another to get in the door.  While each of these programs has its
own unique circumstances, all of them face the common problems and obstacles endemic
to nuclear security cooperation with Russia.
Unfortunately, today these programs are being pursued individually, with very
little coordination among them, and virtually no systematic effort to pursue possible
synergies.  Officials at the U.S. embassy in Moscow report that it is not at all unusual to
have several teams from U.S. laboratories arriving at the same Russian nuclear facility in
the same week for completely different purposes, each unaware of the other’s trip until
they arrive.
Moreover, it is clear that not everything on this broad agenda can be done with
equal energy at the same time, yet there has been very little effort to identify which efforts
are the highest priorities.  Both Russian and U.S. officials working on these programs are
suffering from “initiative overload,” and are unable to keep track of all the important
efforts under way.  While there is some virtue in letting a thousand flowers bloom (with
the understanding that only a fraction will bear fruit), the need for a clear set of priorities
is becoming increasingly obvious.  A strategic plan setting such priorities and identifying
possible synergies among these programs should be developed urgently, and should be
coordinated closely with Russian officials.
There is much to be done to address the security risks posed by the deadly Cold
War legacies of plutonium and highly enriched uranium.  The cost of taking action now
to address this threat is tiny by comparison to the cost and risk of failing to act and
finding that the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons find their way into the hands of
terrorists or proliferant states.  The time for action is now.  Indeed, we cannot afford to
wait.
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